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Coastal management decisions are complicated. They involve an array of competing concerns, 
including environmental, social, economic, recreational, and property interests, and are 
inherently political. These decisions become even more difficult when interested groups use their 
political and economic leverage to influence the policy debate. The Bonner Bridge replacement 
project on North Carolina’s Outer Banks is an example of how this blend of politics, science, and 
competing interests can result in extraordinary complexity. This research project uses a 
qualitative case study of the Bonner Bridge replacement to explore how a bridge project became 
more about priorities and values than science and technical feasibility and how interested parties, 
acting through informal coalitions, strategically worked to shape the policy debate. In the 
process, we see how the replacement of a single aging bridge required 25 years of planning, four 
environmental impact statements, an environmental assessment, federal and state lawsuits, and a 
negotiated settlement before a single piling was put into place.  
 
Drawing on the policy process literature, this project applies aspects of the Advocacy Coalition 
and Narrative Policy Frameworks to a qualitative content analysis of the bridge project over a 25 
 year period (1990-2015). The analysis tracks the emergence and evolution of two distinct 
coalitions and compares their use of general and narrative strategies to influence the bridge 
debate. The project addresses an under-explored area in the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
literature by focusing on how coalitions act strategically to exploit an internal shock within the 
policy subsystem and contributes to the literature by exploring the intersection of the two 
frameworks. The research design addresses three different questions: (1) did the bridge project 
function as an internal shock; (2) how did the coalitions use narratives and strategies to exploit 
this shock; and (3) what roles did science and politics play in these narratives and strategies?   
 
The context for the case study, including the science of barrier island and inlet migration, the 
history, economy, and demographics of Hatteras Island, NC, and regulatory and legal 
considerations, is explored through a detailed case background and chronology. This chronology 
is used to designate five policy periods within the case study. The source materials are publicly 
available narratives and comments produced by coalition members and compiled from 
newspaper accounts, websites, guest newspaper commentaries, letters to the editors, and 
comments submitted on the various environmental impact statements. These comments were 
coded, both by hand and using NVivo software, to identify and track the coalitions’ key issues 
and both general and narrative strategies. These strategies and issues are compared between 
coalitions and tracked over time using the policy phases and case chronology.   
 
The analysis shows that the bridge project upset the status quo in the policy subsystem and 
triggered the emergence of two coalitions. These coalitions took distinctly different views on 
which issues were most important in the bridge decision and used different general strategies in 
 the debate. Both sides altered their strategies and issues in response to each other and changing 
circumstances. The coalitions’ narrative strategies indicated that they both perceived themselves 
as “losing” the debate. Finally, the analysis showed that the coalitions focused more on politics 
than scientific issues in their narratives.   
 
These results suggest directions for future research, including refinement of the idea of policy 
internal shocks (and related concepts), seconding calls for a hierarchy of coalition resources, and 
the need to develop a more fluid and dynamic understanding of “winning” and “losing” 
coalitions. While lessons from a single case study are not directly generalizable to other contexts, 
this project helps to refine aspects of two policy process frameworks. The case also offers 
insights into the interplay of science and politics and serves as a lesson in how individuals, both 
within and outside of government, influenced decisions in a high-stakes, high-visibility coastal 
infrastructure project.  
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 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
October 26, 1990 -- It actually was a dark and stormy night when Deputy Thaddeous Pledger 
floored the gas pedal on his patrol car, heading southbound across the Bonner Bridge. Through 
sheeting rain, he could see a set of oncoming headlights approaching the far end of the bridge 
more than two miles away. A shape loomed from the darkness on his left as he neared the high-
rise of the bridge. The dredge Northerly Island, nearly 200 feet long, had dragged its anchor in 
the strong coastal storm and was now beating against the bridge in the high waves. His 
headlights lit the white superstructure of the dredge, visible behind the bridge railing, as he raced 
past. With each wave, the hull pounded against the concrete pilings and the bridge shuddered 
beneath his tires. Deputy Pledger reached the far side in time to block the northbound traffic, 
before racing back over the bridge. Along the way, he stopped to pick up a man on foot, a 
Northerly Island crewmember who had clambered from the ship to the bridge as chunks of 
concrete began to fall onto the ship’s deck. Within minutes of Pledger reaching the northern 
shore, the bridge was visibly bowing to the side. With sustained northeast winds over 60 miles 
per hour, the six to seven foot waves sweeping from the Atlantic Ocean through the inlet 
relentlessly pressed the dredge against the bridge pilings. From the shore, law enforcement 
personnel watched a section of the bridge bend and sway. Pieces of the bridge deck began to fall, 
then entire spans. A small explosion lit the night as the collapsing spans severed the high-voltage 
cables beneath the bridge. Fifty-three minutes after the dredge struck the bridge, 369 feet of the 
Bonner Bridge on North Carolina’s Outer Banks collapsed into Oregon Inlet.  Bonner Bridge had 
fallen down.  
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Luckily, no one died that cold, dark night at the bridge. Deputy Pledger received the North 
Carolina Governor’s Award for Bravery and Heroism for his trip. He was the last person across 
Bonner Bridge before the collapse. One hundred and ten days later, he rode in the first car to 
cross the newly re-opened bridge. He remarked that he would have to “wait a while” before he 
felt comfortable on the bridge (Thiel 1991b). He was not alone in that feeling. The partial bridge 
collapse was considered a catastrophe by local officials and residents (Thiel 1991a). 
 
The bridge over Oregon Inlet, shown in Figure 1.1, is the only highway transportation route 
between North Carolina’s northern Outer Banks and the barrier islands of the Cape Hatteras 
National Seashore. The collapse stranded 5,000 residents of Hatteras Island and thousands more 
off-season visitors. Electricity and phones were cut off for a week while emergency cables were 
laid beneath the inlet. Visitors on Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands camped in their cars in lines that 
stretched for miles, waiting hours and even days for a spot on the ferries leaving for the 
mainland. For more than three and a half months, travel off of Hatteras Island required an hour-
long ferry ride through six and a half miles of zigzagging channel dredged between the inlet’s 
shoals. Every trip for medical care, commute for work, and delivery of groceries and retail goods 
required more than an hour on the emergency ferry. The limited access had a noticeable impact 
on Dare County’s tourism-based economy. 
 
In time, the bridge was repaired, the tourists came back, and life resumed its normal patterns on 
Hatteras Island. Yet the specter of the bridge collapse stayed with local officials and residents. 
Months before the collapse, the North Carolina Department of Transportation had begun 
planning for replacement of the aging bridge. When local officials and residents gathered to 
 3 
cheer the reopening of the repaired bridge in early 1991, they had no idea that permitting and 
funding concerns would delay the replacement for more than 25 years. As the bridge neared and 
then exceeded its designed service life, locals watched the series of repair projects and 
remembered the aftermath of the collapse. They had already learned a hard lesson about the 
vulnerability of their lifeline, a vulnerability shared to some degree by most coastal 
infrastructure. This experience shaped their opinions on the risk and urgency of the bridge 
replacement.   
 
 
Figure 1.1 Aerial Image of Bonner Bridge looking North, 2008 (Photo by NCDOT) 
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This dissertation uses the ensuing debate over the Bonner Bridge replacement as a case study on 
how interested groups use their resources strategically to influence policy decisions. During the 
bridge project, two different visions for the bridge design emerged: a short parallel bridge 
supported by elected officials and residents and a long bridge through the Pamlico Sound 
championed by an alliance of national environmental organizations. The Bonner Bridge 
replacement project, noteworthy for its length and complexity, provides insight into how coastal 
management and policy decisions were made in a complex, high-stakes situation in which 
regulations, science, economics, and politics combined to limit options, and choices came down 
to balancing values and priorities rather than science and technical feasibility. This case study 
will apply an under-explored aspect of a policy process framework to track themes, coalition 
coordination, and momentum shifts in the bridge debate that were obscured in the multitude of 
voices, forums, and changing events over a period of more than two decades.   
 
Difficult Problems and Difficult Choices 
 
The officials responsible for deciding how to replace the Bonner Bridge faced a difficult choice. 
Engineering and permitting issues reduced the debate to two options, a short bridge or a long 
bridge. There was no middle ground or much room for compromise. Advocates for the two sides 
were polarized, not only in their design preference but also in their perception of the problem to 
be addressed. For short bridge advocates, the issue was protecting lives and livelihoods by 
replacing the aging bridge quickly before it collapsed or was deemed unsafe for travel. Long 
bridge advocates took a long-term view, linking the bridge replacement with maintenance of the 
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road south of the bridge. The long bridge would bypass 13 miles of existing road through a 
wildlife refuge, including several high-erosion areas likely to open as new inlets in the future. 
Both sides claimed their preferred option saved money, either immediately or over time, a 
critical consideration given limited highway funding. Both bridges were technically feasible and 
the science of barrier island migration and erosion was largely undisputed. Ultimately, the 
decision came down to a choice of priorities, a valuing of some concerns as more pressing than 
others.   
 
Decisions about how to design and protect coastal infrastructure like the Bonner Bridge will 
always be difficult. A risk analysis may suggest that infrastructure should be moved away from 
coastal areas threatened by storms, erosion and predicted sea level changes, but this tactic of 
retreat often runs into political and social resistance to the abandonment of property rights and 
recreational opportunities (Beatley 2012). Coastal environments touch something deep within the 
human psyche and inspire impassioned defense of both the natural environment and society’s 
right to use it for livelihoods, recreation, residences and economic growth. When one group’s 
needs clash with another group’s desires, coastal decision makers face hard choices. These 
choices become more challenging if these groups leverage their economic and political power to 
apply pressure and exploit opportunities for policy change.   
 
Purpose of Research 
 
This dissertation explores how individuals and interest groups work to influence decision makers 
when a policy choice becomes more about priorities than science and technical feasibility. To 
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that end, it uses two frameworks from the policy process literature to examine how interested 
parties acted strategically through informal coalitions to influence decision makers. The research 
addresses an under-explored area in the Advocacy Coalition Framework literature by focusing on 
how coalitions strategically exploit opportunities for change caused by internal events in a policy 
system. Specifically, the Bonner Bridge was reaching the end of its service life and coastal 
conditions limited the replacement options. The bridge replacement created an opportunity for 
interested parties to influence the design and, potentially, the state’s policy on road infrastructure 
on the Outer Banks. This project draws on the intersection of the Advocacy Coalition and 
Narrative Policy Frameworks by incorporating narrative strategies into the larger analysis of 
coalition strategies.   
 
This case study also provides insight into the interplay of science, technical feasibility, and 
politics in complex coastal policy situations. For many coastal issues, the difficulty is not in the 
quality or quantity of scientific data or the technical and engineering feasibility. Instead, it is in 
reconciling scientists’ recommendations with the needs and wants of society. Politics are 
inescapable in policy decisions, including coastal issues. Decisions made today may be 
overturned after the next election cycle if policymakers become too unresponsive to their 
constituents’ needs and wishes. A careful examination of this single case can provide insights 
into how these tensions are balanced, or not, and what influences the choices of decision makers.  
These insights often are lost in large-n statistical analyses. Certainly, lessons learned in one case 
are not directly applicable in other places and contexts, but they can help coastal managers to be 
more aware of, and sensitive to, similar concerns and actions from their own constituents. 
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This research focuses on coalition exploitation of the policy change opportunity presented by the 
bridge replacement and whether the project was an internal shock (an event originating within 
the policy area which upsets the status quo and creates a possibility of policy change) (Jenkins-
Smith et al. 2014). The research also addresses the role of science and politics in the coalitions’ 
strategies.  
 
Research Question 1:  Did the bridge replacement project act as an internal shock to the 
policy area?  Could the bridge replacement be considered a potential focusing project? 
 
Research Question 2:  How did the coalitions use narratives and strategies to exploit the 
opportunity for change created by the bridge replacement?   
 
Research Question 3:  What roles did scientific data and political processes play in the 
coalitions’ strategies and narratives during the bridge debate? 
  
These questions are explored through the following chapters. Chapter Two reviews the literature 
underpinning this research project, including the public policy literature for the Advocacy 
Coalition and Narrative Policy Frameworks as well as potential focusing projects. Chapter Three 
describes the content analysis methods used for this research. Chapter Four introduces the case 
study and establishes the context for the bridge replacement. Chapters Five and Six present the 
content analysis findings, divided into five separate policy phases. The dissertation concludes 
with discussion of the findings in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
The case study explores an under-developed area in the literature concerning the strategies that 
coalitions use to exploit opportunities for policy change created by internal shocks, through a 
specific focus on the Bonner Bridge replacement project. The bridge replacement was a high-
profile project that had the potential to produce lasting change to North Carolina’s coastal road 
infrastructure policy. Beyond the ramifications for North Carolina, the project illustrates some of 
the conflicts and compromises that may arise in other coastal projects, including issues of 
funding, recreational access, safe and reliable transportation, permitting restrictions, and conflicts 
between state projects and federal protected lands. As the case study demonstrates, managing 
complex coastal problems can become a matter of priorities and values rather than objective 
rational assessment of long-term costs and benefits, creating a situation where politics outweigh 
science and technical feasibility. This helps explain how echoes of that stormy winter night when 
part of the bridge fell can be heard in politicians’ remarks and thousands of public comments 
submitted on the project two decades later.  
  
 Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
 
This project uses a case study approach (Creswell 2013; Stake 1995; Yin 2014) to explore how 
individuals and interest groups in the Bonner Bridge replacement debate acted strategically 
through informal alliances to influence the bridge replacement design. The research is grounded 
in the policy process research literature, using aspects of two different policy research 
frameworks to analyze coalition activity and policy change. This chapter reviews the relevant 
literature, opening with a general discussion of the policy process field, followed by a closer 
review of the Advocacy Coalition and Narrative Policy Frameworks used in this project. The 
chapter continues with a discussion of other policy process concepts that were incorporated into 
the research design, then concludes with a description of the framework synthesis guiding the 
research design.   
 
While the research design is described in detail in the next chapter, a brief summary is helpful to 
show how the literature links to the research questions and design. As an initial step, a source 
database was compiled from publicly available bridge replacement narratives found in 
organization websites, news coverage, guest commentary articles, and public comments 
submitted for environmental impact statements on the various bridge designs. These sources, and 
supplemental materials, were used to assemble a detailed case chronology and background. The 
source database materials were also sorted into two coalitions and coded to identify patterns in 
coalition narratives, strategies, and use of science. Finally, the coding results were compared to 
the case chronology to track how the coalitions’ use of narratives and strategies changed over 
time.   
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Politics and Policy Process Research 
 
As later chapters show, the bridge replacement project involved not only questions about bridge 
designs, but also about what relative weights should be given to scientific data and political 
priorities. This raises the question of what is meant by politics? Lasswell’s 1950 definition of 
politics as “who gets what, when, and how” is widely known, but this project instead uses 
Heywood’s (2013) description of politics as a means of resolving conflict “by compromise, 
conciliation and negotiation, rather than through force and naked power” (2013, p 8). There are 
many definitions of politics; this one was selected because it was a good fit for the policy process 
frameworks discussed below. Specifically, the frameworks describe how groups of people with 
shared policy beliefs strategically work together to influence decision makers, with a goal of 
shaping the policy outcomes to match their beliefs. This approach focuses on persuasion rather 
than force, which meshes with Heywood’s definition.   
 
This project adopts a view of the policy process in which policy decisions are the result of 
negotiation and the balancing of various interests. Here, balancing is used in the legal sense to 
mean the weighing of different interests against one another; this does not imply that decision 
makers find, or even seek to find, an equal balance. Some, or all, of the various interests are 
represented by advocates or interest groups, who seek to persuade a decision maker that their 
interests should be weighed more heavily than others. These advocates differ in their 
persuasiveness, resources, power, and access. The decision makers themselves are not neutral.  
Instead, they operate within a political climate, which Kingdon (2013) described as being shaped 
by the national mood, organized political activity by interest groups and influential individuals, 
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and the political make-up of administrations and legislatures. This political climate shapes 
decisions about what policy goals should be, what the acceptable means to achieve those goals 
are, and what trade-offs should be made in the process. In this case study, coastal management is 
typical of other policy areas in that it is inherently political. Coastal management policies are the 
end result of the struggles of competing interest groups seeking access to, or control of, limited 
resources (Beatley, Brower and Schwab 2002).    
 
The policy process often involves multiple agencies or levels of government (Theodoulou 1995). 
Policy process research embraces the broad and interconnected nature of policy issues. Emerging 
in the mid-20th century, this area expands beyond government institutions and federal/state 
divisions to also recognize non-government actors like grassroots organizations, organized 
advocacy groups, academics, and the media (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Policy process 
research incorporates elements of economics, sociology, history, law and public administration.   
 
Policy process research has been defined as “the study of the interactions over time between 
public policy and its surrounding actors, events, and contexts, as well as the policy or policies 
outcomes” (Weible 2014, 5). Policymaking is an ongoing and iterative process, with the output 
of one policy cycle serving as the starting point for a new cycle. Within the policy process 
literature, an array of competing and complementary theories has developed to address various 
aspects of policy change. Each theory has its own view on the relative importance of policy 
actors and events in producing policy change.  
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This project relies on two research frameworks that address, in part, the role of coalition 
competition in policy change. Before addressing those frameworks in depth, it is helpful to 
briefly examine the other theories of policy change that underpin those frameworks.     
 
As a usage note, theory is used here as a generic term that includes theories, frameworks, 
processes, and models. This is contrary to standard scientific nomenclature, but it is common 
practice within policy process research where lines between these terms are often blurred 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Schlager 2007). When a specific term is associated with a 
particular theory (e.g. Advocacy Coalition Framework), that term will be used. 
 
Theories of Policy Change 
One of the early models of the policy process was Easton’s (1965) systems model. This model is 
iterative, with policy inputs (e.g. public opinion, election results) feeding into a political system 
black box to produce outputs (e.g. regulations, laws). The political system influences, and is 
influenced by, the social, economic, structural and political environments. Policy process 
researchers have spent the past 50 years trying to pry open this political black box.   
 
The stages approach, derived from the work of Easton (1965) and Lasswell (1956), depicts a 
linear (and cyclical) series of stages in the policy life-cycle: (1) issue emergence; (2) agenda 
setting; (3) alternative selection; (4) enactment; (5) implementation; and (6) evaluation. In 
practice, the policy process does not follow clear steps but instead winds through feedback loops, 
stalled policies, and skipped or merged stages. The stages approach has been criticized as a 
simplistic top-down model lacking causal mechanisms, but it remains a prominent introductory 
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model (deLeon 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The terminology of the stages approach 
is found throughout the literature (Nakamura 1987), including the Advocacy Coalition (ACF) 
and Narrative Policy (NPF) Frameworks used in this project.  
 
Kingdon (2013) closely examined the agenda setting stage with his Multiple Streams Analysis 
(MSA). MSA elaborated on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model of 
organizational choice with an extended metaphor of the policy process as a set of three streams:  
a problem stream, a politics stream, and a policy stream. These streams are usually independent:  
politicians direct their limited attention to pressing issues; problem indicators rise and fall; policy 
specialists refine potential solutions. The streams may be aligned by focusing events (e.g. sudden 
unexpected crises, powerful symbols, politicians’ personal experiences) that open a policy 
window for an issue to reach the national agenda. MSA is widely cited, with other theories 
incorporating the three streams, policy windows, and focusing events concepts. The ACF, used 
in this research project, includes aspects of both policy windows and focusing events.  
 
Policy process researchers also have devoted considerable attention to analyzing how policies 
change over time. Lindblom’s (1959) incrementalism depicted policy change as a series of small 
incremental steps as policymakers respond to the success or failure of previous policies. 
Incrementalism incorporated Simon’s (1957) bounded rationality, a decision making model in 
which an actor’s ability to make purely rational decisions is limited by constraints on 
information, time, and ability to process data.   
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Punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) departed from incrementalism 
with an empirical demonstration that many policy fields experienced long periods of stable 
equilibrium interrupted (or punctuated) by periods of sudden change, followed by another 
equilibrium. The theory attributed the long periods of stability to a dominant interest group 
monopolizing the attention of boundedly rational policymakers. These policy monopolies could 
be disrupted if minority interests used external events or crises to reframe the policy issues in the 
public arena. These minority interests may also venue shop, shifting the debate to another venue, 
such as the courts or legislature, where they might achieve a better policy outcome (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993). If minority interests successfully mobilize to disrupt the policy monopoly, the 
policy may shift abruptly then settle into another long stable period with a new monopoly. These 
concepts all informed the development of the two frameworks used in this research project. 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
 
The mid 1980s and early 1990s were remarkably productive for policy research, with MSA, 
punctuated equilibrium, and the ACF being introduced within a decade. These new theories 
reflected dissatisfaction with the traditional view of policy as the domain of institutions and iron 
triangles (a closed system of bureaucracy, regulated interest groups, and agency) (Sabatier and 
Pelkey 1987). Instead, they described a messy policy process that moves in fits and starts 
(Kingdon 2013) and is largely dependent on chance, external events, and mobilization of varied 
actors (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).   
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Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, with backgrounds in policy implementation and policy analysis 
respectively, formulated the ACF to address perceived weaknesses in the prevailing policy 
process theories, especially in (1) the stages approach and (2) the role of scientific information 
and policy analysis in policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The ACF suggests that 
policy debates occur within policy systems (or subsystems) comprising individuals both inside 
and outside the government who are interested in a particular policy. These individuals 
informally coalesce into groups based on shared beliefs and desired outcomes. Each informal 
group, or advocacy coalition, uses its available resources in an effort to influence decision 
makers and shape the policy to match the coalition’s goals.     
 
The ACF is presented as a framework, or “shared research platform that enables analysts to work 
together in describing, explaining, and sometimes predicting phenomena within and across 
contexts” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 188). Multiple theories and hypotheses can be tested within 
this framework. Sabatier’s framework includes a scope of the questions to be considered, a list of 
underlying assumptions, a common vocabulary, concept categories, and expected relationships 
between those categories (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Such “frameworks are not directly 
testable but provide guidance toward specific areas of descriptive and explanatory inquiry” 
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 189). 
 
The ACF primarily addresses three areas: (1) coalition structure and changes; (2) policy change 
mechanisms; and (3) conditions that favor policy-oriented learning. The ACF includes seven 
fundamental assumptions about the policy process theory. The following descriptions are 
adapted from the most recent iteration in Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, 189-193):  
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1.   “The primary unit of analysis is the policy subsystem” (2014, 189). A policy 
subsystem is the community of individuals and groups who directly or indirectly try to 
influence decisions on a specific policy issue within a geographic area. The subsystem 
includes dozens or even hundreds of players in multiple institutions and overlapping 
jurisdictions. Over time, subsystems may experience stability, incremental change, and 
sudden change; 
 
2.   “Relevant subsystem actors are persons attempting to influence subsystem affairs” 
(2014, 190). Although the ACF is concerned only with individuals or groups who are 
actively involved in trying to influence the subsystem, it recognizes that this group 
extends beyond the iron triangle of bureaucracy, interest groups, and agencies to include 
non-profit and citizen groups, the media, academic researchers, and officials from all 
levels of government. Most ACF studies focus on policy elites, rather than the public, 
because of their perceived ability to influence subsystem affairs, but mobilization of 
supporters is recognized as a coalition strategy; 
 
3.   “Individuals are boundedly rational with limited ability to process stimuli, 
motivated by belief systems, and prone to experience the devil shift” (2014, 190). The 
ACF views individuals, not organizations, as the main drivers of change. While the ACF 
analyzes coalition activity, these coalitions are not monoliths. They are informal 
alignments of individuals who act, learn and respond to contextual factors. Individuals 
are limited in attention and have perceptual filters that bias how they process 
information. They are more likely to remember losses than gains and, over time, are 
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subject to the devil shift where opponents are perceived as having more power and 
malicious intent than in reality. Policy conflicts are difficult to resolve because they are 
rooted in conflicting core beliefs and often escalate over time due to the devil shift 
(Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
 
Individuals make policy choices based on personal beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). The ACF proposes a three-tier belief system for individuals: (a) deep core beliefs 
are fundamental norms and values that are formed early in life and are very difficult to 
change; (b) policy core beliefs are centered on the specific policy field and include basic 
beliefs about the seriousness of the problem, which interests should take priority, causal 
factors, and preferred solutions; while (c) secondary beliefs concern specific issues or 
instruments of achieving policy goals.  Examples of secondary beliefs are preferred 
language for an administrative rule or guidelines for permitting decisions. 
 
4.   Systems may be “simplified for analysis by aggregating actors into one or more 
coalitions” (2014, 191). These analytic coalitions are not necessarily formalized or 
acknowledged by the constituent members. ACF researchers often identify these 
coalitions using network analysis. Coalitions are based on shared beliefs and some degree 
of coordinated activity. The term coalition “is used metaphorically in reference to the 
individuals comprising the coalition” (2014, 190). 
 
5.   “Policies and programs incorporate implicit theories reflecting the translated beliefs 
or one or more coalitions” (2014, 192). In the ACF, policies are interpreted as “the 
 18 
actions or inactions of government but also as the translation of belief systems” (2014, 
192). Policy positions reflect beliefs in specific causal connections and alternatives. 
Coalitions become engaged in a subsystem not as abstract political jockeying but as an 
attempt to manifest their belief systems in real-world applications. 
 
6.   “Scientific and technical information is important for understanding subsystem 
affairs” (2014, 192). Coalitions use technical and scientific data to refine and bolster 
their understanding of subsystem problems, causal factors, and alternatives. Scientific 
and technical information may be used for persuasion as well as learning within a 
coalition. 
 
7.   A long-term perspective is important to “understanding policy processes and 
change” (2014, 192). The ACF suggests applying the framework in mature subsystems 
of at least ten years duration. While ACF researchers may focus on short-term processes, 
they should place them within the long-term policy trend to avoid over-emphasizing 
ephemeral phenomena.  
 
These ACF assumptions shaped the basic parameters of this case study. The assumptions on 
subsystems, actors, coalitions, policy beliefs, and long-term perspective guided the selection of 
the coastal infrastructure subsystem, identification of coalitions and members, and the time span 
of the case study. The analyses of coalition differences in themes and use of scientific 
information were shaped by the assumptions regarding bounded rationality and coalition use of 
scientific and technical information. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual relationships in the ACF. The policy subsystem is influenced 
by institutional and environmental parameters of the larger context. Relatively stable parameters 
are one set of inputs into the subsystem. These are the legal structure, physical and 
environmental attributes of the problem area, and the basic cultural and social context, which are 
inherent qualities of the subsystem and quite resistant to change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). The relatively stable parameters, when applied specifically to the policy subsystem, 
determine the long-term coalition opportunity structures. These structures determine the extent 
to which coalitions can influence the system. Examples include the openness of the political 
system, numbers of veto points, and degree of consensus required for change. Together, the 
relatively stable parameters and the long-term coalition opportunity structures determine which 
policy alternatives are feasible. These subsystem inputs were incorporated into the research 
design of this project as part of a detailed case background chapter. 
 
A second set of inputs are external subsystem events that are beyond subsystem actors’ control; 
these include significant socioeconomic changes, governmental regime changes, crises, major 
public opinion shifts, and ripple effects from change in other subsystems. These external events 
may create short-term constraints and resources that either temporarily take policy alternatives 
off the table or create new short-term opportunities for coalitions to exploit. Together, the stable 
parameters and external events determine the opportunities and constraints of the policy 
subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). At this point, we can see the basic outline of the 
ACF:  
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 (1) Coalitions form primarily around policy beliefs (Matti and Sandstrom 2011; Weible and 
Sabatier 2005); 
(2) A coalition exhibits some degree of coordination in its activities, using resources strategically 
to shape the subsystem policies; the goal is to make the policy reflect the coalition’s shared 
beliefs;   
 (3) Coalitions compete to gain access to, and attention from, governmental decision makers;  
 (4) Policy outputs and impacts from policy decisions feed back into coalition strategies and may 
lead to coalition learning.   
 
	  
Figure 2.1 Diagram of Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 202) 
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Policy Change in the ACF 
Coalitions seek allies and pool resources in an effort to influence policy change. Coalition 
influence is tied to the ability to effectively use resources and strategies. Key ACF coalition 
resources include “formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, 
mobilizable troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership” (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 203 
[list headings]). If a dominant coalition has allies with formal legal authority or has greater 
coalition resources, it will be difficult for a minority coalition to disrupt the status quo and 
induce change. In the ACF, coalitions cannot induce change without an intervening mechanism. 
Over the course of several framework revisions, four pathways to policy change have emerged 
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 202-203): 
 
1.   External shocks are disturbances outside subsystem actors’ control. External shocks 
are more likely to cause change if they coincide with an enabling factor (minority 
coalition exploitation of opportunity, coalition resource changes, increased 
political/public attention, and venue shopping) (2014, 202); 
 
2.   Internal shocks occur within the subsystem and may be affected by subsystem actors.  
Examples are internal scandals, policy failures, and policy crises. Coalitions may spin 
these internal events in an attempt to shift the policy balance. Internal events are more 
likely to cause change if they coincide with an enabling factor listed above; 
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3.   Policy-oriented learning has an enlightenment function (the gradual accumulation of 
information that modifies coalition positions over time) that may result in minor 
policy change over time. Policy-oriented learning may also be an enabling factor for 
internal and external shocks. Policy-oriented learning is more likely to change beliefs 
about secondary beliefs than core beliefs; 
 
4.   Negotiated agreement between coalitions may cause significant policy change. 
Coalitions are likely to negotiate in a hurting stalemate where there is high conflict 
and both coalitions are dissatisfied with the policy situation but do not have sufficient 
resources to induce change. 
 
This research focuses on the second pathway, using a case study to explore how coalitions 
exploit an internal shock to potentially cause policy change. While case studies have been a 
primary means of applying the ACF since its inception (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), 
internal shocks are a relatively recent addition to the ACF, appearing in the most recent 
framework revision (Sabatier and Weible 2007). There has been little direct research on internal 
shocks to date. Sabatier and Weible (2007) note that internal shocks could redistribute political 
resources, including public opinion and financial support. They suggest that internal shocks 
indicate policy failure and will strengthen the core beliefs of minority coalitions while casting 
doubt on the dominant coalition’s positions. Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) note that internal shocks 
must be coupled with an enabling factor, such as minority coalition mobilization, successful 
venue shopping, or heightened public awareness, to result in major policy change. They also 
suggest that minority coalitions may use “public narratives to attract attention to favored courses 
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of action” (2014, 202) and to recruit new actors who have not been actively involved in the 
policy subsystem.   
 
The ACF includes a number of hypotheses, one of which touches directly on the role of internal 
shocks in potential policy change (emphasis added):  
  
ACF Policy Change Hypothesis 1: Significant disturbances external to the subsystem, a 
significant disturbance internal to the subsystem, policy-oriented learning, negotiated 
agreement, or some combination thereof are necessary, but not sufficient, sources of 
change in the policy core attributes of a government program (Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014, 203). 
 
The ACF is clear that an internal shock alone will not lead to policy change: a minority coalition 
must be able to exploit the internal shock to redistribute resources and shift the power balance 
away from the majority coalition. This project addresses this point, tracking coalition activity 
over a 25 year span and comparing it to a case chronology to examine whether, and how, the 
coalitions tried to exploit an internal shock. Although the most recent ACF revision incorporated 
these internal shocks, the concept remains vaguely defined and little explored. Since the ACF 
literature is limited on this question, it is helpful to look beyond the boundaries of the ACF to 
understand what may constitute internal shocks and how they may be exploited. 
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Focusing Events and Projects 
 
Lowry (2006) proposed potential focusing projects (PFPs) as an extension of the non-ACF 
literature on external shocks. Perhaps PFPs could be included as a type of internal shock in the 
ACF. It is helpful to explore the origins of PFPs before considering their usefulness in this 
project. 
 
Many prominent policy process theories, including MSA, Punctuated Equilibrium, and ACF, 
consider external shocks to be a factor in policy change. In general terms, external shocks may 
disrupt a dominant coalition’s policy monopoly (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 2014; 
Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) and open the policy issue to venue shopping. The MSA (Kingdon 
2013) considered external shocks as a type of focusing event that could influence political agenda 
setting. Focusing events are crises and disasters, powerful symbols that gain public attention, or 
policy actors’ personal experiences (Kingdon 2013). These focusing events alone cannot trigger 
policy change but can reinforce preexisting knowledge of problems, serve as early warnings of 
policy failure, or provide a platform for a minority coalition to promote its policy message 
(Birkland 1998).   
 
Birkland (1997) analyzed focusing events as sudden unexpected crises that can shift policy 
issues onto the wider agenda. He moved beyond the MSA’s post hoc characterizations into a 
proactive identification of potential events that could, but may not, become focusing events in 
the right circumstances. He described this potential focusing event as an “event that is sudden, 
relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially 
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greater future harms” (Birkland 1997, 22). Birkland focused on agenda shifting after disasters, 
but did note that focusing events may indicate policy failures that advocacy coalitions could use 
to mobilize public attention. Noting that lessons learned from focusing events could contribute to 
policy-oriented learning and change, Birkland proposed an additional type of focusing event: a 
common event with an unusual aspect that captures attention (Birkland 1997, 147; Birkland 
2006).   
 
Lowry (2006) adapted this last category of focusing event to internal, rather than external, events 
within a policy system. Unlike Birkland’s sudden rare events, Lowry noted that some internal 
routine or planned projects within a policy subsystem “continue traditional policy system 
priorities but do so to what can be perceived as excess” (Lowry 2006, 313). He cited the example 
of a pair of planned dams in the Grand Canyon area in the 1960s. The dam proposals were 
consistent with previous government dam-building policy, but the cost and magnitude of 
potential harm to the Grand Canyon area mobilized a coordinated opposition campaign that not 
only blocked the dam projects but ultimately contributed to a major change in US dam policy.   
 
Lowry argued that PFPs provided opportunities for both mobilization of pro-change forces and 
policy learning within the groups favoring the status quo. The strength of this mobilization and 
policy learning influenced the degree to which lasting change was likely. In ACF terms, these 
potential focusing projects may act as internal shocks that present coalitions with an opportunity 
to mobilize for change. Focusing projects may also contribute to policy learning and change 
within the ACF.   
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The Narrative Policy Framework 
 
A central ACF premise about internal shocks and focusing projects is that they cannot cause 
change on their own. To borrow the terminology of the MSA, the policy window may be opened 
by an internal shock or project, but someone must be ready to seize the opportunity to shake up 
the status quo. Coalitions choose strategies to best exploit these opportunities. Strategies may 
include venue shopping, reframing the issue with narratives, and applying political pressure 
either directly or through public opinion.  
 
As noted earlier, Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, 202) suggest that minority coalitions may use 
“public narratives to attract attention to favored courses of action” and recruit new members. The 
Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) empirically analyzes (at the “meso-level”) how coalitions 
strategically use and alter narratives to influence policy outcomes. Recognizing that policy 
decisions are often based on factors that are subjective, context-dependent, and inherently 
difficult to study with traditional social science methodologies, the NPF seeks to bridge the gulf 
between empirical positivist and interpretive post-positivist policy research (Jones and Radaelli 
2015). As such, it occupies a middle ground between statistics and testable hypotheses on one 
side and subjective, context-specific research on the other. McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan (2014, 
225) assert that “the power of policy narratives is something worth understanding” and this 
understanding can be reached using structural and empirical methods. This project links the 
meso-level NPF narrative strategies with an ACF analysis to analyze policy narratives as a 
coalition strategy to exploit an internal shock.  
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Some aspects of the NPF are designed to dovetail with the ACF. The NPF emerged in the mid-
2000s as a deliberate response to Sabatier’s criticism of post-positivist policy research as being 
disconnected from testable propositions (Dudley et al. 2000). Early NPF research focused on 
how to quantify structural elements of policy narratives to empirically measure policy beliefs 
within advocacy coalitions (McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones 2005). After determining that policy 
narrative structures could be studied empirically, the NPF founders turned to demonstrating that 
coalitions use narratives strategically (McBeth et al. 2007). From this foundation, the NPF’s 
central premise is that policy narratives are context-specific in content but include “generalizable 
narrative elements that can be applied across policy contexts” (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 
2014, 228). The meso-level of NPF analysis focuses on how advocacy coalitions use narratives 
within a policy subsystem.  
 
The NPF founders presented the complete framework with assumptions, levels of analysis, and 
hypotheses in 2010. The NPF is built around policy narratives. Adapting Stone (2002), a NPF 
policy narrative includes four core structural elements that are generalizable and can be applied 
across policy contexts (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014, 228-229): 
1.   Setting: Policy narratives are grounded in a specific policy context and focused on an 
issue.  The setting includes physical location, legal and constitutional systems, 
sociocultural conditions, and economic conditions.  The NPF setting is similar to the 
ACF Relatively Stable Parameters; 
2.   Characters: A policy narrative includes at least one character.  Characters may be 
presented as heroes (fix the problem), villains (cause or worsen the problem), or 
victims (suffer due to the problem); 
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3.   Plot: The plot is the story arc of the policy issue that connects the characters with 
causes and events within the setting; 
4.   Moral: Policy narratives include a preferred policy solution. 
 
The NPF asserts that policy narrative content can be systematically analyzed to reveal the 
underlying policy beliefs and strategic choices. These belief systems can be coded using 
established deductive theories that aid in generalizability (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 2011). 
Beliefs and strategies can be extracted from their case-specific context and compared to other 
policy contexts. 
 
The NPF relies on several core assumptions: (1) NPF assumes an objective reality but 
acknowledges that individuals assign meaning to policy issues. This meaning is socially 
constructed and varies between individuals according to their values, norms, and belief systems;  
(2) narratives are central to how individuals process and communicate information; (3) narratives 
have generalizable structural forms independent of the policy context; and (4) policy narratives 
operate simultaneously at micro (individual), meso (small group), or macro (large group/society) 
levels (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014). 
 
Coalitions and Narratives 
The NPF addresses the “strategic construction and communication of policy narratives by 
coalitions to achieve a desired policy goal” (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014, 237). 
Coalitions use policy narratives that can be broken down into elements (setting, character, plot, 
moral), strategies, and policy beliefs. In this project, several of these building blocks were used 
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to compare narratives within and between coalitions and track how coalition narratives change 
over time.  
 
Coalitions strategically tailor their narratives to broaden the appeal of their message. The NPF 
draws heavily from Schattschneider’s (1960) work on groups and conflict in agenda setting. 
Following Schattschneider, the NPF asserts that coalitions see themselves as either winning or 
losing in a policy conflict and vary their strategies accordingly (McBeth et al. 2007). Coalitions 
that perceive themselves as winners try to contain the debate to the existing parties and maintain 
the status quo. Losing coalitions try to expand the debate to recruit new allies and shift the power 
balance. The NPF operationalizes these strategies by tracking narrative (1) depiction of costs and 
benefits, (2) use of symbols and surrogates, and (3) identification of winners/losers, (McBeth et 
al. 2007). In this case study, the coalition narratives were coded for the depiction of costs and 
benefits and the use of symbols and surrogates. 
 
Coalitions and the Strategic Use of Science 
 
The Bonner Bridge replacement project was inseparable from its physical setting, with barrier 
island and inlet migration processes shaping the range of replacement alternatives. Despite the 
relationship between island movement, storm processes, coastal engineering, and viable bridge 
replacement designs, it does not necessarily follow that scientific information similarly shaped 
the public debate. The ACF provides expectations about how coalitions use science in policy 
debates. The NPF notes that coalitions use science in narratives, but it does not discuss the use of 
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science as a specific narrative strategy. Accordingly, the research design for this project is 
informed by the ACF expectations discussed below. 
 
The ACF considers scientific information through the lens of policy-oriented learning. Science 
and technical information are part of the enlightenment function, where information gradually 
accumulates and alters a coalition’s understanding of the issue. Usually, policy-oriented learning 
alone will not change a coalition’s core beliefs. Core beliefs about a policy issue are deeply held 
and not readily susceptible to persuasion. Policy-oriented learning is more likely to change a 
coalition’s secondary beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The ACF also notes that coalitions use 
scientific and technical information to recruit new allies and buttress established positions. 
“[T]he crucial role of technical information is to alert people to the extent to which a given 
situation affects their interests and values . . . once political actors have developed a position on a 
policy issue, analysis is used primarily in an ‘advocacy’ fashion, that is, to justify and elaborate 
that position” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 45). 
 
A Synthesis of Coalitions and Change 
 
This case study synthesizes elements of the ACF, NPF and potential focusing projects to explore 
how coalitions strategically use narratives and strategies to exploit the bridge replacement, which 
may have served as an internal shock and potential focusing project. The ACF provides the basic 
framework for the case study. Coalitions compete with each other to influence decision makers 
and shape subsystem policy to match coalition beliefs. Coalitions are informal alliances of 
individuals united by shared norms, values, and beliefs about the policy area. Most policy 
 31 
subsystems have a dominant coalition and at least one minority coalition. The degree of 
engagement and competition between the coalitions varies with the level of controversy (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Coalition competition and policy-oriented learning typically cannot 
break the dominant coalition’s control to cause major policy change. Major change requires the 
coalitions to exploit external or internal shocks or negotiate an agreement to end a stalemate. 
   
This case study is a good opportunity to explore how Lowry’s (2006) potential focusing projects 
may function as internal shocks in the ACF. Internal shocks can heighten attention and offer 
coalitions a chance to re-frame the debate. “Critical in testing . . . policy change is understanding 
how a coalition can capitalize or exploit the opportunity, which ultimately involves attempts to 
either preserve the status quo or seek policy change” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 203). Coalitions 
can exploit an internal shock through strategic use of resources, narrative strategies, and venue 
shifting. The NPF provides an empirical framework for analyzing the coalitions’ use of narrative 
strategies. 
 
This synthesis of frameworks and focusing events addresses the research questions better than 
other policy process theories. Punctuated Equilibrium overlaps this framework synthesis in a 
number of ways, including interest group mobilization, issue expansion/containment, venue 
shopping, and policy images (how a policy is portrayed, positive or negative). Punctuated 
Equilibrium is highly regarded but lends itself to quantitative research on broader patterns of 
policy change rather than small qualitative case studies. Likewise, the Bonner Bridge project 
could be analyzed as a MSA policy window. MSA was designed to explore national agenda-
setting processes. The Bonner Bridge replacement is not an agenda-setting issue; the question is 
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not whether to replace it, but how. Given this difference, and the relatively small-scale of the 
project, a MSA approach would be possible, but would not be a good fit for the research 
questions. The MSA focuses on how the different streams intersect to get an issue on the policy 
agenda. In this case, the bridge was on the policy agenda because of obsolescence and 
transportation planning cycles. Certain concepts borrowed from MSA may be useful to the 
analysis, but the overall approach does not address the research focus on coalition strategies and 
narratives. Overall, the research questions seem to be best served by a synthesis of ACF and NPF 
analyses. 
Chapter Summary 
 
Policy process research takes a broad approach to the policy process, recognizing that a policy 
field may involve multiple levels of government and players from both within and outside of 
bureaucracies, agencies, and interest groups. The ACF focuses on policy change as the result of 
coalitions of individuals, loosely aligned based on shared beliefs and goals, competing to 
influence decision makers and shape public policy to match the coalitions’ values. Under the 
ACF, one pathway to possible major policy change is an internal shock that is skillfully exploited 
by a minority coalition, resulting in a shift of power or resources that leads to policy change. 
While internal shocks have not been widely explored in the literature, some insights can be 
drawn from the literature on policy windows, focusing events, and potential focusing projects. 
Aspects of the NPF provide a means to examine how coalitions strategically use narratives to 
exploit an internal shock in the ACF. A research design incorporating these concepts is explored 
in the next chapter. 
  
 Chapter Three:  Research Methods 
 
This research used a qualitative case study to examine ACF coalitions’ use of strategies and 
narratives to influence the Bonner Bridge replacement decision. These strategic choices were 
traced through (1) a detailed case chronology and (2) a content analysis of media coverage, 
advocacy materials, government agency materials, and public comments on Environmental 
Impact Statements. The source materials, gathered from publicly available sources, were 
inductively (emerging from the text) and deductively (derived from the literature) coded and 
analyzed to reveal patterns of coalition activity. 
 
Case Study Considerations 
 
Both the ACF and NPF frequently use case studies to explore how groups try to influence the 
outcome of actual policy decisions (McBeth, Jones and Shanahan 2014; Sabatier and Brasher 
1993; Weible and Sabatier 2005). This is not surprising, given that case study methods are useful 
for exploring the “how” and “why” of contemporary events that cannot be manipulated or 
controlled by the researcher (Yin 2014). Case studies allow a rich exploration of context, which 
both frameworks emphasize as playing a central role in shaping subsystem parameters, coalition 
membership, and narrative setting. The ACF literature has included qualitative case studies 
nearly since its inception. The NPF was designed with quantitative methods in mind, but one of 
the framework’s creators recently co-authored a qualitative variation on the framework (Gray 
and Jones 2016).   
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There are several major approaches to case study methods, with Yin (2014), Stake (1995), and 
Creswell (2013) some of the best known. This research relied primarily on Yin’s (2014) 
approach to the method. Yin describes a case study as an empirical inquiry that (a) investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within the real-world context, especially 
when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. He 
suggests that a case study is appropriate when there are (a) more variables of interest than data 
points, (b) multiple sources of evidence, and (c) existing theoretical propositions that may guide 
data collection and analysis (Yin 2014).   
 
This Bonner Bridge research project serves as both an instrumental and an exploratory case 
study (Hancock and Algozzine 2006; Stake 1995;). Instrumental case studies are used to explore 
a theory or research idea. Here, the Bonner Bridge project is useful to explore ACF and NPF 
theories about coalition strategies, policy change, and internal shocks. Exploratory cases are used 
to explore categories and concepts where little is known. The Bonner Bridge case allows 
exploration of the interplay of policy conflicts, hazards, and scientific and technical information 
usage in a complex and contentious coastal policy issue. 
 
Research Design 
 
A case study was used to analyze how coalitions used and altered strategies and narratives in 
response to an internal shock. The research design followed two tracks. In the first track, labeled 
Background Analysis in Figure 3.1, the detailed case chronology was assembled and used to 
track the evolution of the bridge project over time. In the second track, labeled as Coalition 
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Analysis, content analysis was used to identify and compare the coalitions’ narratives and 
strategies. The two tracks were consolidated in a final research stage where coalition activity was 
compared over time. The discussion below describes the research steps in the following order:  
•   Gathering source documents into source database (Step 1) 
•   Track A:  Background Analysis (Steps 2 & 3) 
•   Track B:  Coalition Analysis (Steps 4, 5 & 6) 
•   Tracking change over time (Step 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Diagram of Research Design 
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Research Step 1:  Gather Source Documents into Source Database 
An ACF coalition tries to shape the outcome of policy decisions within a subsystem by 
persuading decision makers and potential allies to view the policy issue the same way the 
coalition does. Many of these efforts play out in public forums or leave some visible trace in 
policy decisions. In this case study, the two coalitions used news media, advocacy materials, 
websites and public comments to communicate to their intended audience. These materials are 
publicly available and served as the source documents for the content analysis.   
 
 Step 1A:  Identify and Sort Newspaper Items 
Newspaper materials covering Bonner Bridge and NC 12 were identified using the “America’s 
News” database (maintained by NewsBank Inc.). This searchable database archives over 1400 
national and regional news sources, with coverage from 1978 to present. Table 3.1 lists the 
search terms and search parameters used to query this database. These search terms and 
parameters were refined during the newspaper database search. The initial searches were for 
basic geographic descriptors likely to be mentioned in any articles about the bridge. The results 
were reviewed for content, with additional searches performed for organizations and concepts as 
they were identified. This process continued until the searches returned no new results.  
 
Google searches identified three additional local news sources covering the bridge project to 
varying degrees: The Outer Banks Voice (online news outlet), Island Free Press (online news 
outlet), and Outer Banks Sentinel (online news outlet and weekly subscription print newspaper).  
The online archives for these three news outlets were examined, using search terms similar to 
those in Table 3.1, to locate news and opinion coverage of the bridge debate. Once retrieved, 
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both the local news and “America’s News” database articles were reviewed for content 
relevance. If an article contained at least one statement of opinion on the bridge project attributed 
to a named individual, it was placed into a source database for later analysis. If an article 
contained only factual recitations (no opinion or commentary) or was a duplicate article from a 
wire service (i.e. Associated Press, Reuters), it was excluded from the source database. Some 
excluded articles deemed useful for assembling the case background were retained in a separate 
data file for later use.  
   
Table 3.1: “America's News” Database Search Terms and Parameters 
 
Search Terms  
(used individually and in combination) 
 
 
Search Parameters 
“Bonner Bridge” 
“NC12” 
“Route 12” 
“Pea Island” 
“North Carolina” 
“Oregon Inlet” 
“National Wildlife Refuge Association” 
“Defenders of Wildlife” 
“Outer Banks” 
“Erosion” 
“Southern Environmental Law Center” 
“Pamlico Sound” 
“Dare County Commissioners” 
 
North Carolina newspapers 
national newspapers 
search dates: 1990 to present 
 
After sorting, the “America’s News” database yielded 325 newspaper items that (1) were 
published during the case study time frame, (2) fit the sorting criteria, and (3) were relevant to 
the case study. They included news articles, editorials, guest commentaries, and letters to the 
editor, primarily in major regional newspapers like the News & Observer (Raleigh, North  
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Carolina) and the Virginian-Pilot (Virginia Beach, Virginia). The local news sources yielded 25 
articles from the Island Free Press and eight from The Island Voice. The Outer Banks Sentinel’s 
online archives contained no relevant results.  
 
One focus of this research is whether the bridge debate acted as an ACF internal shock or a 
potential focusing project. Using the news articles and editorial coverage as a proxy for public 
attention, the items were sorted by year of publication and compared to the case background and 
timeline. The results, depicted in the next chapter in Figure 4.7, showed whether the activity 
patterns corresponded with those described by the potential focusing project or ACF internal 
shock formulations.  
  
Step 1B:  Identify and Sort Advocacy Materials and Websites 
The newspaper items identified in Step 1A were reviewed to compile a list of individuals, 
agencies, and organizations participating in the bridge debate. Google searches were performed 
on those organizations and agencies to locate their websites and social media pages. Additional 
Google searches were run for all individuals who appeared at least twice in the newspaper 
coverage to determine any agency or organization affiliations. Once located, the organizations’ 
and agencies’ websites and social media were searched to identify any advocacy materials 
related to the case study. Typical search terms were “Bonner Bridge,” “North Carolina,” “Pea 
Island,” “Oregon Inlet,” and “NC 12.” Once located and reviewed for relevance, these materials 
were added to the source database. Some materials were on now-defunct websites, with broken 
links available on other websites. When possible, archived versions of these defunct web pages 
were accessed through the Internet Archive (www.archive.org) using the broken page links. The 
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social media review did not produce any information that was not already in the database in other 
forms.  
 
Multiple Google searches were conducted at various times throughout the data gathering to 
identify any other advocacy materials, online petitions, blog posts or other data relevant to the 
bridge debate. These searches identified two online petitions and several posts on public policy 
blogs, which were added to the source database. 
 
 Step 1C:  Identify and Gather Public Comments  
The bridge replacement project produced six versions of Environmental Impact Statements and 
Environmental Assessments (EIS, EA), which are required for such projects under the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Once an EIS or EA is prepared, relevant state and federal agencies 
and members of the public are given an opportunity to submit comments during a public 
comment period. The public (including the organizations identified in Step 1B) could submit 
written comments or make oral comments during public hearings. The agency preparing the EIS 
usually transcribes the public hearings and publishes those transcripts and the written comments 
in the appendices of the final version of the EIS. All six versions of the EIS and EA for this case 
were located online or obtained from North Carolina Department of Transportation. 
 
Six public hearings on the bridge project were held (two each 2005, 2007, and 2010). Written 
comments were submitted in 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010. The transcribed oral comments and 
written comments were extracted from the EIS or EA Appendices and reviewed for content. One 
coalition organized a letter-writing campaign in 2010 that generated a large number of form 
 40 
letters, nearly one-third of which had unique comments appended. These unique comments were 
transcribed into a separate document. A total of 1,572 unique written and oral comments were 
added to the source database. These comments were manually tallied by source, coalition, and 
date for later analysis. The 3,147 form letters were counted and set aside, but not included in 
later analyses of coalition narratives, to avoid skewing the results. 
  
Track A:  Background Analysis 
 
Once the source documents were compiled, the research split into two tracks. In Track A, the 
materials gathered in Step 1 were supplemented with historical, economic, governmental, and 
scientific information to assemble a case background. This case background was used to 
establish the context for the case study, including the ACF subsystem parameters. These 
background materials were also used to identify a series of policy phases for later analysis.   
 
Research Step 2:  Assemble Case Background 
Using the news articles compiled in Step 1A, an annotated case timeline was created for the 1990 
to 2015 study period. The basic information from the news coverage was supplemented with a 
number of sources. For historical and legal background, information was gathered from federal 
statutes, executive orders, and historical secondary sources relating to the Outer Banks, Cape 
Hatteras National Seashore, and Pea Island Wildlife Refuge. Tourism and economic data was 
obtained from the State of North Carolina and Dare County, North Carolina. Scientific and 
technical literature regarding barrier island processes and migration was reviewed. Meeting 
minutes of the Dare County Board of Commissioners supplied local government information. 
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These materials were used to produce a narrative account of the bridge replacement, along with a 
detailed chronology. The narrative account and chronology are presented in Chapter Four. 
 
Research Step 3:  Identify Policy Phases 
The case background and timeline created in Step 2 were analyzed to identify key events in the 
bridge project. Based on this review, five policy phases were identified: 
•   Policy Phase One: 1990 – 2001: Initial planning phase.  Draft and final environmental 
impact statements on a proposed parallel bridge replacement are presented. The planning 
process stalls during agency permitting negotiations and the final planning documents are 
not signed. 
•   Policy Phase Two: 2002 – 2003: Changing coastal conditions require a new round of 
bridge planning. The parallel bridge plan is dropped and a 17-mile bridge design through 
the Pamlico Sound is designated for further study. This proposed bridge would bypass 
Oregon Inlet and likely eliminate road access on NC 12 through the Pea Island National 
Wildlife Refuge. 
•   Policy Phase Three: 2004 – 2010: Political pressure leads the North Carolina Department 
of Transportation (NCDOT) to add a short parallel bridge design to the environmental 
studies. Four additional environmental studies are prepared (3 EIS, 1 EA), each analyzing 
various versions of NC 12 maintenance designs. The short parallel bridge (including a 
provision to defer future NC 12 planning) is selected for construction. 
•   Policy Phase Four: 2011 – 2014: Environmental advocacy organizations challenge the 
environmental analysis in federal court. NCDOT wins at the US District Court. On 
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appeal, the Appellate Court issues a split decision and remands back to the US District 
Court for further analysis. The parties enter closed negotiations. 
•   Policy Phase Five: 2015 – 2016: A settlement is reached that dismisses the federal 
lawsuit in exchange for concessions from NCDOT regarding a future NC 12 bridge north 
of Rodanthe, North Carolina. Construction on the Bonner Bridge replacement begins.  	  
 
Track B: Coalition Analysis 
 
In the second research track, the source documents gathered in Step 1 were sorted by coalition 
affiliation and inductively (codes arising from the text) and deductively (codes derived from the 
literature) coded to identify coalition strategies and narratives. The coding strategy is described 
below. These coding results were compared to explore differences in coalition activity. 
  
Research Step 4:  Sort into Coalitions 
An ACF coalition includes “actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of 
government who share a basic set of beliefs . . . [and] who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, 
and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time” (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 5). This project does not directly address coalition formation and 
beliefs, which has been the focus of a considerable segment of the ACF literature. This research 
design instead examined coalitions’ strategic activities and policy goals, which are an outward 
public policy expression of underlying beliefs (Sabatier 1993).  
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For several reasons, including the legal framework, bridge replacement options were limited to a 
binary choice: a short bridge or a long bridge. Unsurprisingly, there were two coalitions active in 
the bridge debate. One coalition favored a short replacement bridge built parallel to Bonner 
Bridge (the Short Bridge Coalition), while a second coalition preferred a long bridge that 
detoured through the Pamlico Sound to avoid the Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge (the Long 
Bridge Coalition). Each coalition represented a distinct view of policy priorities and acceptable 
trade-offs. Following Albright (2011), Hysing and Olsson (2008), and Shanahan et al. (2013), 
coalition membership can be assigned based on stated policy positions. Here, coalition narrative 
statements (and their authors) were sorted into either the Long Bridge or Short Bridge Coalition 
based on the stated bridge preference.  
 
Research Step 5:  Identify Narratives and Strategies 
 Narratives 
The ACF and NPF present different views of narratives. In the ACF, narratives are regarded as a 
strategic resource through which coalitions attract public attention, but there is no formal 
definition (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The NPF views policy narratives as “words, images, and 
symbols” used strategically to influence the public, stakeholders, and decision makers 
(Shanahan, Jones and McBeth 2011, 536). NPF policy narratives must include characters and 
either a policy stance or judgment of policy-related behavior (Shanahan et al. 2013, 457).  
 
The collected narratives from Step 1 were grouped into three types, depending on their 
characteristics: 
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•   Complete advocacy narratives – narratives produced by coalition members and presented 
in their entirety without editing or filtering through a third party. These were primarily 
found in (1) organization websites, (2) guest opinion columns in newspapers, 
(3) editorials, (4) letters to the editors, (5) letters to political figures, and (6) comment 
letters. 
•   Statements to media -- narrative fragments in quotations or attributed statements in 
newspaper articles. These quotes have been edited or selectively chosen by news staff, 
but still express aspects of larger narratives. 
•   Written and oral comments -- submitted by coalition members and members of the public 
in response to environmental impact statements prepared by the government. These 
comments are presented in their entirety and have not been filtered through a third party. 
Depending on the source, they may range from multipage analyses to curt statements of 
concerns. They are found in public hearing transcripts and environmental impact 
statements appendices. 
 
Appendix A includes the coding manual for the narrative classification. The entire set of source 
narratives was classified as general (ACF) narratives, and then was reviewed to identify those 
also qualifying as NPF narratives. Statements to media and oral comments were excluded from 
the NPF narrative set on the grounds that they were either edited or extemporaneous and may not 
have accurately presented the coalition position. The remaining set of complete advocacy 
narratives and written comments were examined using the NPF narrative criteria. If the required 
elements were present, the narrative was designated as an NPF narrative. The narrative 
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classification resulted in 1,837 general narratives, with 146 sources also classified as NPF 
narratives.   
 
Strategies 
  General (ACF) Strategies 
Coalition strategies are somewhat of an enigma in the ACF. Coalitions are presumed to act 
strategically, but the literature is inconsistent on defining those strategies. Following Pierce 
(2016) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), a list of likely coalition strategies, tailored to the 
case study, was created:   
 
•   Submission of formal written or oral comments on environmental impact studies 
•   Lobbying and recruiting local, state, and federal political figures 
•   Lobbying of agency staff to act upon regulatory “veto points” 
•   Public outreach through regional media - newspaper editorials, guest commentaries, and 
letters to the editor 
•   Public outreach through local media 
•   Public outreach with narrative statements posted to organization websites 
•   Public mobilization through letter writing campaigns 
•   Appealing through administrative or regulatory channels 
•   Litigation 
 
The case background, chronology, and source database materials were used to identify the 
strategies for each coalition. Some strategies were readily apparent, such as local media outreach, 
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while other strategies were inferred from the circumstances. For example, when multiple 
politicians began expressing support for a coalition around the same time, it was inferred that the 
coalition had been lobbying and recruiting political figures. The results for each coalition were 
compared against each other as well as over time, to track how the coalitions adjusted their 
strategies in response to each other and changing circumstances.   
 
As the source narratives were read for content and strategies, they were also coded for the use of 
science. If the narrative explained scientific processes or issues, such as barrier island migration, 
in some degree of detail, it was coded as “detailed science.” If the narrative mentioned science, 
but only used cursory explanations, such as saying that “the long bridge is better because it 
avoids high-erosion areas and allows for natural barrier island movement,” it was coded as “brief 
science.” A narrative that did not mention scientific issues was coded as “no science.” 
 
  NPF Narrative Strategies 
The NPF views narrative strategies as the deliberate construction of narratives to achieve a goal 
(Shanahan et al. 2013). Following Schattschneider (1960), the NPF suggests that coalitions will 
attempt to expand or contain the policy debate by depicting a policy as creating either (1) diffuse 
costs and concentrated benefits, or (2) concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. To measure this 
strategy, the NPF narratives were hand coded for their identification of issues and depiction of 
costs and benefits. First, each NPF narrative was coded by date and issues discussed. Second, the 
narrative’s depictions of costs or benefits were coded, using inductively derived codes drawn 
from the text itself. Using a generic example, a narrative stating “a proposed policy would cause 
damage to seagrass beds and the opposing coalition supports the policy because it would raise 
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land values for local real estate developers” would be classified as “benefitting property 
developers” (benefit) and “harming habitat and the environment” (cost). Frequently, these 
depictions described the groups or individuals who would suffer the cost or reap the benefit, 
rather than explicitly stating what the cost or benefit was. In those instances, the losers (suffer the 
cost) were coded as a “cost” and the winners (reap the benefit) were coded as “benefit.” The 
frequency of use for each code was calculated and sorted by both coalition and date for later 
analysis.  
 
Table 3.2 lists the cost/benefit codes derived from the NPF narratives in this case study. Each of 
these cost/benefit codes was labeled as “concentrated” or “diffuse” depending on whether it 
described (1) a small group or people or an issue of very limited interest or effect (concentrated) 
or (2) a large group of people or an issue of general widespread interest or effect (diffuse).  
Interestingly, all costs were diffuse and all benefits were concentrated. 
 
Table 3.2: Categories of Costs and Benefits Described in NPF Narratives. 
 
Cost Categories 
 
 
Benefits Categories 
 
recreation  
residents’ welfare  
reliable transportation access  
Refuge access  
taxpayers  
economy  
safety  
visitors  
habitat and wildlife  
tourism  
island processes & integrity 
 
 
environmental groups  
Refuge management  
limited Refuge access  
property owners or developers  
businesses  
NCDOT  
political goals  
off-road vehicle access  
USFWS  
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Research Step 6:  Coding and Comparison 
Coding 
The narratives were coded both by hand (first coding pass) and using NVivo qualitative analysis 
software (second coding pass). The two coding passes are described below.  
 
The first coding pass was preliminary, using the 119 news articles in the source database to 
compile a list of issues and concerns. This coding used descriptive codes derived from the text 
itself. This preliminary pass yielded a list of 169 topics, which were then grouped by theme and 
consolidated into eight anticipated codes for the next round of coding. These anticipated codes 
were: (1) safety; (2) feasibility; (3) potential benefits/harms; (4) politics; (5) natural processes; 
(6) cost; (7) time; and (8) permitting issues.    
 
The second coding pass used NVivo data analysis software to inductively code the entire source 
database for these eight anticipated codes and any other emergent descriptive codes. This 
emergent coding produced 21 content codes (Table 3.3). In addition to coding for content, every 
source was coded for demographics as follows: 
•   Coalition Membership: Long Bridge, Short Bridge, Unclear 
•   Document Type:  newspaper (by name), editorial, guest commentary, letter to editor, blog 
•   Speaker:  resident, visitor, organization, agency, local officials, higher elected officials, 
NCDOT, scientist  
•   Date:  year of publication, policy phase 
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Table 3.3: Content Codes from Second Coding Pass 
 
agency influence 
barrier island processes 
common sense 
cost 
design features 
economy 
engineering solutions 
environmental concerns 
environmentalists and lawyers 
long-term versus short-term planning 
navigation and inlet issues 
 
 
other 
Pea Island access 
outsiders 
permitting issues 
place attachment and heritage 
reliability 
safety 
time 
transportation 
uncertainty 
 
Comparison 
After the narratives were coded for demographics and content, they were grouped by coalition to 
compare how the narratives differed in their assessment and depiction of the issues at stake in the 
bridge decision. Using NVivo, the 21 content codes from the second coding pass were ranked by 
how frequently they were used in the source narratives. One code, labeled “Other” was a catch-
all code for topics like bicycle lanes or ferries that appeared sporadically but were tangential to 
the larger debate. Many of the speakers in this code were not members of a bridge coalition. 
Given the variety of topics and diverse speakers, this code was set aside from further coalition 
analysis, leaving 20 codes. Ten of these codes were used frequently (range of frequencies: 92 to 
446), with the remaining ten used less frequently (range: 11 to 57). The ten most frequent codes 
were used for the comparative analysis: (1) safety; (2) time; (3) transportation; (4) reliability; (5) 
Pea Island access; (6) opponents (environmentalists and lawyers); (7) economy; (8) cost; (9) 
barrier island processes; and (10) agency influence.  
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The NVivo Query function, which allows a user to search for source content where coding 
categories coincide, was used to compare how the two coalitions differed in their use of the ten 
most common codes. For instance, a query was used to return all text that was coded for both the 
“Short Bridge Coalition” and “safety.” The results were compared against a similar query for the 
“Long Bridge Coalition” and “safety.” The comparison not only showed the differences in 
frequency of use, but allowed the query returns to be reviewed to reveal whether the coalitions 
described “safety” differently. Each of the ten codes was queried for both the Long Bridge 
Coalition and Short Bridge Coalition.   
 
A second set of queries was run to compare each coalition with source and format types. These 
queries contributed to the strategy analysis by showing whether one coalition relied more heavily 
on one category of speaker or forum than another in its narratives. For example, the results of 
querying each coalition with “guest commentary,” compared against the base coding data for 
each coalition, showed that the Long Bridge Coalition relied more heavily on newspaper guest 
commentaries than did the Short Bridge Coalition.  
 
Research Step 7:  Track Change over Time 
In the final research step, the data from the coalition comparison was combined with the 
chronology and policy phases (Step 3) to track how the coalition narratives changed over time. A 
final set of NVivo queries was run to search the coded narratives with the five Policy Phases. For 
example, “Long Bridge Coalition” was queried with “Policy Phase 4” to identify the narratives 
produced by the Long Bridge Coalition between 2011 and 2014. Queries using three codes (e.g. 
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“Short Bridge Coalition” x “Policy Phase 3” x “safety”) were run to track and compare how each 
coalition’s narrative focus changed over time.  
 
The coding and query results were compared with the chronology to track how the topics and 
tone of the coalition narratives changed in response to changing events and opponents’ efforts. 
The NPF strategy coding results from Step 5 were compared between coalitions and over time to 
demonstrate how the coalitions strategically tried to expand or contain the issue in response to 
their perceptions that they were winning or losing the debate. The general ACF narratives were 
also compared over time, both between and within the coalitions. 
 
Rigor and Validity Considerations 
 
A necessary consideration with case studies, as with qualitative research in general, is the rigor 
and validity of the research. Yin suggests that research validity is relative to the researcher’s 
stance on the nature of reality and knowledge, noting that the question is “whether another study, 
given the same lens or orientation, would have collected the same evidence and have drawn the 
same conclusions” (2014, 79). Yin (2014) suggests four data collection principles to ensure 
transparency and consistency. First, triangulation by drawing on different sources or methods can 
produce converging lines of inquiry. Here, the research method uses both inductive and 
deductive coding techniques and a wide range of document sources and perspectives, including 
newspapers, press releases, editorials, public hearings, organization website pages, and written 
public comments.   
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Second, Yin suggests maintaining an evidentiary database that can be used to reconstruct the 
research. Here, all source material is publicly available on the Internet. The author maintains a 
database of downloaded digital copies of all source materials. Using the search parameters 
described above, the database could be reconstructed by another researcher. Third, Yin advised 
keeping a chain of evidence to support specific findings. This research relies on content analysis 
based on coding of source material. The codebook was informed by the literature and adapted for 
the case context. The codebook, along with the literature sources it relied upon, is available in 
Appendix A. Finally, Yin advised taking care to establish the trustworthiness of electronic 
sources. All data sources are coalition comments or narratives by groups or individuals presented 
in a public forum with the intent of persuading either decision makers or the public. As such, 
they are reliable representations of coalition narratives. All source material was obtained from 
archived newspaper stories, organization websites, or government documents.   
 
This research aims for analytic generalization rather than direct generalization. Qualitative case 
study research is context-dependent and cannot be directly generalized to other cases. Analytic 
generalization seeks to generalize particular case results to a broader theory, rather than to other 
cases or situations. Analytic generalization requires clear specification of research conditions and 
theoretical relevance (Firestone 1993). The goal is to “provide evidence that supports (but does 
not definitively prove) [the] theory” (Firestone 1993, 17). Case study research may provide 
transferability, where rich case description allows a reader to use results of one case to inform 
research in similar cases (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2009).  
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Chapter Summary 
 
The research method used a source database of newspaper and coalition advocacy materials 
(Step 1) as the foundation for two tracks of research. The media news and opinion items in the 
source database were also plotted over time to identify activity patterns. In Track A (Figure 3.1), 
the background material was compiled (Step 2) to establish the case study context and inform the 
analysis of coalition strategies and use of science. This material was used to identify policy 
phases (Step 3) that would be used in the later comparative analyses. In the second track (Track 
B), the source database materials were sorted into coalitions (Step 4), then coded for narrative 
themes and strategies (Step 5), and compared against each other (Step 6). The two tracks 
converged in the final research stage (Step 7), where the coalition narratives and strategies were 
tracked against the case timeline and policy phases to show how they changed over time.  
 
These research steps combined into a research method that addressed the research questions. The 
first research question concerned whether the bridge project acted as an internal shock or 
potential focusing project. In Step 1, news coverage was plotted over time and compared to the 
case background to determine whether the case study aligned with the ACF internal shock or 
PFP formulations. The second research question focused on how the coalitions used narratives 
and strategies to exploit the opportunity presented by the bridge project. This question was 
addressed by identifying strategies in Track A and inductively and deductively coding narratives 
in Track B, then comparing and tracking those strategies and narratives both within and between 
coalitions in Step 6. Finally, the last research question addressed the role of science and politics 
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in the bridge debate. The coalitions’ use of science was coded in Step 5, and then compared with 
the use of political strategies throughout the case study.    
  
 Chapter Four:  Case Background 
 
Before delving into coalition activity in the Bonner Bridge debate, it is essential to establish the 
context for the debate. The policy context determines why coalitions take particular positions, 
what options they have in pursuing those positions, and what compromises they are willing to 
make. The ACF literature clearly emphasizes the importance of thoroughly establishing the 
background of a policy debate (Sabatier 1993). 
 
In confronting a policy issue, coalition strategies are limited by the Relatively Stable Parameters, 
including the basic features of the problem, social values and structure, legal limitations, 
economic system, and resource distribution (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). These elements 
determine the limits of potential coalition actions (Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structures). 
Coalitions may desire policy goals that are constitutionally prohibited, contrary to statutory or 
regulatory requirements, unreasonably expensive, or inconsistent with prevailing social values. 
Promoting these goals would waste limited coalition resources. Instead, coalitions tailor their 
goals and strategies to reflect what is both legally permissible and politically and economically 
feasible.  
 
The Bonner Bridge replacement is part of ongoing debate on the long-term maintenance of North 
Carolina Highway 12 (NC 12) along the Outer Banks. This debate occurs within a larger coastal 
infrastructure and development policy subsystem. Although NC 12 permitting and project 
concurrence involves federal agencies, this case study is focused at the state level where the 
construction, maintenance, and funding decisions are made.  
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The Bonner Bridge and NC 12 debate touches on nearly every issue of US coastal management, 
including development, infrastructure, hazard response, shoreline and inlet processes, tourism, 
habitat, navigation, recreational access, and economics. The road lies within multiple 
jurisdictions that require an array of approvals and permits from both state and federal agencies. 
The combination of these competing interests with a dynamic barrier island that changes with 
every storm creates a policy environment where the replacement of a bridge universally agreed 
to have exceeded its design life required twenty-five years, five environmental impact 
statements, an environmental assessment, both federal and state lawsuits, a federal appellate 
ruling, mediation, and settlement negotiations before a single piling was driven into place. 
 
How did a single bridge project become so complicated? With the range of environmental, 
social, economic, legal, and political concerns involved, it is difficult to identify a thread that 
will unravel the issues. A trip over Bonner Bridge and down Hatteras Island yields one 
inescapable truth:  setting is everything. The experience of being on that narrow strip of sand 
between ocean and sound draws millions of tourists to the Outer Banks every year. Without the 
remarkable setting, there would be little need for a transportation corridor adequate to handle 
summer traffic. There would be no need for the National Seashore and Wildlife Refuge that 
protects the setting but complicates jurisdictional issues. In an ironic note, the physical setting 
that draws the visitors and residents is fundamentally unsuitable for the development and 
infrastructure needed to accommodate them. The road and bridge are stationary objects on 
islands that shift in response to natural conditions. The struggle to hold a fixed line of 
development on naturally moving islands threatens both engineered structures and the islands 
themselves.  
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The tension between residential/commercial development and natural barrier island migration 
processes is at the heart of the Bonner Bridge debate. Without access to the physical setting, the 
tourists would not come. Without the tourist influx each year, one of the state’s strongest tourism 
economies would be destroyed. The infrastructure to support the residents and tourists threatens 
the physical setting. The decision on how to replace Bonner Bridge and the long-term future of 
NC 12 rests on balancing these issues. This chapter explores each of these issues in turn, 
beginning with a discussion of barrier island processes on Hatteras Island, followed by a review 
of the development of NC 12 and the economic and social aspects of the modern Outer Banks. 
The chapter then turns to the legal restrictions on the bridge project, starting with the National 
Seashore and Refuge, their relationship with NCDOT on NC 12 maintenance, and larger 
environmental permitting issues. The chapter concludes with a chronology of the Bonner Bridge 
since its construction in the 1960s. Together, these elements establish the context that shaped the 
coalition strategies explored in the following chapters. 
 
Barrier Island Processes  
 
The Outer Banks 
The Outer Banks of North Carolina are a well-known example of barrier islands in the United 
States. Barrier islands, like other coastal barrier features, protect estuaries or lagoons from the 
wave action of the open ocean. They are long narrow islands with inlets at either end to allow 
water flow into and out of the estuary. The barrier islands found along the US eastern seaboard 
make up the longest and most well-developed barrier island system in the world (Leatherman 
1988). North America's east coast is a “trailing edge coast” with broad coastal plains and wide 
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continental shelves (Numedal 1983). The Outer Banks likely formed over a period of several 
thousand years as rising sea level flooded behind ridges along ancient shorelines following the 
last glacial period. They have existed in something resembling their current form for 
approximately 2,500 years, although some areas have collapsed, reformed and changed in 
intervening centuries (Riggs et al. 2008).  
 
An aerial view of the Outer Banks is striking, with a thin ribbon of sandy islands sheltering the 
Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. Together, these sounds cover approximately 2,550 square miles. 
The broad and shallow Pamlico Sound, which borders most of the central Outer Banks, is 
roughly 25 miles wide and 50 miles long, with an average depth of ten feet (Dolan and Glassen 
1973). While many inlets have opened and closed over time, the current stretch of barrier islands 
from southern Virginia to Cape Hatteras features a single inlet, Oregon Inlet (Figure 4.1). This 
case study focuses on NC 12 on Hatteras Island in the central section of the Outer Banks. The 
northern end of Hatteras Island is also known as Pea Island, reflecting an earlier period when a 
now-closed inlet divided Hatteras Island.  
  
In morphological terms, the central Outer Banks are microtidal, transgressive, simple barrier 
islands. In layman’s terms, they are long, low and narrow islands that experience frequent storm 
overwash. The Outer Banks experience a small tidal range (two to four feet), allowing wave 
energy to dominate island shape and movement. As transgressive islands, they have low supplies 
of available sand and experience rapid shoreline retreat (Leatherman 1988).   
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Figure 4.1: Oregon Inlet and Northern Hatteras Island (NCDOT 2008) 
 
Hatteras Island is a classic example of this type of barrier island. Roughly 50 miles in length, 
Hatteras Island averages around a mile in width but dwindles to around 600 feet at its narrowest 
spots. The island is low and sandy with a vegetated and engineered dune line. Hatteras Island is 
bordered by Oregon Inlet to the north and Hatteras Inlet to the south. When viewed as a 
generalized cross-section, Hatteras Island has an ocean beach subject to wave action, an 
engineered dune line, a barrier flat, and a tidal marsh along the sound side. Figure 4.2 shows a 
generalized simple barrier island cross-section. This low flat topography is subject to ocean 
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overwash when storms breach the dune line. This overwash, along with inlet processes, is an 
essential part of natural barrier island migration. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Cross Section of Simple Barrier Island (USGS n.d.) 
 
Over the last century, Hatteras Island has experienced significant engineered alterations, which 
have disrupted island migration. To understand the situation on Hatteras Island, we need to first 
examine unaltered barrier island processes. If left in a natural state, a microtidal, transgressive 
barrier island migrates both landward and in the direction of the longshore current (Numedal 
1983). This retreat preserves island width and elevation in response to storm action and rising sea 
level. While every barrier island reflects its unique geographic conditions, a generalized model 
of barrier island migration can be described. 
 
General Barrier Island Migration 
Ocean overwash is a key feature of landward movement. During storm events, high waves move 
between and over the dunes, eroding both the beach and dunes and carrying sand landward into 
the barrier flats. In higher-energy storms, this overwash may continue over to the tidal marshes 
on the sound side of the island. As the water retreats, the sand deposited by this overwash 
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produces distinctive features called overwash fans (Figure 4.3). This movement of sand from the 
beach to the island interior builds elevation. Native vegetation holds this deposited sand and 
contributes to new dune growth. Overwash sand that is transported into and beyond the 
soundside marsh builds elevation and allows marsh vegetation to begin colonizing shallow 
water. As the ocean beach erodes, the island builds elevation and expands on the soundside. In 
this manner, the island can maintain its width by very gradually moving landward while also 
building island elevation against rising sea level (Godfrey 1976).  
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Overwash Deposits on Hatteras Island (Google Maps) 
 
 
Overwash contributes significantly to island migration, but inlets provide the majority of 
sediment transport necessary for migration (Dolan and Glassen 1973). Inlets are highly dynamic 
components of barrier island systems. They are very unpredictable, opening during storm events 
and closing as they become choked with sand. Inlets typically form when storms drive water into 
the estuary behind a barrier island. The wind-driven water backs up within the estuary as the 
storm approaches and then is driven back out as the storm exits. If the existing inlets are 
overwash 
fans 
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insufficient to handle the volume and force of the water, weak or narrow places in the barrier 
island may be forcefully breached to form a new inlet. This new inlet may be temporary, lasting 
only a few weeks or decades, or it may become a semi-permanent feature of the island.     
 
Tidal exchange and longshore currents around these inlets transport considerable volumes of 
sediment into the sound. This sediment transport near and through inlets is a primary mechanism 
of both inlet and island migration. Inlets migrate in the direction of the longshore current, which 
forms as ocean waves strike the beach at an angle and create a current moving parallel to the 
shoreline. This current carries sediment that is suspended in the water by wave action against the 
beachface. Inlets disrupt this current, resulting in sediment deposition. The remainder of this 
discussion assumes a north to south longshore current, as is found on the Outer Banks. 
 
The major features of an inlet are: (1) the inlet throat – the actual opening in the island; (2) the 
flood tide delta – a large shallow delta feature created when tides transport sediment from the 
longshore drift into the calmer waters of the estuary where it is deposited; and (3) the ebb tide 
delta – a smaller offshore bar created at the mouth of the inlet and formed by sediment deposited 
by either the ebb tide or the longshore current. Some sediment is deposited on the updrift (north) 
side of the inlet, causing shoaling as the island builds up (accretes). This shoaling and accretion 
force the tidal flow to the downdrift (south) side of the inlet, causing erosion. In this manner, the 
inlet gradually moves in the direction of the longshore current (Inman and Dolan 1989). An 
aerial image of Oregon Inlet (Figure 4.4) shows the well-developed flood tide delta in the estuary 
(left side of image) and breaking waves on the smaller ebb tide delta at the mouth of the inlet 
(right side of image). Shoaling on the updrift shoulder of the inlet and relic deltas being 
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colonized by marsh vegetation are evident in the top of the photo, while the downdrift shoulder 
shows the sand built up behind the terminal groin constructed to protect the bridge landing. 
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Oregon Inlet Aerial Image, 1998 (US Army Corps of Engineers n.d) 
  
As the inlet migrates southward, older areas of the ebb tide delta are blocked behind the 
accreting northern island. Over time, shoaling builds sufficient elevation to support marsh grass 
colonization and these new marshes are incorporated into the soundside of the island. Most inlets 
opened by storm events will shoal up and become choked with sand over time. Once an inlet 
closes, the old inlet area and ebb tide delta are incorporated into the island. This pattern of inlet 
migration and closure, coupled with overwash deposition in the interior and soundside of the 
island, results in a net landward movement of the island. This movement counters beachface 
erosion and maintains island width.  
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Conditions on Hatteras Island 
 
Barrier Island Processes 
The generalized pattern described above occurs on barrier islands in a natural state. When an 
island, such as Hatteras Island, has been significantly altered by engineering and infrastructure, 
island migration may be disrupted. In the 1930s, erosion concerns led the government to build a 
continuous engineered dune line on the Outer Banks from the state line to Hatteras Inlet (Binkley 
2007). The state and/or federal government have worked nearly non-stop to maintain this dune 
line and hold Hatteras Island against natural erosion and landward retreat. The dunes created an 
illusion of safety that increased both residential and tourism development in the island 
communities. Development further increased once NC 12 was completed as a paved road behind 
the dunes in the early 1950s. Bonner Bridge was opened over Oregon Inlet in 1963 to 
accommodate growing traffic demand (NCDOT 2008).   
 
These infrastructure projects, though intended to reduce erosion and ease transportation, reflect 
the era's inadequate understanding of barrier island processes. The bridge and paved road along 
the length of Hatteras Island led to development of the island communities for both residents and 
vacationers. Storm damage and erosion threatened the road and bridge almost immediately, but 
the economic boon of tourism seemed to justify the cost of road maintenance. With time, road 
access to the Refuge and the National Seashore became central to a multi-million dollar tourism 
industry. The road became too important to lose; yet the measures necessary to protect the road 
from erosion threaten the island itself. 
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The artificial dune line along NC 12 was constructed to slow erosion. In practice, the high 
engineered dunes block the normal overwash critical to island migration. Under natural 
conditions, the low natural dunes and broad beach (or run-up) allow storm waves to dissipate 
energy. In some storms, a natural dune line may be destroyed and the sand distributed as part of 
the overwash fan. The height of the engineered foredune on Hatteras Island has changed the 
interaction of wave energy with the beach, resulting in a steeper shoreface and narrower beach. 
This narrow beach and high dune cannot dissipate the wave energy. Storm waves erode the 
dunes but do not overwash them, resulting in erosion without deposition. The eroded sand is 
transported offshore instead of being deposited on the island. NCDOT then rebuilds the damaged 
dunes slightly inland of the previous ones. Over time, the island narrows as the ocean shore 
erodes but the soundside does not build. As the island narrows, areas with weaker substrate are at 
heightened risk of island breach and inlet creation during storms (Riggs et al. 2008).    
 
Hatteras Island experiences high wave energy and frequent storm activity. The North Carolina 
Division of Coastal Management has mapped annual erosion rates along the Outer Banks. While 
Hatteras Island is accreting in a few locations, most of the island is eroding. The highest average 
erosion rate is north of Rodanthe (11 feet/year average), with the Pea Island Wildlife Refuge 
averaging between five and seven feet of erosion per year (NCDOT 2008). The pattern of 
erosion and island narrowing is especially critical in structurally weak areas. Most of these are 
former inlets that are at particular risk for reopening during storms. The most high-risk breach 
areas along NC 12 have been identified as “hot spots.” There are five “hot spots” on Hatteras 
Island (from north to south): (1) Canal Zone; (2) Sandbag Area; (3) Rodanthe 'S' Curves; (4) 
Canadian Hole; and (5) Hatteras Village. Figure 4.1 shows the Canal Zone, Sandbag Area, and 
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Rodanthe ‘S’ Curves relevant to the case study. Erosion in some of these areas has required the 
highway to be moved westward. In numerous areas on Hatteras Island, NC 12 now abuts the 
soundside marsh and can be moved no further. Beach nourishment and dune maintenance are 
necessary to offset erosion in these areas, at yet more cost.  
  
Oregon Inlet 
Oregon Inlet’s southward migration also threatens NC 12 and Bonner Bridge. Oregon Inlet, 
opened by a hurricane in 1846, is currently the only inlet between Cape Hatteras and Virginia. 
The inlet is migrating southward, with spit accretion on its north shoulder and erosion on the 
south shoulder of the inlet. In the 170 years since it opened, the midpoint of Oregon Inlet has 
shifted roughly 2.2 miles southward and over 2,000 feet westward (NCDOT 2008). The inlet’s 
width, depth and orientation have varied over the years, with a significant orientation shift and 
narrowing trend evident since the 1962 Ash Wednesday storm (Dolan and Glassen 1973).  
 
The width and location of Oregon Inlet fluctuates significantly between stormy and calm periods. 
Between 1945 and 1989, the south shoulder of Oregon Inlet (Hatteras Island) averaged erosion 
of 103 feet/year while the north shoulder (Bodie Island) accreted southward an average of 88 
feet/year. The overall movement is south, with the pattern and rates fluctuating with storm 
frequency. Generally speaking, Oregon Inlet widens with erosion on both shoulders during 
stormy periods (maximum inlet width of 6,670 feet in 1962) and narrows during calm periods 
(average minimum width of 2,100 feet) (NCDOT 2008).  
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In the 1980s, erosion of Oregon Inlet’s southern shoulder increased to an average of 308 
feet/year; during a single storm in 1989, the southern shore eroded more than 350 feet. This rapid 
erosion threatened to undermine Bonner Bridge’s south terminus (NCDOT 2008). In 1991, 
NCDOT completed construction on a terminal groin to stabilize the south side of the inlet. 
Accretion is ongoing on the northern shoulder while the southern shoulder is no longer 
retreating, resulting in narrowing of the inlet.  
 
Navigation through Oregon Inlet and under Bonner Bridge is threatened by this movement and 
shoaling. As the inlet gorge (deepest channel) moves southward, it no longer aligns with the 130 
feet wide bridge navigation span. Dredging to maintain navigability has been nearly constant 
since the 1970s. These dredging operations alter normal sediment transport and may starve 
downdrift beaches of sand (Riggs and Ames 2011).  
 
Inlet and island migration processes are natural and would not be a “problem” on Hatteras Island 
but for the demand for a transportation corridor along the island. Removal of the engineered 
dune may restore natural overwash and island building, but it would quickly render NC 12 
impassable. To grasp the importance of maintaining NC 12 along Hatteras Island, we must take a 
brief look at the history of island development.  
 
Development of NC 12 
The English effort to establish a settlement on Roanoke Island failed in 1584, but historical 
records reveal that colonists encountered established Native American settlements that fished 
and hunted in the sheltered waters behind the barrier islands. These native populations relocated 
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as English colonists spread southward out of the Virginia colony in the 1700s. By the 1830s, 
Nags Head in the northern Outer Banks had become a summer retreat for wealthy planters (Stick 
1958). The remainder of the Outer Banks, including Hatteras Island, was only sparsely settled by 
locals eking out a subsistence living. The islands were accessible only by shallow-draft boats and 
travel was via tracks in the sand. By the turn of the century, out-of-state hunting clubs had 
purchased large tracts of the Outer Banks, with islanders supplementing meager incomes 
working as hunting and fishing guides. A period of high erosion and dune migration in the early 
1900s resulted in abandonment of several sizable Outer Banks communities, including 
Portsmouth and Little Kinnakeet. The period leading up to the Depression was one of 
considerable hardship on the Outer Banks as natural resources were depleted or were regulated.  
 
Desperate for some source of income, the Dare County, NC Board of Commissioners embarked 
on an ambitious plan to build roads and bridges to open the virtually inaccessible beaches to 
tourism from other states (Stick 1958). Dare County built the first bridge across the Roanoke 
Sound in 1928 with county revenue bonds. A private toll bridge across the Currituck Sound to 
Kitty Hawk was completed in 1930. The state highway department stepped in and connected the 
two bridges with the first paved road on the northern Outer Banks soon afterwards (Carr 2016).  
 
Road access to the northern Outer Banks coincided with the start of private ferry operations, 
including a car ferry across Oregon Inlet. Together, these ferries, road, and bridges opened the 
area to development. While large tracts were being subdivided for residential development in the 
Nags Head area, Bodie Island and Hatteras Island remained isolated, with locals traveling via 
small boats or undeveloped roads through the sand. Accelerated dune loss and erosion were 
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threatening parts of the islands, including the Cape Hatteras Lighthouse. Influential locals, 
including landowners, officials, and journalists, heartened by the successful projects in the 
northern Outer Banks, proposed a new project to re-establish vegetation, install sand fencing, 
rebuild lost dunes, and develop a national park along the central Outer Banks. Government 
officials embraced the suggestion; the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC) began working to “restore” the Outer Banks in 1934 (Binkley 2007).   
 
By 1940, the CCC had built a massive dune line 115 miles long down the northern Outer Banks 
to Hatteras Inlet and partially along Ocracoke Island. At some points, the dune was up to 25 feet 
in height with a base width of 300 feet. CCC workers installed over 600 miles of sand fencing 
and planted millions of seedlings and grasses (Stick 1958). Work stalled during World War II, 
but by the early 1950s NC 12 was paved along the length of Bodie and Hatteras Islands. The era 
of tourism on the Outer Banks had arrived. The Oregon Inlet ferry, which had been bought by 
the state, had a capacity of 2,000 vehicles per day. By the late 1950s, it was unable to keep up 
with traffic demand, resulting in long lines in peak summer season. In 1963, the 2.44-mile long 
Bonner Bridge over Oregon Inlet was opened to traffic (NCDOT 2008).  
 
The Modern Outer Banks 
A paved highway route along the length of islands boosted residential and tourism development 
in the island communities. This growth was restricted, though, by the designation of large 
portions of the Outer Banks as either Wildlife Refuge or National Seashore. The Cape Hatteras 
National Seashore, including the Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge, stretches south for 70 
miles from Nags Head to Ocracoke Island. The Refuge and the established communities along 
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the Banks are geographically within, but are not part of, the National Seashore. Residential and 
commercial development is restricted to those areas outside the boundaries of the Refuge and 
National Seashore. 
 
Once transportation improvements opened the way for tourism and residential development, 
Dare County saw a significant population growth, peaking in the decade between 1970 and 1980 
when the population grew from 6,995 to 13,377, or a 91% increase (Dare County 2010) (see 
Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Dare County, NC Percentage Population Change by Decade 
Decade  Percentage Population 
Change 
1950 – 1960  + 9.8% 
1960 – 1970  + 17.8% 
1970 – 1980  + 91.2% 
1980 – 1990  + 70.0% 
1990 – 2000  + 31.7% 
2000 – 2010  + 13.2% 
 
In 2010, Dare County had 33,920 permanent residents. Of those permanent residents, not quite 
13 percent (4,322 people), live in the communities south of Oregon Inlet (Lane 2013). Dare 
County’s population increases significantly during both peak and off-peak “shoulder” tourist 
seasons, with an estimated peak seasonal population (both seasonal and residents) of over 
226,000 (Dare County 2010). Many of these tourists rent residential homes for short-term stays. 
Non-resident owners account for 56 percent of Dare County’s residential structures. Many of 
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these absentee owners rely on rental income to cover expenses of these second homes (Dare 
County 2010).  
 
Many Hatteras Island visitors are drawn to the remoteness and ambience of the communities 
south of Bonner Bridge. Vacationers and day-trippers alike visit the Cape Hatteras National 
Seashore, Cape Hatteras Lighthouse and Pea Island Wildlife Refuge in large numbers. In 2015, 
the National Park Service reported 2,274,635 visitors to the Cape Hatteras National Seashore 
(National Park Service 2017). The National Seashore is only accessible via NC 12 or state 
vehicle ferries between the mainland and Ocracoke Island. Given the ferries’ limited capacities, 
the majority of these visitors pass over the Bonner Bridge.  
 
Tourism drives Dare County’s economy. Dare County visitors spent over one billion dollars in 
2014, the fourth-highest county total in the state. Tourism related industries like retail, real 
estate, and hotel/restaurant provided 12,300 jobs in Dare County in 2014 (U.S. Travel 
Association 2014). Hatteras Island is home to roughly 13 percent of the county population but 
contributes roughly 40 percent of county occupancy tax revenues. In 2011, visitors to Hatteras 
Island spent some $204 million dollars. Around 25 percent of all Hatteras Island businesses are 
related to tourism, providing roughly 60 percent of employment (2,600 jobs) on the island (Lane 
2013). 
 
 Bonner Bridge as a Lifeline 
From the dead of winter when only residents and a few diehard visitors are on Hatteras Island to 
the peak summer season when the population may swell to 50,000, Bonner Bridge is the island’s 
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lifeline. Virtually all of the food, consumer goods, building supplies, mail, gasoline, heating fuel, 
and trash service to the island come by truck over Bonner Bridge. Cable television, internet, 
telephone, and electricity cables cross the inlet attached beneath the bridge. Serious medical care 
requires a trip off-island. Students cross the bridge in activity buses for sports events and school 
activities. In 2002, the most recent year with available data, an average of 5,400 vehicles crossed 
Bonner Bridge each day, with peak summer traffic nearing 11,000 vehicles per day (NCDOT 
2008).  
 
Both Hatteras Island and Ocracoke Island to the south rely primarily on NC 12 and the Bonner 
Bridge for transportation. Ocracoke Island is served by a ferry route to Hatteras Island (less than 
one-hour transit) and two ferry routes to remote mainland ferry terminals (more than two-hours 
transit). Combined, the two mainland ferry routes carried 92,477 vehicles in 2014. In 
comparison, more than two million vehicles travel the Bonner Bridge each year (NCDOT 
2015a). NC 12, including the Bonner Bridge, serves as the designated hurricane evacuation route 
for the Outer Banks.   
 
Park and Refuge Management 
 
A major draw to the Outer Banks is the Cape Hatteras National Seashore. Authorized as the 
nation's first National Seashore by Congressional legislation in 1937, the land was assembled 
from landowner donations and purchases by the state. Once the last parcels were transferred to 
the federal government, the Seashore was officially established in 1953. While the Seashore is 
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designated as a recreational area open to hunting and fishing in season with beach driving in 
designated areas, the authorizing language for the Seashore in 16 U.S.C. § 459(a-2) states that: 
 . . . the said area shall be permanently reserved as a primitive wilderness and no 
development of the project or plan for the convenience of visitors shall be undertaken 
which would be incompatible with the preservation of the unique flora and fauna or the 
physiographic conditions now prevailing in this area. 
 
In effect, this language prevents any residential or commercial development within the 
boundaries of the Seashore, which stretches from just south of Nags Head to the southern end of 
Ocracoke Island. Communities already present when the Seashore was created are excluded from 
its boundaries. Access to nearly 70 miles of undeveloped barrier islands is a major draw for 
tourists. The Seashore includes one of the most famous lighthouses in the world, Cape Hatteras 
Lighthouse, as well as Bodie Island Lighthouse near the north shore of Oregon Inlet. The 
developed facilities within the Seashore include parking areas and visitor centers, a Coast Guard 
facility at Oregon Inlet, a marina and store operated as a concession adjacent to the Coast Guard 
facility, and the right of way for NC 12 and utilities.         
 
Thirteen linear miles on the northern end of Hatteras Island were designated as the Pea Island 
National Wildlife Refuge in 1938. The primary purpose of the Refuge is to provide habitat and 
breeding grounds for migratory waterfowl and other wildlife. The Refuge includes 4,655 
terrestrial acres and 25,700 water acres. More than 365 species of birds, including migratory 
snow geese and the threatened piping plover, are found there (USFWS n.d.). The Refuge lies 
within the boundaries of the National Seashore and features a visitor’s center, freshwater habitat 
impoundments, viewing stations, and wildlife trails. The National Park Service and US Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS) jointly operate the Refuge with USFWS making all decisions 
concerning habitat management and Refuge uses. 
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Management of NC 12 
The first paved portion of NC 12 in the northern Outer Banks was completed in 1931. The 18-
mile road was almost immediately damaged by two successive hurricanes and required major 
repair within two years of its completion (Stick 1958). This was a harbinger for the future. The 
apparent stability of the engineered dunes encouraged further construction of NC 12 behind the 
dunes following World War II. The road was paved between the Hatteras Island communities in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the final 12-mile segment built through the Refuge in 1953. 
By 1963, visitors could travel via paved roads and bridges from the mainland to Hatteras Village 
at the southern end of the island. 
 
NC 12 within the Refuge has been a source of conflict since its construction. Initially, Refuge 
management refused permission to construct the road, citing the Refuge’s mandate to maintain 
and protect habitat for migratory waterfowl. Refuge management was concerned that vehicle 
traffic would pose a danger to wildlife. They also worried that the ease of transportation within 
the Refuge would increase foot traffic in areas beyond the road (Carr 2016). The situation was at 
an impasse until political pressure prevailed; on October 29, 1951, Congress passed Public Law 
229 (65 Stat. 662), instructing the Secretary of the Interior to convey a right of way to the state 
for road construction through the Refuge. 
 
The highway and the engineered dunes have been interrelated from the beginning. The erosion 
control project was a joint project between the state and National Park Service; the Park Service 
recognized that the islands were migrating westward, but intended the erosion control project to 
slow the rate of movement and stabilize the islands as much as possible without resorting to 
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hardened structures like jetties or groins. The dunes were not built to facilitate the road, but 
transportation was cited as a factor encouraging stabilization. Without the dune project, NC 12 
would not have been built in the 1950s (Binkley 2007).  
 
Completion of NC 12 along the length of Hatteras Island brought considerable tourism and 
commercial growth to the communities outside the National Seashore. The economy rapidly 
shifted from traditional fishing livelihoods to tourism. Without reliable access, this new economy 
would flounder and isolate island communities from the conveniences that are near-necessities in 
the modern world. The highway became the lifeline for those communities and the lifeblood of 
the economy. The dune building of the 1930s made the road possible; protection of the road 
made the dunes a necessity. To use a modern phrase, the highway became “too big to fail.”  
 
Conflicts and Highway Maintenance 
NC 12 along Hatteras Island may be the lifeline of the local communities, but it is plagued with 
troubles that seem almost insurmountable. Every hurricane, tropical storm, and winter storm 
threatens to sweep portions of the road away and bury the rest under feet of sand. Maintenance 
work and dune reconstruction are almost continuous. The Refuge management would prefer it to 
go somewhere other than the Refuge. Four parties play a major role in determining the future of 
the highway: NCDOT, the Federal Highway Administration, the Pea Island National Wildlife 
Refuge management, and the National Park Service. Each group has a distinct purpose that 
shapes its view of the highway. 
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North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT)  
NCDOT is responsible for the construction and ongoing maintenance of NC 12. As part of its 
general obligation to provide adequate transportation routes to the citizens and communities of 
the state, either through state highways and secondary roads or by ferry routes, NCDOT is 
obligated to maintain NC 12 as the primary transportation connection along the Outer Banks. As 
years of engineering projects have altered the normal barrier island migration, the state has spent 
increasing amounts of time and money removing sand from the highway and rebuilding breached 
dunes. NCDOT has moved several sections of road westward in recent decades, while island 
breaches from storms have either been closed or received a temporary bridge.  
 
The NCDOT Division of Highways is administered through 14 regional divisions.  Funding for 
NC 12 maintenance and the Bonner Bridge repair and replacement comes out of the funding 
allocation for District One and is subject to the statutory funding cycles of the state budget 
process. NCDOT planning and project selection are determined by transportation needs, 
environmental regulations, and funding limitations. All NC 12 projects require the state to 
conduct some form of environmental impact assessment under either the State Environmental 
Policy Act or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
 
Much of the length of NC 12 on the Outer Banks lies within the boundaries of the National 
Seashore or the Refuge. When the National Seashore was established in 1953, a right-of-way 
was reserved for the state road. Within the Refuge, NCDOT has a permanent easement to 
construct and maintain a public road. NCDOT must confine its maintenance activities to the 
right-of-way or easement within both the National Seashore and the Refuge. Any NCDOT 
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activity outside of these boundaries requires a permit from the National Seashore or Refuge 
administrators. Those permits are discussed below. 
 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
North Carolina, like other states, receives a considerable amount of federal highway funding. 
This federal funding supplies roughly 45 percent of the budget for highway and bridge 
construction in the state (NCDOT 2010a). A major project like the Bonner Bridge replacement 
cannot be completed without federal funds. The FHWA, a division of the United States 
Department of Transportation, oversees the use of federal funds in state highway maintenance 
projects to ensure compliance with federal regulations.   
 
The use of federal funds triggers an environmental review under NEPA. For the Bonner Bridge 
replacement, NEPA requires the FHWA to complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed project as well as possible alternatives. The 
FHWA officially oversees the Environmental Impact Statement, but in practice, the FHWA 
delegates preparation of the environmental analysis to the NCDOT while retaining final 
“signing” authority.   
 
In addition to the EIS process, the FHWA must also complete a Department of Transportation 
Act Section 4(f) analysis. Section 4(f) restricts federal funding for transportation projects on 
federal protected lands, including wildlife refuges. Specifically, under 49 U.S.C. 303(c), FHWA 
cannot approve federal funding for such projects unless it finds that there is no “feasible and 
prudent alternative” and the project has taken all steps to minimize harm to the protected lands.  
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If FHWA can identify an alternative to avoid using protected land, that alternative must become 
the preferred alternative unless it is “infeasible or imprudent,” under 23 CFR 774.17. Again, the 
FHWA delegates preparation of the analysis to the NCDOT but retains final approval. 
 
Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge 
The Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge (henceforth “Refuge”) was established by Executive 
Order in 1938 to manage wetlands and habitat as “a refuge and breeding ground for migratory 
waterfowl and other wildlife” (U.S. President 1938). While the Refuge mission identifies the 
maintenance of public use as a goal, recreation is not one of its main purposes (USFWS 2006). 
The NCDOT has a 100-foot wide easement for maintaining a road through the Refuge. Any 
activity beyond this easement requires the Refuge Manager to issue a Special Use permit. Refuge 
management has repeatedly issued permits for emergency repair for storm damage, but has 
expressed reluctance to continue to do so (Bryant 2003). In the late 1980s, the Refuge 
management permitted the state to construct a terminal groin along the south shoulder of Oregon 
Inlet to protect the southern terminus of Bonner Bridge from erosion. This permit requires the 
groin to be removed if the existing bridge is removed from service. If the State of North Carolina 
wishes to keep the groin in place, it must receive a new permit (NCDOT 2008).  
 
In 1997, Congress passed the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 
which, in part, refined the permitting standards for any new uses or modifications of existing 
uses in Wildlife Refuges. Under this new law, Refuge Managers must make a determination that 
a proposed use is compatible and “will not materially interfere with or detract from the 
fulfillment of the mission of the [Refuge] System or the purposes of the Refuge” (16 U.S.C. 
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668ee(1)). The Bonner Bridge replacement is the first major project within the Pea Island 
Wildlife Refuge to require analysis under this new standard. The Department of the Interior, 
which includes the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), has indicated that many of the 
alternatives offered for long-term maintenance of NC 12 through the Refuge are “unlikely” to be 
viewed as compatible with the core purposes of the Refuge (NCDOT 2005, 2.15).  
 
National Park Service 
According to the National Park Service: 
The purpose of Cape Hatteras National Seashore is to permanently preserve the 
wild and primitive character of the ever-changing barrier islands, protect the 
diverse plant and animal communities sustained by the coastal island processes, 
and provide for recreational use and enjoyment that is compatible with 
preserving the distinctive natural and cultural resources of the nation’s first 
national seashore. (National Park Service 2011, 9) 
 
Like the Refuge, the National Seashore Superintendent issues Special Use permits to NCDOT 
for road projects or maintenance beyond the boundaries of the right-of-way. The Bonner Bridge 
replacement will likely require a permit for construction and staging activities for the new 
northern terminus of the bridge. Otherwise, the Park Service does not currently have as active a 
role in discussions of NC 12 as the Refuge, largely because the most critical “hot spots” with 
frequent overwash are generally within the Refuge boundaries. Beyond the northern terminus of 
the Bonner Bridge, all bridge replacement alternatives avoid Park Service boundaries. 
 
Other Tensions 
The social structure of the Outer Banks reflects changing demographics brought by tourism. For 
centuries, the Outer Banks were very sparsely settled and isolated from the mainland. The only 
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access was via boat. The economy was based on fishing supplemented by hunting, livestock, and 
scavenging from ships washed ashore on the Graveyard of the Atlantic. By the early 20th century, 
wealthy out-of-state landowners had purchased large tracts of land for private hunting preserves. 
Although a few locals were hired as managers, these preserves were closed to residents for 
fishing and hunting.  
 
 Although there was considerable resistance in the post-war years to the creation of the National 
Seashore, the influx of tourists forever changed the culture of the Outer Banks. Isolated and self-
sufficient communities became beach towns, lined with oceanfront vacation rentals and small 
gift shops. Increasing land values enticed many small landowners to sell while escalating 
property taxes forced others away. While locals still live amongst the retirees, transplants, and 
absentee owners, virtually all of them are dependent on the steady flow of visitors to the Outer 
Banks. 
 
Many of these tourists are drawn to the Outer Banks for surf fishing and beachgoing in areas that 
allow beach driving. The tension between the Park Service/Refuge and residents and visitors 
came to a head in 2007 when the Southern Environmental Law Center filed a lawsuit on behalf 
of Audubon and the Defenders of Wildlife seeking to restrict beach driving in many areas of the 
National Seashore. The ensuing debate was extremely contentious and resulted in the closure of 
some beach areas within the Seashore and Refuge to beach driving and pedestrian access for 
months out of the year. The dispute is still ongoing and has left many Outer Banks residents and 
visitors with strong resentment toward both the Southern Environmental Law Center and 
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environmental advocacy groups. Although the issue was different, these resentments resurfaced 
during the debate over Bonner Bridge.  
 
Environmental Permitting 
 
The Bonner Bridge replacement involves constructing a bridge over federal jurisdictional waters 
with potential harm to wetlands, submerged and terrestrial habitats, and state-designated “areas 
of environmental concern.” The northern and southern approaches for the bridge lie within the 
National Seashore and the Refuge, respectively. State highway engineers would use a mix of 
state and federal funding to construct the bridge. Given these facts, it is no surprise that there are 
considerable permitting requirements for the bridge project. Required federal permits include: (1) 
a Coast Guard Bridge permit for the Oregon Inlet; (2) US Army Corps of Engineers Clean Water 
Act Section 404 and Section 10 permits for dredge and fill operations within waters of the United 
States and (potentially) a Section 13 permit for ocean deposit of dredge materials; (3) a USFWS 
Special Use permit to re-authorize the terminal groin; (4) a National Park Service Special Use 
permit for use of land within the National Seashore; and (5) a USFWS Special Use permit for 
any roadwork outside the existing easement through the Refuge. A North Carolina Coastal Area 
Management Act (CAMA) Major permit would be issued with the Corps of Engineers Section 
404, Section 10, and Section 401 (water quality) permits under a joint permitting program. 
 
While significant, these permits are separate from the major environmental analysis for this 
project. Under NEPA, any federal agency (here, the FHWA) proposing a major action must 
assess any potential environmental effects. The Bonner Bridge project’s likelihood of significant 
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environmental effects triggered a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) review (40 CFR 
Part 1500-1508). North Carolina has a similar State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) EIS 
procedure; the SEPA review is not required if a full NEPA review is conducted. Since 1997, the 
NCDOT, FHWA, and US Army Corps of Engineers have operated under either an Interagency 
Agreement (1997) or a Memorandum of Understanding (2003, with multiple later revisions) to 
consolidate the NEPA and Section 404 (Clean Water Act) reviews for highway projects affecting 
wetlands. For discussion purposes, the term “Memorandum” will refer to both the Interagency 
Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
The Memorandum established the EIS process for all but the earliest rounds of Bonner Bridge 
project planning. This process relies on a Merger Team made up of 13 federal and state agencies. 
Key members include the FHWA, NCDOT, NC Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (two divisions), US Army Corps of Engineers, US Environmental Protection Agency, 
USFWS, and the Refuge Manager. The EIS process mandates the following steps:  
(1) the Merger Team defines the project’s Purpose and Need (Concurrence Point 1) and develops 
project alternatives; (2) the Team selects the alternatives to be studied in the EIS (Concurrence 
Point 2); (3) the NCDOT incorporates these selections into a Draft EIS and solicits written and 
oral comments from the public and consulting agencies; (4) based on feedback, the Merger Team 
selects one project alternative as the Least Environmentally Damaging Practicable Alternative 
(LEDPA); (5) the Final EIS refines the presentation of alternatives, designates the Preferred 
Alternative, and addresses the received comments; this Final EIS is published for public and 
agency comment and the Merger Term determines any necessary mitigation for the LEDPA 
(Concurrence Point 4); and (6) as a last step, the Record of Decision is prepared and signed by 
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both NCDOT and FHWA; the US Army Corps of Engineers approves or denies the 404 permit. 
The Bonner Bridge EIS also includes the Section 4(f) analysis for a road project within a Refuge. 
Additional steps for EIS supplements and assessments as well as a Merger Team conflict 
resolution process are discussed in the next section.  
 
A Bonner Bridge Chronology 
 
By the late 1950s, traffic demands on the Outer Banks exceeded the capacity of the free ferry 
across Oregon Inlet. Construction of the 2.44 mile Herbert C. Bonner Bridge began in 1962, with 
the bridge opening to traffic in November 1963. The bridge was built in a curving arc 4,000 feet 
inland of the ocean, a design that was expected to protect the bridge from storms. The designers 
were aware of the inlet’s southward migration and planned to stabilize the inlet with two jetties 
within five to ten years after bridge completion (NCDOT 1993). Within two years of completion, 
engineers repaired severe scour (erosion around structures) around pilings near the navigation 
span. In 1978, erosion left several pilings on the south end with only seven feet of bottom 
penetration. Support pilings were added to counter erosion in 1978, 1979, and 1981.  
 
Additional pilings were added on the north end in 1989 and 1991, followed by riprap and 
gabions (caged riprap) in 1992. Between 1978 and 1992, scour repair costs exceeded $9.3 
million. In 1989 and 1990, a $14 million terminal groin was constructed to hold the southern 
terminus against severe erosion. In 1990, a hopper dredge performing routine navigation 
dredging struck the bridge during a storm, causing several spans to collapse. The bridge was 
closed between October 1990 and February 1991 for repairs, forcing all traffic onto emergency 
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ferries. By 1990, the bridge was reaching the end of its design life. Ongoing scour problems, 
corrosion of steel members, and concrete spalling (fragments falling from the concrete face) left 
the bridge with a sufficiency rating of 32.5 out of 100. In 1991, the bridge was estimated to have 
a remaining service life of six years without “massive maintenance and repair expenditures” 
(NCDOT 1993). 
 
NCDOT initiated planning for replacement of the deteriorating Bonner Bridge with a feasibility 
study in 1990-1991. The process continued for 25 years, requiring a feasibility study, five 
environmental impact statements, an environmental assessment, and federal and state lawsuits. 
The following chronology is based on news articles gathered for the source database and 
summarizes the key points of the project history.  
 
1990-1991: NCDOT conducts a feasibility study and scoping process to select bridge alternatives 
for the EIS process. They solicit state and federal agency comments and hold public 
informational workshops. Multiple alternatives are considered, including no action; maintenance 
of the existing bridge; ferries; a tunnel; and new bridge corridors with parallel, east, or west 
alignments. The preferred alternative for the EIS is selected based on results of the feasibility 
study. 
 
1993: A Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) is published for review.  The DEIS is 
compiled before the EIS Merger Team process is established, but the National Park Service, 
USFWS, US Army Corps of Engineers, and US Coast Guard are closely consulted. The DEIS 
analyzes a Parallel Bridge as the Preferred Alternative for analysis.   
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The DEIS explicitly separates the bridge replacement from long-term planning for NC 12, noting 
that NC 12 needs a different planning process. Within the same month as the DEIS publication, 
the Outer Banks Task Force (OBTF) is formed by a partnership agreement between the FHWA; 
NC Department of the Environment, Health, and Natural Resources; National Park Service; 
NCDOT; US Army Corps of Engineers; and USFWS. The OBTF is tasked with developing a 
long-term plan for NC 12 that will balance barrier island preservation and safe transportation 
access.   
 
1994: The Parallel Bridge Corridor is designated as the Preferred Alternative for further analysis.  
 
1996: A 3.3 mile stretch of NC 12 south of the bridge (Sandbag Area “hot spot”) is threatened by 
erosion and relocated westward at a cost of $3.5 million. A preliminary version of the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (pFEIS) is circulated to key agencies. The pFEIS includes 
agency comments on the DEIS. In their comments, the USFWS and the Department of the 
Interior object to the separation of the bridge and NC 12 planning and note concerns about 
ongoing roadwork within the Refuge.   
 
1997:  Congress passes the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 
(henceforth, 1997 Refuge Act). This law, in part, amended the grounds upon which the Refuge 
Manager of Pea Island Wildlife Refuge can issue Special Use permits for roadwork within the 
Refuge. The Federal Highway Administration requests that USFWS initiate an Endangered 
Species Act Section 7 formal consultation for the project. This consultation is never completed 
and the pFEIS is left unsigned.  
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1998-2000: Planning for the Bonner Bridge replacement remains at a standstill. Anecdotally, this 
is due to conflict between USFWS and NCDOT over permitting concerns. Since the early 1990s, 
USFWS has repeatedly expressed concerns about long-term road plans within the Refuge. 
USFWS seems to imply that any bridge replacement that deviates from the existing easement 
will be found “incompatible” under the 1997 Refuge Act and cannot be permitted. It is likely that 
an ongoing controversy about the planned jetty project for Oregon Inlet also plays a part in 
stalling replacement efforts.   
 
2001: NCDOT renews planning for the bridge replacement. Given the time lapse since 
completion of the DEIS, the pFEIS must be re-evaluated. NCDOT determines that changed 
conditions warrant preparation of a Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(SDEIS) to consider new alternatives.   
 
2002: SDEIS scoping begins under the new Merger Team process. Erosion data shows that areas 
near the 1993 Parallel Bridge Corridor’s southern terminus have eroded significantly. 
Considering the OBTF’s long-term NC 12 planning process, the Merger Team agrees that the 
bridge replacement must include planning for long-range NC 12 maintenance between the bridge 
and Rodanthe.  
 
The Merger Team notes that the 1993 DEIS bridge corridor terminates outside of the highway 
easement through the Refuge and will require a Special Use permit. This permit can only be 
issued if the Refuge Manager finds the project compatible with the Refuge’s Management Plan 
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and mission. Refuge staff indicates that this is unlikely. NCDOT conducts a new Bridge Corridor 
Study to analyze corridors that avoid the Refuge and known erosion “hot spots”  
 
2003: The Merger Team considers four corridors with multiple sub-corridors and selects two for 
detailed study in the SDEIS. Corridor One (Wide) would terminate in the center of the Refuge 
while Corridor Four would extend far into the Pamlico Sound and terminate in Rodanthe, 
avoiding the Refuge entirely. USFWS advises the Merger Team that it likely will not issue a 
permit for a bridge in Corridor One. The Merger Team responds by removing Corridor One from 
consideration and chooses Corridor Four and its sub-corridors as the only study alternative. 
Corridor Four is designated as the Pamlico Sound Bridge Corridor (henceforth, Long Bridge). 
 
Hurricane Isabel opens an inlet roughly 1,700 feet wide on the southern end of Hatteras Island. 
The US Army Corps of Engineers fills the new inlet with sand and replaces the road. Significant 
overwash occurs along the length of NC 12. 
 
2004: Dare County, NC County Commissioners adopt a Resolution protesting the Merger 
Team’s selection of the Long Bridge. They note that this corridor eliminates all highway access 
to the Refuge. They also express concern about loss of recreational fishing access at the inlet, 
possible removal of the terminal groin, and funding issues. In response, NCDOT considers, and 
ultimately rejects, five additional bridge designs suggested by the County Commissioners. 
Political pressure prompts the Merger Team to add a Parallel Bridge Corridor with NC 12 
Maintenance (henceforth, Short Bridge) to the SDEIS study.   
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2005:  The North Carolina General Assembly passes a bill (N.C.G.S. 136-89.183b) expressly 
recommending a parallel bridge and includes provisions to accelerate construction once all 
permits are approved. The SDEIS is published, analyzing both the Long Bridge and Short Bridge 
options. The SDEIS (and all future iterations of the Bonner Bridge EIS) includes the 4(f) analysis 
of roadwork within the Refuge. Two public hearings are held and written comments are 
accepted. The Long Bridge analysis includes two alignment alternatives. The Short Bridge 
analysis includes a parallel bridge over the inlet and three alternatives that would maintain NC 
12 on Hatteras Island to Rodanthe through 2060. 
 
The Long Bridge would be roughly 17.5 miles long, the third longest continuous bridge over 
water in the world. The bridge would pass through Pamlico Sound approximately five miles east 
of Hatteras Island. The Short Bridge would be approximately 2.7 miles long and generally 
parallel the existing bridge (Figure 4.5). Three alternatives are suggested for NC 12 with the 
parallel bridge: (1) Nourishment – maintain the road within the existing easement with beach 
nourishment; (2) Road North/Bridge South – move the road westward in the northern half of the 
Refuge and place the southern half on a bridge; (3) All Bridge – elevate the road on a bridge 
along the island to Rodanthe. The SDEIS also proposes mixing elements of these maintenance 
alternatives.  
 
2006: Tensions persist between NCDOT and USFWS regarding long-term road maintenance 
options through the Refuge. US Department of the Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne 
acknowledges the urgent need to replace the existing bridge and the difficult question of 
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maintaining the road within the Refuge. Secretary Kempthorne recommends separating the 
bridge and road projects so the bridge can be permitted quickly.   
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Proposed Bonner Bridge Corridors - Short Bridge in Red, Long Bridge in Purple 
Dotted Line (NCDOT 2008) 
 
In response to this, as well as a proposal from NC Senator Marc Basnight during the SDEIS 
comment period, NCDOT develops a new alternative to build a parallel bridge then elevate 
portions of NC 12 onto bridges within the easement in four phases as erosion threatens. This new 
alternative is the Parallel Bridge Corridor with Phased Approach (henceforth, Phased 
Approach). The Merger Team recommends a Supplement to the Supplemental Draft 
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Environmental Impact Statement (SSDEIS) to study the Phased Approach as a variation of the 
Parallel Bridge alternative.   
 
The Bonner Bridge is rated “Poor” in a NCDOT bridge inspection, earning a sufficiency rating 
of 2 out of 100. The remaining service life is estimated at five years without major repair and 
maintenance projects. 
 
2007: The SSDEIS analysis of the Phased Approach is published. Two public hearings are held 
and written comments are accepted. Multiple state and federal agencies, along with 
environmental organizations, express strong disagreement with the Phased Approach. NCDOT 
deems the Long Bridge impracticable due to the high up-front construction costs.     
 
Construction and maintenance costs through 2060 are roughly similar for both designs. The 
difference is between the up-front costs for construction. Short Bridge up-front construction 
costs are estimated at $260 million. The Long Bridge up-front construction costs are estimated at 
$930 million.    
 
The Merger Team meets to designate the LEDPA (Least Environmentally Damaging Practicable 
Alternative) and cannot reach a consensus. After multiple attempts, the issue is elevated to a 
Merger Review Board where senior agency officials with NCDOT, FHWA, US Army Corps of 
Engineers, and NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources approve the Parallel 
Bridge with Phased Approach as the LEDPA. 
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2008: The FEIS is published with detailed studies of two bridge corridors, each with multiple 
alternatives. The Long Bridge Corridor includes two alternative methods of joining NC 12 in 
Rodanthe: (1) Curved Rodanthe Terminus, and (2) Intersection Rodanthe Terminus. The Parallel 
Bridge Corridor with NC 12 Maintenance Plan includes five alternatives: (1) Nourishment; (2) 
Road North/Bridge South; (3) All Bridge; (4) Phased Approach/Rodanthe Bridge; and (5) Phased 
Approach/Rodanthe Nourishment. The FEIS designates the Parallel Bridge with Phased 
Approach/Rodanthe Bridge as the Preferred Alternative. 
 
2009: NCDOT publishes a Revised Final 4(f) Analysis that determines the Long Bridge is not a 
feasible and prudent alternative to maintaining a road through the Refuge. Merger Team 
members object to the Phased Approach, noting that it calls for pre-planning of future road 
projects despite the inherent uncertainty in modeling future coastal change. The Environmental 
Protection Agency recommends building the parallel bridge as Phase One, with planning for 
future projects deferred for consideration under a collaborative adaptive management plan. This 
becomes the Parallel Bridge Corridor with NC 12 Transportation Management Plan 
(henceforth, Parallel Bridge with TMP). 
 
2010: The Merger Review Board amends the 2007 LEDPA agreement to designate the Parallel 
Bridge with TMP as the new LEDPA. The National Park Service and USFWS refuse to enter 
into a long-term agreement to participate in the TMP strategy meetings but remain part of the 
Merger Team for future projects.   
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An Environmental Assessment (EA) is published to assess the impacts of the Parallel Bridge with 
TMP. A NEPA Environmental Assessment is a less in-depth review than an EIS and assesses the 
potential for significant impacts for a project. Given the previous assessment of all components 
of the TMP in the SDEIS, SSDEIS, and FEIS, the Environmental Assessment was deemed to be 
an adequate review. The EA selects the Parallel Bridge with TMP as the new Preferred 
Alternative. Public hearings are held on the EA and written comments are accepted. Over 4,000 
written comments are received. 
 
The Record of Decision is published, identifying the Parallel Bridge with TMP as the Selected 
Alternative. This ends the NEPA process.  
 
2011: The Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) files suit in U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina on behalf of two non-profit organizations, Defenders of 
Wildlife and the National Wildlife Refuge Association. The suit asks the Court to set aside the 
Record of Decision and issue an injunction to stop construction of the Short Bridge on the 
grounds that the NEPA and Section 4(f) analyses were inadequate.    
 
Hurricane Irene opens a large breach within the Refuge. The new inlet opens on the site of a 
previously closed inlet. A temporary bridge is constructed and will remain in place until long-
term plans are completed (Figure 4.6). 
 
2012: SELC petitions for a state administrative hearing to challenge the Coastal Resources 
Commission’s approval of a CAMA Major Permit for the Bonner Bridge replacement. 
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Figure 4.6: “New Inlet” opened by Hurricane Irene and Temporary Bridge, Fall 2012. (Photo by 
D. Swain) 
 
2013: The U.S. District Court enters summary judgment in favor of NCDOT and FHWA.   The 
SELC appeals the decision to the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Cape Hatteras Electric 
Cooperative intervenes as a defendant with NCDOT and FHWA due to its interest in the cost 
differential between attaching electric transmission cables to the Short Bridge versus the Long 
Bridge.   
 
2014: A three-judge panel for the Court of Appeals issues a split decision, finding that NCDOT 
and FHWA complied with the requirements of NEPA, but questioning the sufficiency of the 
Section 4(f) analysis; the case was remanded back to the U.S. District Court for additional 
analysis of the 4(f) question. The SELC and NCDOT jointly announce they are entering closed 
negotiations to resolve the dispute. 
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2015: The parties announce a settlement of the Bonner Bridge lawsuit. The settlement terms are 
that the SELC will drop all lawsuits regarding the Parallel Bridge is exchange for NCDOT: (1) 
rescinding the awarded contract for a planned bridge over the inlet created by Hurricane Irene 
and requesting new contract bids for an interim bridge parallel to the existing temporary bridge; 
(2) designating a “jug handle” bridge around the ‘S’ Curves “hot spot” north of Rodanthe as the 
Preferred Alternative for Phase IIB; and (3) agreeing that the Short Bridge and future bridges 
will not preclude a longer bridge in the Pamlico Sound in the future. Additional provisions 
concern Section 4(f) analyses and Merger Team agreements.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This case study background has only briefly examined the many physical, social, economic, and 
legal concerns that influenced the bridge debate, yet one thing is clear: the issue is very 
complicated. Despite the array of acronyms and agencies, a central thread of background 
information should be kept in mind through the following chapters. The Outer Banks are barrier 
islands that, in their natural state, migrate westward due to ocean overwash and inlet processes.  
  
The engineered dune line constructed in the 1930s along Hatteras Island interrupted this natural 
migration, resulting in narrowing of the island width and increased risk of breaches during 
storms. This dune line gave the illusion of safety, leading NCDOT to construct NC 12 as a paved 
road along the length of Hatteras Island around 1950. The road opened the island to tourism, 
fundamentally changing its character and economy. Bonner Bridge over Oregon Inlet was built 
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in the early 1960s to accommodate increasing traffic demands. The bridge became a lifeline for 
residents and millions of tourists visiting Hatteras Island each year. 
 
The harsh conditions and dynamic inlet beneath the bridge have led to numerous repairs since its 
construction. In the early 1990s, the bridge exceeded its design life and planning began for a 
replacement. Following environmental laws, NCDOT included federal and state agencies and the 
public in the planning process. Many locals favored a parallel design to replace the aging bridge 
quickly, while USFWS and environmental groups supported a long bridge to bypass the Refuge 
completely. Refuge staff noted that this long bridge option would be compatible with the mission 
of the Refuge by preserving wildlife habitat and allowing a return to natural barrier island 
processes. The ensuing debate raised issues of competing agency priorities and public values. 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the ebb and flow of activity in the bridge debate, using newspaper 
coverage (articles, editorials, guest commentaries, letters to editor from prominent coalition 
figures) plotted against the year of publication.  
 
There was a surge in coverage in the early 1990s around the partial bridge collapse and 
reopening, followed by a lull for the remainder of the decade. The introduction of the long bridge 
in 2003 triggered an increase in activity that generally persisted for the remainder of the case 
study time period. The temporary decline in activity in around 2008 marked a period when the 
FEIS was published and no new bridge designs were introduced. Publication of the EA and the 
ensuing litigation saw another increase in activity, with a noticeable spike in activity in 2013 that 
is discussed in Chapter Six. The following two chapters apply aspects of the ACF and NPF 
policy process frameworks to the bridge project to examine the coalitions that emerged to 
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support these two positions and the strategies they used to influence the policy process, exploring 
the ebb and surge in coalition activity. 
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Newspaper Items Concerning Bridge Project, Plotted by Publication Year 
 
  
 Chapter Five:  Findings and Analysis of Early Policy Phases  
(1990-2003) 
 
 
For the first half of the case study, the bridge replacement debate followed the typical course for 
road projects on the Outer Banks: NCDOT presented its preferred plan and negotiated the details 
and permits with the relevant agencies through normal agency channels. The coalitions that are 
the focus of this project did not begin to emerge until around 2004, but the groundwork for their 
positions and strategies were laid in these early agency negotiations. This chapter explores these 
positions and strategies through the first two policy phases. The policy phases are presented 
separately; each section opens with a summary of the context, then continues with a discussion 
of each side’s position and general strategic choices, and concludes with a summary.  
 
Pre-1990 Bridge Condition 
Standing at the edge of Oregon Inlet, Bonner Bridge curved in a broad arc against the horizon. 
The grey concrete of the navigation span cut a stark, graceful line across the blue of water and 
sky. From afar, the bridge seemed a monument to human engineering and design. A closer look 
presented a troubling image: pitted and broken concrete contrasted with the rust-red of steel 
supports that shored up shaky pilings. Decades of salt, waves, and erosion had taken their toll, 
leaving a bridge near the end of its service life and much worse for wear. Figure 5.1 shows the 
bridge in the 2008 and 2012, depicting similar conditions as would have existed in the 1980s. 
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Figure 5.1:  Left – Bonner Bridge, 2012 (Photo by D Swain); Right – Structural Deterioration to 
Bridge, 2008 (OBTF 2008) 
 
NCDOT began repair projects on Bonner Bridge within three years of its completion in 1963; in 
the following decades, tens of millions of dollars were spent on maintenance and repairs. Pilings, 
threatened by erosion and scour, were reinforced in 1965 and 1978. Support pilings were added 
in 1978, again in 1981, and yet again in 1989. That same year, the erosion threat to the southern 
bridge terminus prompted the state to lift its long-standing ban on hardened structures along the 
ocean shoreline to construct a $14 million terminal groin (rock jetty) to stabilize the southern 
shoulder of the inlet.   
 
Policy Phase 1:  1990-2001 
 
Policy Phase Preview:  The bridge replacement created an opportunity for USFWS to break 
longstanding patterns and oppose future road maintenance within the Pea Island Wildlife Refuge. 
Within agency interactions, two distinct positions emerged that laid the groundwork for future 
coalition positions. The following discussion traces the development of those positions.  
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Strategies are discussed only in the sense that the choices made in this policy period influenced 
the strategic choices of the coalitions that emerged in later policy periods. 
 
Context:  Round up the Usual Suspects 
As this case study opens, the scene is set: Bonner Bridge was built in the early 1960s using the 
best available information about the dynamic barrier island, inlet, and local conditions. The 
bridge was designed for a 30-year service life.  By the early 1990s, salt water and air had 
penetrated the concrete and corroded the reinforcing steel. Tides and storms threatened to 
undermine the bridge pilings. Despite near continuous dredging, the navigation channel 
repeatedly shifted away from the navigation span, forcing boat traffic to pass under neighboring 
spans between pilings not engineered to withstand collisions. The current bridge could not 
endure indefinitely. The issue was not whether to replace the bridge, but how and where? 
 
At this early stage, the cast of characters was predictable: NCDOT took the lead in initial bridge 
replacement planning, with FHWA supervising over its shoulder. The National Park Service 
controlled the northern bridge terminus as part of the Cape Hatteras National Seashore. 
Likewise, the southern terminus lay within the Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge and was 
managed by the local Refuge Manager, a USFWS employee. Any bridge replacement would 
require a US Army Corps of Engineers permit for dredge and fill of waters of the United States. 
A new bridge would cross a navigable waterway, requiring a permit from the US Coast Guard. 
The key state agency was the North Carolina Division of Coastal Management (since 
reorganized as part of NC Department of Environmental Quality), which oversaw the North 
Carolina Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Lead Actors, Federal Agencies, and State Resource Agencies Active in Policy Phase 1 
Lead Actors Federal Agencies State Resource Agencies 
NCDOT 
FHWA 
 
USFWS 
National Park Service 
US Army Corps of 
Engineers 
US Coast Guard 
US Department of the 
Interior 
 
NC Division of Coastal 
Management 
  
 Familiar Opponents 
Most of these groups were quite familiar with one another. Nearly every NCDOT maintenance 
project on NC 12 within the Refuge, routine or emergency, required a permit from the Refuge 
Manager. Likewise, the National Park Superintendent issued permits for roadwork within the 
Seashore. Those decisions were generally made by the local site managers, with the USFWS and 
National Park Service retaining final permitting oversight.    
 
Familiarity did not lead to cooperation. In 1990, the bridge replacement was not the only debate 
surrounding Oregon Inlet. The State of North Carolina, US Army Corps of Engineers, US Coast 
Guard, and Department of the Interior were engaged in a longstanding dispute over plans to 
stabilize Oregon Inlet. When the Bonner Bridge was designed, engineers anticipated the inlet 
being stabilized with jetties within five years (NCDOT 2008). Thirty years later, the jetties were 
still in the planning stage. The project remained stalled in a mire of agency objections and 
numerous environmental impact statements. The Department of the Interior lodged one of the 
key objections to the jetties, refusing to issue permits based on findings that the plan was 
incompatible with the purposes and mission of both the National Seashore and the Refuge.  
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When initial planning for the Bonner Bridge replacement began, the stalled jetty debate was 
revived. NCDOT and FHWA both favored moving forward with the jetty project to stabilize the 
inlet beneath the bridge. The National Park Service and USFWS steadfastly opposed any inlet 
stabilization. The decades of disagreement over how to manage Oregon Inlet may have shaped 
the agencies’ initial response to bridge planning.  
 
 Considering the Options 
NCDOT initiated scoping for a bridge replacement feasibility study in early 1990. The feasibility 
study considered six replacement alternatives, including ferries, a tunnel, and a new bridge. After 
consideration, a bridge replacement built parallel to the old bridge was selected for analysis in 
the upcoming Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS).   
 
At this early stage, all parties agreed that the bridge must be replaced (NCDOT 1998). In 
October 1990, a hopper dredge struck the bridge during a storm, causing a span to collapse. For 
more than three months, Hatteras Island residents relied on emergency ferry service and 
generators for all supplies, transportation, and services. This emergency underscored the 
importance of the bridge as a lifeline for Hatteras Island. According to an Outer Banks Chamber 
of Commerce official, “[t]he bridge outage had a devastating impact on the people of Hatteras 
Island, no question about it” (Thiel 1991a). Another local agreed, telling a newspaper that the 
bridge collapse “made people realize the importance of tourism on the island. . . it really hit 
county officials how much revenue Hatteras Island contributes to the occupancy tax and the 
general fund” (Thiel 1991a). In 1993, the bridge sufficiency rating was 32.5 out of 100.  
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Despite the discontent in other agencies, NCDOT published the DEIS for a parallel bridge 
replacement in 1993. The DEIS was submitted to 13 federal and eight state agencies for formal 
comment, with additional copies sent to local government entities, civic and business groups, and 
environmental organizations. Two public hearings were held on the DEIS, where 31 out of 74 
total attendees presented comments. NCDOT prepared a preliminary Final Environmental 
Impact Statement (pFEIS) in 1996, but this document was never formally signed or published 
due to permitting issues with USFWS. 
 
 Early Signs of Future Discord 
In this early period, outlines of the future coalition positions were already visible, though the 
coalitions had not yet formed. The discussions were limited to agency interactions in regulatory 
consultations, with NCDOT and USFWS emerging as chief proponents of the two positions.  
The core positions developed during this period formed the foundation for later coalition debates. 
These proto-coalition positions were communicated through environmental impact studies and 
formal comments rather than persuasive narratives, but there are embedded indications of which 
issues were given priority. 
 
NCDOT (Future Short Bridge Coalition) Position 
NCDOT’s position focused on replacing a critical transportation lifeline before it reached the end 
of its service life. NCDOT noted that the Bonner Bridge “provides the only highway connection 
of Hatteras Island and the mainland via NC 12” and that the bridge was constructed after the 
existing “ferry was unable to keep pace” with the traffic demand. “During the 1994 summer 
season, more than 7,900 vehicles crossed the bridge each day. The bridge is the only exit for 
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evacuation from Hatteras Island during major storms. Many residents of Ocracoke Island also 
evacuate via Bonner Bridge. The bridge also carries the island’s electrical power and telephone 
lines” (NCDOT 1993, 1.1). 
 
In 1990, NCDOT estimated the bridge had a service life of 12 years until major repairs would be 
required. By 1993, that estimate had dropped to six years. In a fanciful description, the NCDOT 
planner overseeing the bridge studies explained that she saw “this bridge lying in a hospital bed 
with its leg up in a cast and bandages all over it.  It’s still alive, but it’s costing a lot of money to 
get it better again, and it’s probably on Medicare and doesn’t know where that money is going to 
come from” (Glass 1993). 
 
 Priorities 
NCDOT acknowledged the necessity of factoring the dynamic physical environment into bridge 
planning; the official project purpose described the need to account for natural inlet migration 
and shoreline movement through 2050. The proposed bridge was designed “so it can continue to 
serve NC 12 easily, even if that road must be shifted because of shoreline erosion and overwash” 
(NCDOT 1993, 1.11). NCDOT recognized the need to accommodate the natural conditions, yet 
the planning documents were clear that this was not the only consideration. The pFEIS identified 
23 “trade-off” factors for the bridge alternatives. The pFEIS seemed to indicate NCDOT’s order 
of priorities. The ferry alternative was “substantially more expensive,” would reduce traffic 
service, and require extensive dredging. The tunnel alternative “also would be substantially more 
expensive” and require excavation of the inlet bottom. The west bridge corridor would require a 
“substantially longer [crossing]. . ., would involve greater cost, and would result in more difficult 
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and less desirable connections to NC 12” (NCDOT 1998, S.3-S.4). The east bridge corridor 
would pose greater impacts to wildlife habitat while increased exposure to waves and currents 
would offset any cost savings. NCDOT’s choice of wording emphasized cost with a secondary 
focus on environmental interests, including dredging and habitat. 
 
 NC 12 Planning 
NCDOT did not consider planning for the future of NC 12 along Pea Island to be part of the 
bridge project. Discussion about NC 12’s future did not feature prominently in the pFEIS 
(covering only pages 58-60 in the second chapter), with NC 12’s relocation omitted from the 
alternative bridge designs. NCDOT argued, both in the DEIS text and in response to agency 
comments, that the “need to replace Bonner Bridge is urgent . . . [and] it seemed unreasonable to 
tie the largely long term need of NC 12 with the clearly short-term need of replacing Bonner 
Bridge” (NCDOT 1993, 2.61). Instead, NCDOT reasoned that “[b]etter decisions related to the 
disposition of NC 12 near the Bonner Bridge could be made if it were studied as part of a 
comprehensive study of NC 12 rather than as a part of the Bonner Bridge replacement study” 
(NCDOT 1993, 2.58). They pointed to the 1993 creation of an interagency task force (OBTF) 
tasked with “develop[ing] a long range protection and maintenance plan for the Outer Banks’ 
transportation system” (NCDOT 1993, 2.62). Noting the time it would take for this new task 
force to produce recommendations, NCDOT argued that it was unreasonable “either to 
artificially accelerate NC 12 studies to conform with the urgency of the Bonner Bridge 
replacement or to delay the design . . . to meet the need for thoughtful consideration of the full 
range of NC 12 issues” (NCDOT 1993, 2.63).  
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During the formal commenting period, the USFWS suggested that a long bridge be constructed 
from Roanoke Island or the mainland to Rodanthe to avoid the Refuge. NCDOT dismissed such 
an alternative as “longer, more expensive, and [creating] a circuitous traffic circulation pattern” 
(NCDOT 2008, 8.12) for National Seashore visitors. This suggestion would reappear later in the 
policy debate. 
 
USFWS (Future Long Bridge Coalition) Position 
The separation of NC 12 planning and the bridge project was the central point of disagreement 
between the NCDOT and USFWS positions. The key agencies all agreed that the bridge required 
replacement. In formal comments, the National Park Service acknowledged that “a transportation 
link on the Outer Banks is essential and that the proposed Bonner Bridge replacement plan is the 
only likely means by which that link will be maintained for the near future. . .” (NCDOT 1993, 
C.66). 
 
Various federal agencies and environmental groups disagreed with NCDOT’s decision to sever 
the bridge and road planning. The US Army Corps of Engineers’ formal comments deemed it 
“very unfortunate” (NCDOT 1998, C.54) that the timing of the bridge project and the OBTF 
long-term NC 12 planning could not coincide. The NC Chapter of the Sierra Club echoed this 
sentiment, advising that the “environmental impacts of replacing Bonner Bridge and relocating 
NC Highway 12 should be considered together instead of in a segmented or piecemeal fashion” 
(NCDOT 1993, C.93). 
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The Department of the Interior, speaking on behalf of the USFWS, took the firmest stance 
regarding coordination of the bridge replacement and NC 12 planning. As early as 1993, they 
laid out the position that would be the core of the future Long Bridge Coalition argument: 
Replacing the bridge connection at Oregon Inlet will require future maintenance 
of NC 12 for the life of the bridge. In that period, the management options 
available to the Service to carry out its mission at the Refuge will be restricted, as 
they have been in recent years, by the recurring need to protect NC 12 from 
erosion and storm overwash. . . It is impossible to evaluate the future of Bonner 
Bridge without addressing the issue of NC 12 potential relocation. . . Replacement 
of Bonner Bridge will restrict alternatives to highway relocation for the life of the 
bridge. Now that the bridge needs replacing, it is also appropriate to study the 
highway’s future (NCDOT 1993, C.45 – C.46).  
 
In the same 1993 comment letter, USFWS formally proposed a long-term solution to the NC 12 
issue that anticipated many aspects of the long bridge. “One way to remove NC 12 from the Inlet 
area would be to construct a bridge on pilings from Wanchese [Roanoke Island] to Hatteras 
Island” (NCDOT 1993, C.46). USFWS explained that such a bridge would meet traffic demand, 
accommodate island migration and sea level rise, avoid many navigation hazards, reduce 
dredging demands, and potentially provide both a shorter route to the mainland and a safer 
evacuation route, while also eliminating the need to maintain the engineered dune line and 
terminal groin on Pea Island.  
 
In 1994, USFWS refused to concur with NCDOT’s Section 4(f) analysis (required for federally 
funded road projects within the Refuge) that there were no “feasible and prudent alternatives” to 
keeping the bridge and NC 12 within the Refuge. In language that would reappear in future legal 
briefs, USFWS argued that the analysis failed to present a sufficiently rigorous examination of 
alternatives (NCDOT 1993, C.57). USFWS suggested that the FEIS and 4(f) analysis should not 
be issued until the OBTF completed its NC 12 analysis and made recommendations.   
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Other Voices 
Though the bridge discussion was centered in agency consultations, some interested individuals 
shared their thoughts about the various proposals with the media. Although few, these comments 
provide a glimpse into conversations likely taking place outside of the formal process. Orrin 
Pilkey, a Duke University coastal geologist with extensive experience on the Outer Banks, was 
one of the most prominent voices. Pilkey deemed any plan to rebuild a bridge over the inlet as 
“just madness” (Glass 1991), and lent his support to a ferry system that could adjust as islands 
moved and sections of NC 12 were lost to erosion. A high-ranking NCDOT official dismissed 
ferries as “extremely undesirable” and “virtually cost-prohibitive” (Glass 1990), with such a 
limited capacity that they could not begin to meet demand. State Senator Marc Basnight (D-
Dare) was unequivocal in responding, “If I’m around, they’re not going back to ferries” (Glass 
1990). 
 
Throughout the early 1990s, sporadic news articles about NC 12 provided a preview of 
arguments that would see widespread discussion in the following decade. The Roanoke Island to 
Rodanthe bridge formally suggested by USFWS in 1993 had entered public discussion early, 
with the Chairman of the Hyde County, NC Board of Commissioners publicly favoring exploring 
such a design as early as 1991 (Glass 1991). The suggestion met with a discouraging response 
from a NCDOT planner, who noted that a long bridge was “way beyond the scope of this 
project,” citing a ballpark cost estimate of $380 million dollars (Glass 1991).  
 
Following the announcement of a plan to add sandbags to storm-damaged NC 12 in 1992, the 
influential Raleigh News & Observer editorialized “It was the ocean, not man, that built these 
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glorious but fragile sand-spits, the ocean that ever since has moved them at its whim – and will 
move them again, no matter what puny men do with their puny machines . . . before NCDOT 
dumps a fortune in sand to seaward of NC 12, it should take a closer look at moving the road 
toward where the ocean will move the islands” (Raleigh News & Observer 1992). 
 
General Strategic Choices 
During this early period in the case study, the bridge discussion generally remained within 
formal agency interactions, which restricted strategic options. These interactions were mandated 
by statutes or regulations and generally followed established formats. NCDOT consulted 
unofficially with key agencies during the scoping process and submitted the DEIS and the pFEIS 
to the agencies for comment. The agencies, including USFWS, advocated their positions in their 
formal written comments, focusing on concerns particular to their regulatory missions. The 
language was formal, restrained, and professional. USFWS used their formal comments to 
indicate that NCDOT’s plan may be contrary to statutory and permitting requirements. 
 
Summary of Phase 1 
As Table 5.2 shows, the future Short Bridge and Long Bridge Coalitions differed in their 
narrative topics, but used the same general strategy in Policy Phase 1. NCDOT placed significant 
emphasis on the costs of various bridge design alternatives. While environmental concerns, by 
law, must factor into NCDOT’s analysis, it was already apparent that funding issues took 
priority. Most agencies accepted NCDOT’s selection of the parallel bridge, but the USFWS was 
already firm in its position that the bridge and NC 12 could not be analyzed separately and that 
the 4(f) analysis was insufficient. 
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Table 5.2: Narrative Issues and Strategies by Future Coalition, Policy Phase 1 
 Future Long Bridge Future Short Bridge 
 
 
Lead Actors 
 
 
USFWS 
 
 
NCDOT 
 
Narrative Issues 
 
link between road and 
bridge 
restricting options in 
future 
 
 
transportation needs 
design costs 
 
 
General Strategies 
 
agency procedures 
 
agency procedures 
 
 
 
Policy Phase 2:  2002-2003 
 
Policy Phase Preview: The parallel bridge design that seemed settled at the end of the previous 
policy phase was completely set aside in light of new coastal engineering data. With the planning 
process reset, USFWS had an opportunity to use its permitting authority to steer the bridge 
corridor selection and incorporate NC 12 planning into the bridge project. This resulted in a long 
bridge design that bypassed the Refuge. Dare County officials responded by exerting political 
pressure to slow or reverse this longer bridge project. 
 
Context:  Back to the Drawing Board 
At the close of 2001, NCDOT was arranging funding and working on permitting issues for the 
parallel bridge. The process had stalled in 1999 when the pFEIS was left unsigned due to a 
conflict over the USFWS Section 7 Endangered Species consultation, but construction was still 
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projected to start in 2006. A few months later, all of NCDOT’s expectations were turned on their 
heads.    
 
In late 2001, NC Senator Marc Basnight, then President Pro Tempore (highest ranking member) 
of the NC Senate, had used his political influence to accelerate bridge planning. After a meeting 
with the NCDOT Secretary, Basnight announced NCDOT’s plan to “proceed as quickly as we 
can to construct a new bridge. It is not a matter of not being able to . . .the bridge has to be 
replaced” (Kozak 2001). These plans came to an abrupt halt a few months later when a new 
coastal engineering report predicted that areas near the planned junction of the bridge and NC 12 
south of the inlet were at risk of washing away. This area, dubbed the “Canal Zone” for its banks 
of sand dunes on either side of the road, was experiencing an average erosion rate of six feet per 
year, with a higher rate of nine feet closer to the bridge. At its narrowest spot, there were just 115 
feet between ocean shoreline and NC 12’s pavement.    
 
Faced with building a bridge that would connect to a road that could soon be washed away, 
NCDOT agreed to scrap its parallel bridge design. New bridge corridors would be designed, 
followed by a Supplemental Draft EIS (SDEIS), with planning coordinated through the new 
Merger Team process described in Chapter Four. This clean-slate planning process presented 
USFWS with an opportunity to use provisions of the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act of 1997 (henceforth, 1997 Refuge Act) to possibly block construction of any 
bridge landing within the Refuge.  Under this Act, the USFWS was directed to determine 
whether a proposed use (or project) was compatible with the mission of the Refuge before 
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issuing a Special Use permit. On that basis, USFWS advised that any bridge design that landed 
within the Refuge was unlikely to receive a permit.   
 
With the parallel bridge off the table and USFWS’s permitting restrictions in mind, the Merger 
Team identified two new bridge designs for detailed study in the SDEIS: (1) a six-mile bridge 
that would join NC 12 south of the Canal Zone “hot spot;” and (2) a 17-mile bridge through the 
Pamlico Sound that would avoid the Refuge entirely and rejoin NC 12 in Rodanthe. Both designs 
would avoid the high erosion area on northern Pea Island. The Merger Team officially selected 
the 17-mile bridge as the Preferred Alternative for study in summer 2003. The Dare County 
Board of Commissioners objected strongly to this plan, repeatedly expressing concern about its 
effect on public access to the Refuge. In late 2003, responding to political pressure, the Governor 
ordered a six-month hiatus on all bridge planning to address Dare County’s concerns. 
 
NCDOT and USFWS (Future Long Bridge Coalition) Position 
NCDOT made a significant policy shift when the 1993 bridge design was scrapped in favor of 
new, longer alternatives. During this policy period, NCDOT’s new position put it on the same 
side as USFWS. Whether this alliance reflected expediency or common priorities, it resulted in a 
long bridge design that ended in Rodanthe and completely bypassed the Refuge. The existing 
bridge and terminal groin would be removed. NCDOT’s policy shift was a significant reversal of 
its previous position: 
•   In 1996, NCDOT had firmly indicated that the bridge replacement and NC 12 
planning operated on two different time scales and should not be considered 
jointly 
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•   In 2003, NCDOT and the Merger Team adopted joint planning for the bridge and 
the segment of NC 12 within the Refuge, concurring that (1) the	  project	  area	  
should be extended south to Rodanthe [outside the Refuge] to avoid frequent 
overwash areas on NC 12, and	  (2) if the selected bridge alternative did not extend 
to Rodanthe, planners must consider a future bridge extension to Rodanthe 
(NCDOT 2005). 
 
The new NCDOT and USFWS position emphasized compatibility with management of the 
Refuge. This is reflected in NCDOT’s 2002 screening criteria for proposed bridge corridors, 
which directed that they should (1) be compatible with the Refuge management plan and 1997 
Refuge Act; (2) be eligible for a non-impairment determination from the Park Service; (3) 
minimize impacts on multiple natural resources; and (4) be compatible with a potential longer 
bridge to the south or other long-term NC 12 solutions (NCDOT 2005).  
 
In 2003, NCDOT explained in a bridge update newsletter that the 17-mile bridge “minimize[s] 
natural resource impacts and bypass[es] three locations on NC 12 regularly threatened by 
overwash” (NCDOT 2003, 1). By avoiding the Refuge and “hot spots,” the long bridge presented 
a long-term solution for many NC 12 problems. In comparison, the shorter six-mile bridge “cost 
substantially less but had greater potential impacts to wetlands and waterfowl feeding areas. . . 
[and] may not be compatible with management strategies of the Pea Island National Wildlife 
Refuge” (NCDOT 2003, 1). The 17-mile bridge was chosen for further study based upon 
indications from USFWS that a long bridge was the only option that would receive required 
permits.   
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The long bridge plan would include removal of the 13-mile segment of NC 12 within the Refuge 
along with the terminal groin at the inlet. USFWS committed to providing alternative Refuge 
access, but maintained that the situation was too preliminary to determine the type of access. As 
the Refuge Manager explained in 2003: 
The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, which is what we administer 
under, we manage for wildlife first but not to the exclusion of people, we manage our 
public so that it doesn’t overly impact the wildlife. We want to have the public enjoy and 
utilize the Refuge. Agreed it’s going to be a huge and different way, a huge challenge . . . 
there will always be public use as far as I know on portions of Pea Island . . . other 
Refuges handle people with trams to move people and minimize impact from a lot of 
vehicles (Dare County, NC Board of County Commissioners 2003a, 8).  
 
NCDOT and USFWS justified bypassing the Refuge based upon its importance to migratory 
waterfowl habitat and migration. The shorter six-mile bridge would have landed in the Refuge, 
resulting in “valuable wildlife habitat [being] lost or severely impacted” (Bryant 2003, 1).  
Beyond the effects on birds and habitat, USFWS also pointed out that a bridge bypassing the 
Refuge “makes the best economic sense and will have the best long-term sustainability – making 
this a more reliable transportation corridor” (Bryant 2003, 1). 
 
USFWS and NCDOT (Future Long Bridge Coalition) General Strategies 
USFWS used a strategy of working “within the system” in this policy phase, skillfully using its 
permitting leverage during the Merger Team meetings to significantly redirect the course of 
bridge and road planning. The 2002 reset on bridge planning gave USFWS the opening to apply 
pressure and persuade NCDOT to change course on both the bridge and the road.  
 
At the end of Policy Phase 1 in 2001, USFWS and NCDOT held differing opinions on the 
connection between the short parallel bridge and NC 12 planning. NCDOT had dismissed 
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USFWS’s earlier suggested 22-mile bridge from Wanchese to Rodanthe out-of-hand as “way 
beyond the scope of this project” and unduly expensive. NCDOT also firmly resisted calls to 
jointly plan for both the bridge replacement and NC 12. A year later, NCDOT had designed and 
endorsed a 17-mile bridge that completely avoided the Refuge and erosion “hot spots” on NC 12. 
This change of heart was apparently due to USFWS’s timely application of permitting pressure.    
 
When NCDOT agreed to start with a blank slate in designing the replacement bridge, USFWS 
had a prime opportunity to apply regulatory leverage. There were three regulatory “pressure 
points” for the bridge and NC 12. First, any roadwork outside the NCDOT easement required a 
USFWS Special Use permit. Second, under Section 4(f), any federally funded road project 
within the Refuge required planners to demonstrate that there was no “prudent and feasible” 
alternative and that the selected alternative minimized harm to Refuge. A failure to do so could 
result in legal action. Third, as a member of the Merger Team, USFWS could refuse to concur on 
the selection of alternatives or the designation of the Preferred Alternative. Such a refusal would 
require elevating the NEPA process to a Review Board for a final decision. 
 
NCDOT would have recognized USFWS’s power to stall any short bridge plans, so when the 
Merger Team favored a long bridge circumventing the problem areas, NCDOT concurred in the 
decision. The likely explanation for this is expediency. NCDOT’s goal was to replace the bridge 
quickly, safely, and at a reasonable cost. The predicted erosion on northern Pea Island and non-
negotiable permitting roadblocks restricted NCDOT’s options. The bridge could not be built 
within the Refuge without USFWS permits; USFWS indicated that it would not issue those 
permits. The bridge replacement could not be postponed and re-negotiated indefinitely.   
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In the face of these constraints, NCDOT’s only apparent option was to concede to building a 
bridge outside the Refuge. While this was a reversal of a long-standing position, it had the 
benefit of solving many of the NC 12 maintenance issues by bypassing the major erosion “hot 
spots.” While permitting pressures may have limited their options, it is important to remember, 
in light of the controversy soon to follow, that NCDOT both designed and supported the long 
bridge corridor in 2002. 
 
Dare County (Future Short Bridge Coalition) Position 
The decision to eliminate the parallel bridge design in favor of a long bridge was made by the 
Merger Team without input from the public or local officials. As word began to circulate of the 
new plan, the Dare County, NC Board of Commissioners recognized that this plan would likely 
eliminate 13 miles of road access on northern Hatteras Island. This would restrict access to 
popular recreational beach areas and the fishing catwalk on the southern bridge terminus. The 
Dare County Commissioners took the lead in expressing surprise and disapproval of the new 
plan. Stan White, a County Commissioner, also served on the NC Board of Transportation; this 
increased the Board’s access and influence in the debate. The Board consistently addressed the 
issue during its monthly meetings, referencing the importance of Refuge access to both the 
tourism economy and the local way-of-life. Their position was summarized in the following list 
of concerns presented to USFWS and NCDOT at a 2003 meeting: 
•   Access:  Access to Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge must be maintained in a 
manner that permits the same use and enjoyment of the Refuge that exists today, 
including: 
o   complete access twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week; 
o   vehicular access on a paved, two-lane road (Highway 12); 
o   preservation of the State’s right to maintain and repair NC 12, even in the 
event of a full breach of the road. 
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•   South Terminal Groin: The south terminal groin that currently gives some 
stability to Oregon Inlet, and that protects the beaches and habitat on the north 
end of Pea Island, the historic Coast Guard Station, and the prime recreational 
fishing areas must be preserved and maintained. 
•   Time Frame: The replacement bridge must be designed so as to be fully 
funded and constructed on a time frame that guarantees completion by 2010 
(Dare County Commissioners 2003b, 1-2). 
  
The Dare County Board of Commissioners was the most prominent voice in this period, but the 
mayors and councils of several northern Outer Banks communities expressed support for the 
County’s position. A citizen surfing group, the “Pea Island Coalition,” formed to oppose the long 
bridge plan.  The group gathered over 700 signatures and letters with a petition reading, in part,  
[N]o planned access to Pea Island north of Rodanthe is unacceptable to me. . . I would 
like to see . . . a commitment to a maintained 2 lane blacktop road that would be open 
24/7 to the public. . . [the parties should] revisit the idea of replacing the current bridge 
with a bridge just to its west. This option would . . . save over $130 million dollars on the 
bridge project . . . [T]housands of people utilize the recreational opportunities on Pea 
Island and not having this area available will assuredly crowd the other beaches. . . (Pea 
Island Coalition 2003). 
 
Dare County (Future Short Bridge Coalition) General Strategy 
The Dare County Board of Commissioners used a political strategy to oppose NCDOT’s 
proposed long bridge. By May 2003, updates on the bridge project had become a standing 
agenda item at every Board meeting. In June 2003, the Board invited Refuge Manager Mike 
Bryant and a NCDOT representative to make a presentation and answer questions during their 
regular meeting. They used this opportunity to voice their concerns and get clarification of 
USFWS’s and NCDOT’s positions. At this time, the Commissioners’ primary concerns were 
Refuge access and terminal groin removal. There was some division regarding acceptance of the 
long bridge, with most Commissioners opposing it. A few were willing to support the long 
bridge if access and groin issues were adequately addressed. 
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The Board also arranged a meeting on August 12, 2003 between local officials and USFWS and 
NCDOT staff in Manteo, NC to ask questions and share their constituents’ concerns (Table 5.3). 
While there were no immediate results from this meeting, the willingness of senior state officials 
and regional federal agency staff to attend demonstrates the political clout of the county Board of 
Commissioners. As mentioned previously, Commissioner Stan White was also serving on the 
state Board of Transportation. This allowed him greater political access in his dual roles, 
including meetings with NC Governor Easley and NC Secretary of Transportation Tippett to 
express his displeasure with NCDOT’s position on Refuge access and groin removal.   
 
Table 5.3: Attendees at Meeting Between County Commissioners and Agencies– August 12, 
2003, Manteo, NC 
Federal and State Officials Local Officials 
NCDOT Secretary Dare County Board of Commissioners 
NCDOT Deputy Secretary State Representative NC House District 2 
USFWS Atlanta office representative Staff Member – office of NC Senate President pro tem 
Pea Island NWR Manager Mayor Southern Shores, NC 
2 staff members USFWS  
Raleigh office Mayor Kill Devil Hills, NC 
2 staff members NCDOT 
Raleigh office 
 
 
1 staff member NCDOT  
Edenton office 
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The Board found an ally in Senator Marc Basnight (D-Dare). In Fall 2003, Senator Basnight sent 
a letter to the Governor that incorporated the Board’s concerns as addressed in the August 
meeting with NCDOT and USFWS. Basnight raised additional concerns about long bridge 
funding difficulties and Refuge access. He concluded by expressing his hopes that the Governor 
would “take a personal interest in this project and see to it that the citizens of Dare County are 
heard. This is a very important project, Governor, in a community that contributes very strongly 
to our state’s economy. It is only fair that their voices be heard and that their concerns be 
addressed” (Basnight 2003).  
 
This combination of political pressure from the Board, a member of the state Board of 
Transportation, and the state’s most prominent legislator was effective. In mid-September 2003, 
the Secretary of Transportation ordered a six-month halt to the bridge studies to allow Dare 
County officials the opportunity to develop an alternative bridge plan. While this was a 
noteworthy political concession, it also set a lofty goal for rural county officials: draft a plan that 
addressed local concerns, was fiscally responsible, environmentally sound, and described a route 
that could be permitted by USFWS.   
 
Whether this was a token offer from NCDOT or not is debatable. What is less debatable is the 
outcome of an October meeting in Atlanta between Dare County officials, the NCDOT Deputy 
Secretary, and USFWS regional staff. As Commissioner White explained at the next Board 
meeting, USFWS officials were adamant that any bridge landing within the Refuge could not be 
permitted. The meeting minutes note that Commissioner White was “now convinced that 
USFWS has mandates that say that we cannot land that bridge anywhere except within the 
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existing right of way” (Dare County Commissioners 2003c, 4). This meeting showed that there 
were limits to political influence. Dare County’s political strategy yielded some results at the 
state level but was ineffective at the federal level in this policy phase.   
 
Summary of Phase 2 
In this policy phase, NCDOT reversed its previous position and designed a long bridge that 
would completely bypass the Refuge. This reversal was prompted by an engineering study that 
indicated that the planned parallel bridge terminus would face serious erosion problems in the 
near future. With NCDOT forced back to the drawing board, USFWS seized the opportunity to 
use its permitting authority to restrict the feasible options to a single design: a bridge that 
avoided the Refuge entirely. In response, the Dare County Board of Commissioners used 
political pressure to draw attention to the loss of road access to the Refuge and removal of the 
terminal groin. This political pressure had some results at the state level, but was unsuccessful in 
swaying the federal USFWS. Table 5.4 summarizes the differences between the two positions in 
Phase 2.  
Table 5.4: Narrative Issues and Strategies by Future Coalition, Policy Phase 2 
 Future Long Bridge Future Short Bridge 
 
 
Lead Actors 
 
 
USFWS, NCDOT 
 
Dare County      
Commissioners 
 
 
Narrative Issues 
 
link between road and 
bridge 
permitting issues 
 
 
refuge access 
terminal groin 
quick replacement 
 
 
General Strategies 
 
permitting leverage 
 
 
political efforts 
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Chapter Summary 
 
In the first two policy phases, the coalitions had not yet emerged, but the core positions and 
strategies were already becoming apparent. USFWS remained consistent in favoring a long 
bridge alternative, expressing concerns that attempts to separate the bridge and road projects 
were short-sighted and would limit future road planning options. As circumstances forced a reset 
on bridge planning, USFWS built on its earlier agency strategy, using permitting leverage in 
Phase 2 to “persuade” NCDOT to change its position and support a long bridge. 
 
The Future Short Bridge position saw remarkable evolution in this period. Initially, the short 
bridge was favored by NCDOT based on costs and the need for a quick replacement. When 
NCDOT reversed this position, the Short Bridge cause was taken up by the Dare County 
Commissioners, who changed both narrative and strategy tacks. Faced with opponents skilled in 
using agency and permitting leverage, the Commissioners relied on their own area of influence, 
using a political strategy to advance new arguments about Refuge access, the terminal groin, and 
the need for a speedy replacement. The next chapter explores how the “Future Short Bridge” and 
“Future Long Bridge” positions became the core of the coalitions that dominated the remainder 
of the case study. 
  
 Chapter Six:  Findings and Analysis of Later Policy Phases 
(2004-2015) 
 
This chapter focuses on the last half of the bridge debate when the two coalitions emerged and 
actively worked to influence the outcome of the bridge decision. Like the previous chapter, the 
policy phases are presented in sections. The Phase 3 and Phase 4 sections each open with a 
context discussion; then proceeds to an analysis of the Long Bridge Coalition positions, 
narratives, and strategies; followed by similar treatment of the Short Bridge Coalition; then 
concludes with a summary. The Phase 5 discussion, which covers the legal settlement where the 
coalitions were not active, is limited to a general discussion. The format is as follows: 
•   Policy Phase 3 
o   Context 
o   Long Bridge Coalition 
§   Positions – Narratives – Strategies 
o   Short Bridge Coalition 
§   Positions – Narratives – Strategies 
o   Summary 
•   Policy Phase 4 
o   Context 
o   Long Bridge Coalition 
§   Positions – Narratives – Strategies 
o   Short Bridge Coalition 
§   Positions – Narratives – Strategies 
o   Summary 
•   Policy Phase 5 
o   Context and General Discussion 
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Policy Phase 3:  2004 – 2010 
 
Policy Phase Preview: The coalitions formed as local and elected officials successfully lobbied 
to have a short parallel bridge design added to the environmental studies. USFWS continued to 
warn that a short bridge would not receive permits. NCDOT proposed multiple design variations 
in an effort to satisfy the permitting restrictions. As cost estimates climbed with each new 
environmental impact study, public interest in the issue grew. Each coalition continued its 
previous strategy while adding public outreach efforts. Ultimately, the short bridge was selected 
for construction. 
 
Context:  Alternatives, Supplements, and Hearings 
As this policy phase opened, NCDOT found itself in a difficult position. The bridge replacement 
could not be delayed indefinitely, but the only design likely to receive USFWS permits was 
proving to be politically unpopular. During NCDOT’s six-month planning moratorium, Dare 
County officials proposed several short bridge designs with a terminus on state-owned property 
adjacent to the existing easement. By avoiding a bridge terminus on Refuge property, the designs 
potentially eliminated the need for a USFWS compatibility determination and permit. They 
would also keep the existing NC 12 road access through the Refuge and, possibly, leave the 
terminal groin in place.  
 
While NCDOT ultimately rejected the County’s proposals after cost studies, it took the 
opportunity to reconsider the 1993 Parallel Bridge design. With some alteration, NCDOT noted 
that the 1993 version “could be designed and built so it would terminate within the state’s 
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existing NC 12 easement.  No new NC 12 right-of-way would be needed, so no Refuge 
compatibility determination would be needed” (NCDOT 2005, 2.56) for the bridge terminus. 
This plan would still need USFWS permits for any NC 12 maintenance within the Refuge. 
 
This parallel bridge re-design appeared to sidestep the USFWS permitting roadblock. In a 
surprise move, the Merger Team agreed in October 2004 to add a parallel bridge design with an 
assortment of NC 12 maintenance options to the Supplemental Draft EIS (SDEIS). When the 
SDEIS was published, NCDOT and USFWS once again found themselves on opposite sides of 
the issue. The SDEIS cost analysis estimated the 17-mile bridge construction costs at around 
$420 million (NCDOT 2005). The short parallel bridge had a significantly lower up-front cost 
($191 million) but similar or higher long-term costs over 50 years. USFWS warned that the 
proposed NC 12 maintenance options were unlikely to receive permits.  
 
NCDOT was left to choose between a politically unpopular long bridge it could not afford and a 
shorter, cheaper bridge that would not receive the necessary permits. In 2006, NC Senator 
Basnight proposed an alternative “Balanced Approach” design, featuring a parallel bridge, with 
future bridges at the “hot spots” to be constructed within the existing easement as necessary. 
Around the same time, the newly appointed Secretary of the Interior suggested that that the 
bridge and NC 12 be considered separately for USFWS permitting. This appeared to offer a way 
out for NCDOT: the deteriorating Bonner Bridge could be replaced with a parallel bridge while 
NC 12 planning continued separately. NCDOT prepared a new Supplement to the Supplemental 
DEIS (SSDEIS) to study Basnight’s proposed design. 
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The 2007 SSDEIS analysis of the newly renamed “Phased Approach” met with nearly 
unanimous objection from state and federal resource agencies. They argued that the plan would 
result in ongoing construction within the Refuge, with bridges eventually left standing in the 
surf. USFWS insisted that future NC 12 work would not be compatible with the Refuge and 
questioned the legal sufficiency of the Section 4(f) analysis. The Merger Team would not concur 
with the plan, forcing NCDOT to elevate the approval decision to a Merger Review Board. The 
Review Board overrode agency objections and selected the Phased Approach as the Preferred 
Alternative.   
 
In 2008, NCDOT published the Final EIS analysis of both the long and short bridges with the 
short parallel bridge (Phased Approach) designated as the Preferred Alternative. USFWS and 
other resource agencies continued to voice strenuous objections to the plan, including the 
accompanying 4(f) analysis. During negotiations, a representative from EPA suggested that 
future NC 12 planning be deferred. Faced with key agencies’ clear opposition to the Phased 
Approach, NCDOT followed EPA’s suggestion and presented yet another short bridge proposal, 
featuring a parallel bridge with NC 12 project planning deferred for future analysis as erosion 
conditions changed. An Environmental Assessment (a less detailed review than an EIS) of this 
plan was published and met with the same objections from USFWS and other agencies. Despite 
the opposition, the 2010 Record of Decision identified the new proposal as the Selected 
Alternative. After seven years of non-stop planning, revision, and more planning, NCDOT 
ultimately chose a short bridge that it could afford but that was certain to face legal challenges in 
the near future. 
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Every one of this seemingly endless series of environmental studies required both public 
hearings and a formal notice and comment period. The back-and-forth between NCDOT and 
USFWS provided opportunities for interested parties to choose sides. The issue became highly 
visible and hotly debated. The coalitions formed into recognizable factions during this policy 
phase as the debate attracted new and vocal participants.  
 
Long Bridge Coalition Position 
As Phase 3 opened, Long Bridge supporters were taken aback by NCDOT’s reversal and the 
inclusion of a short bridge alternative in the SDEIS. Up to this point, their arguments focused on 
permitting issues that would be persuasive to agency staff. Introduction of a competing design 
and increasing public attention needed a new presentation of the long bridge position that would 
be persuasive to a wider audience. This refined argument emerged as the Long Bridge Coalition 
formed.   
 
The Long Bridge position first appeared in environmental advocacy groups’ formal comment 
letters and was elaborated upon in public outreach efforts. The key issues were preservation of 
Refuge function, cost comparisons, the environmental consequences of NC 12 maintenance, 
transportation needs, politics, and altered Refuge access. The core Long Bridge argument could 
be, and frequently was, boiled down to a single sentence: “[A] long bridge that bypasses the 
sensitive Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge is the best option because it is safer, more reliable, 
more cost-effective and environmentally sound” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006b). A more detailed 
exploration of the issues central to the Long Bridge Coalition position follows. 
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 Refuge and Barrier Island Processes 
The long bridge proponents argued that NC 12 maintenance efforts caused ongoing harm to the 
Refuge, contending that Refuge concerns should take priority in the bridge debate. As an 
advocacy group noted, the Refuge “was established in 1937 (sic) and provides habitat for more 
than 365 species of migratory birds . . . [and] provides one of the last stretches of undeveloped 
Atlantic coastline in the U.S.” (Build The Long Bridge 2007c).  Defenders of Wildlife explained 
that “[t]he continual fight to preserve NC 12 from overwash has seriously compromised the 
ability of Refuge staff to ensure proper marsh accretion, resulting in a diminution of the Refuge 
ecological integrity” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006c). Efforts to maintain NC 12 have “profound 
negative impacts on the Refuge’s diverse habitat types and associated wildlife species” (Build 
the Long Bridge 2007a). The harm caused by beach nourishment and engineered dunes was not 
balanced by successful road protection. Despite NCDOT’s best efforts, sections of NC 12 had 
been moved westward multiple times until they abutted wetland habitat areas. There was 
nowhere left to move the road.   
 
 Cost 
The upfront cost of the long bridge was estimated at $420 million in 2005.  By 2007, this was 
revised upward to between $1.01 billion and $1.4 billion. This was significantly higher than the 
2007 upfront costs of the short bridge, estimated between $250 million and $350 million 
(NCDOT 2007). Although coalition members questioned the accuracy of these figures, an 
advocacy group explained that “the long bridge option would save the state money over time by 
avoiding the millions of dollars in upkeep to continuously clear and maintain NC Highway 12 
south of the proposed short bridge option” (Build the Long Bridge 2006a). They extended this 
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argument further, noting that, over the long term, the long bridge would actually be cheaper than 
the short bridge. Defenders of Wildlife explained, “In reality, the costs of maintaining NC 12 for 
decades to come will require hundreds of millions of dollars more in removing over-washed 
sand, repairing pavement, and spanning so called ‘hotspots’ with additional bridges” (Defenders 
of Wildlife 2006a).  
 
 Safety and Reliability 
Safety and reliability were interrelated concerns for the Long Bridge Coalition, with traveler 
safety threatened by an unreliable road. They cited the frequent storm closures of NC 12, the 
primary transportation and evacuation route for Hatteras Island. Defenders of Wildlife noted that 
“[T]he long bridge option would completely avoid vulnerable sections of NC 12 that routinely 
wash out during storms, effectively stranding Hatteras Island residents and visitors in dangerous 
conditions” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006c). The long bridge would enhance resident and visitor 
safety by providing a “dependable method of travel, free from the threat of overwash and traffic 
disruption during storms and emergencies” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006b). 
 
 Politics 
Coalition members pointed out the unanimous agency support for a long bridge in 2003. As one 
advocacy organization explained, “[e]xperts from 14 federal and state agencies spent years 
debating every aspect of the Bonner Bridge replacement, including safety, cost, and reliability.  
Their decision to pursue the long bridge option should be respected” (Build the Long Bridge 
2006a). Coalition members accused political figures of disrupting this early accord. “Political 
pressure eroded the plan for the bridge” (Defenders of Wildlife 2010), with planning “brought to 
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a screeching halt by state and Dare County officials who intervened in the NCDOT approval 
process” (Southern Environmental Law Center 2008).  
 
Local and state political officials were also accused of working against the public interest and 
engaging in deliberate deception. An advocacy group remarked, “Local politicians, including 
State Senator Basnight, are pushing the short bridge option despite the fact that it is not as safe, 
reliable, cost-effective, or environmentally sound” (Build the Long Bridge 2006b). They argued 
that NCDOT engaged in intentional misrepresentation in the SDEIS, presenting project costs 
over a 50-year period instead of the potential 100-year life span of the structures. They alleged 
this shorter time frame reduced the apparent cost of the short bridge, presenting a false basis for 
comparison with the upfront long bridge costs (Build the Long Bridge 2007b).  
 
 Refuge Access 
The long bridge design would bypass the Refuge entirely, including 13 miles of NC 12. USFWS 
indicated that it wanted this portion of the paved road removed from the Refuge. They agreed 
that some form of public access must be provided, but deferred planning for alternative access 
until the final bridge decision was made. The Long Bridge Coalition cheered USFWS’s 
commitment to alternative access; some proponents suggested that NC 12’s removal would 
“drastically improve visitors’ experience on the Refuge by providing long-term protection for the 
wildlife and habitat that attract so many enthusiasts” (Build the Long Bridge 2007a). They 
argued that various short bridge designs would also limit Refuge access, since proposed future 
bridge designs did not include access points. The Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) 
explained that, “The Phased Approach would interfere with fishing, surfing and other beach 
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activities and will severely limit and reduce access to the Refuge” (NCDOT 2008, B-276). 
Finally, they noted that many other parks and Refuge areas were not accessible by road but were 
still used by the public. 
  
 Time 
Finally, supporters of the long bridge referenced NCDOT’s tentative project schedules from 
2003 in contending that short bridge supporters actually delayed bridge construction. In a letter 
to the Interior Secretary, multiple advocacy groups argued, “If the project had moved forward 
from [the 2003 Merger Team] agreement, all permits would have been issued in May 2006 and 
construction of the replacement bridge could have begun [in] August [2006]” (Defenders of 
Wildlife 2006c). In their view, short bridge supporters lengthened the process by introducing 
numerous bridge designs, each of which would require additional environmental analysis and 
still be unlikely to receive USFWS permits.   
 
 Long Bridge Coalition General Strategies  
The Long Bridge Coalition continued the previous strategy of working within agency and 
regulatory channels, but supplemented those efforts with a public outreach strategy, using 
websites, newspaper commentaries, and advertising. They found allies in the editorial boards of 
several major regional newspapers. Despite some public mobilization in the early public 
comment periods, environmental advocacy groups were the primary voice for the coalition in 
this phase. Several prominent coastal geoscientists in the state entered the debate, arguing for the 
long bridge in newspaper guest commentaries and letters to the editor. Table 6.1 lists some of the 
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more visible coalition members. A discussion of the general strategies used by the coalition 
follows. 
 
Table 6.1: Long Bridge Coalition Phase 3 - Prominent Members  
Governmental Environmental 
Advocacy Groups 
News Outlets Coastal 
Scientists 
-Pea Island 
NWR staff 
-USFWS 
-US Dept of the 
Interior 
-SELC 
-Defenders of Wildlife 
-National Wildlife 
Refuge Assoc. 
-Coastal Refuge Society 
-Audubon NC 
-Sierra Club (Cypress 
Chapter) 
-Environmental Defense 
Fund (Raleigh, NC) 
-Wilderness Society 
-NC Coastal Federation               
 (compromise)  
-News & Observer  
    (Raleigh, NC) 
-Fayetteville 
Observer                               
(Fayetteville, NC) 
  -O. Pilkey 
  -A. Coburn 
  -S. Riggs 
 
 
Permitting Authority 
It is almost impossible to overstate the strategic importance of controlling the USFWS permitting 
for the bridge project. The long bridge design was a response to agency warnings that any shorter 
bridge landing within the Refuge would not receive necessary permits. Any project within the 
Refuge required a determination from the Refuge Manager that the use was compatible with the 
Refuge mission. This made the Refuge Manager a key figure in bridge planning.   
 
Refuge Manager Mike Bryant’s role in encouraging the long bridge design was recognized when 
he received the 2003 Interior Department Environmental Achievement Award and the 2004 Paul 
Kroegel Refuge Manager of the Year from the National Wildlife Refuge Association and the 
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National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, respectively. The press release for the 2004 award cited 
his work on the Bonner Bridge replacement project as a key accomplishment (National Wildlife 
Refuge Association 2004). Bryant explained his role in the bridge planning process: “Rather than 
just sitting behind my desk and saying this not compatible, I crafted my rationale and went to 
them.  I respect what they do. They have to maintain a road system. That isn’t easy. I have to 
maintain a wildlife Refuge” (Rawlins 2004). In 2003, it had appeared that Bryant’s negotiations 
had carried the day.   
 
With NCDOT’s 2004 addition of a short bridge alternative in the SDEIS, Bryant’s permitting 
“veto point” again became a key consideration. The short bridge would keep NC 12 within the 
Refuge and USFWS’s permitting authority. The Deputy Refuge Manager said, “if they come to 
[Bryant] with the same alternative they presented to him in ’93, then he’s going to have the same 
opinion. We’re back to square one” (Kozak 2004).  
 
USFWS and the Refuge Manager were also influential in the Merger Team, whose members had 
to concur at various stages for the planning process to proceed. USFWS, National Park Service, 
and the Refuge Manager were all Merger Team members. It is possible that the USFWS and 
Refuge Manager used the Merger Team meetings as an opportunity to make their case to other 
agencies. While this is only speculative, the Merger Team ultimately refused to concur on 
proceeding with the short bridge.   
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 Formal Written Comments  
Advocacy organizations in the coalition used the formal notice and comment period for each 
version of the EIS to varying degrees. The SELC submitted highly detailed legal arguments 
while larger national environmental organizations presented detailed comments about design 
specifics. Regional organizations submitted shorter and more general comments about Refuge 
importance, permitting issues, overwash and reliability, costs of NC 12 maintenance, and 
environmental degradation. A few organizations submitted letters for each round of planning, 
while others only commented on only one or two versions. As expected in formal commenting, 
these written comments followed a standard format and maintained a professional tone. There is 
no apparent coordination or planning in these comments (i.e. similarity in phrasing and topics). 
These formal written comments feature the coalition’s most detailed discussion of science, 
though they focused more on the sufficiency of the EIS scientific data and monitoring than 
general scientific arguments supporting their position.  
 
 Public Outreach Efforts 
The coalition credited politics for NCDOT’s return to a short bridge design. As one advocacy 
group said, “We’re surprised that DOT succumbed to political pressure” (Allegood 2004). The 
coalition responded to this political pressure with a public outreach campaign, presumably 
intended to sway public opinion and exert counter-pressure on politicians. In Fall 2006, a group 
of environmental advocates (SELC, Environmental Defense Fund, Audubon NC, Defenders of 
Wildlife, and Wilderness Society) formed a group called “Build the Long Bridge Coalition” 
(henceforth, BTLB). BTLB created a website with an issue overview page and multiple 
advocacy pages that presented the bridge as “more cost effective,” “the safest choice,” and a 
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means to “restore a wildlife Refuge.” BTLB also sponsored a radio ad presenting a new message 
that politics had unduly influenced the debate. The script is reproduced below verbatim to give a 
sense of the tone of these efforts:  
 MALE: Psst. Hey, wanna buy a bridge? 
FEMALE: Some NC politicians have a bridge in the Outer Banks they’d like to sell you. 
Don’t buy it. 
MALE: But the Bonner Bridge is old and needs to be replaced. 
FEMALE: We all agree on that. In fact, construction of a new, “long bridge” to connect 
Bodie Island with Rodanthe was proposed to begin this month, until a handful 
of politicians stopped it in its tracks. 
MALE: Yeah, they say a short bridge will be cheaper. 
FEMALE: Don’t buy it. The short bridge connects to NC 12, which gets washed out 
every time we have a major storm. It costs us taxpayers millions of dollars to 
clear year after year. 
MALE: So over time, the long bridge will be cheaper? 
FEMALE: Yes. So, if someone says they have a short bridge to sell you, don’t buy it.  
Get the facts at . . . Call Governor Easley’s office at . . . and ask him to replace 
the Bonner Bridge with the long bridge now (Build the Long Bridge 2006b). 
 
The BTLB, Defenders of Wildlife (DOW), and SELC used their organization websites for public 
outreach. There was apparent coordination, both in phrasing and subject matter between 
organization websites. Some phrases were shared, sometimes verbatim, between websites. For 
example (italics added to show similarity):  
•   BTLB: “The need to replace the aging Bonner Bridge with the safer, more reliable, more 
environmentally sensitive long bridge . . .” (Build the Long Bridge 2006a). 
•   DOW: “A long bridge . . . is the best option because it is safer, more reliable, more cost-
effective, and environmentally sound” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006a). 
•   SELC: “SELC pushes for cost effective, environmentally sound solution” to replacing 
Outer Banks bridge (Southern Environmental Law Center 2008). 
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Newspaper Commentaries and Editorials 
The coalition used newspaper commentaries and editorials to reach a wider audience, 
occasionally adopting an argumentative and political tone in some newspaper commentaries, 
especially toward the end of this policy phase. The guest commentaries presented the usual 
arguments about cost, road maintenance, and environmental harm, but added allegations that 
special interests and Dare County officials were deliberately misrepresenting the facts to the 
public. For example, one scientist wrote “Misinformation and half-truths have been spread by 
special interests pushing one alternative over the other, and it’s no surprise that most people have 
a hard time separating fact from fiction” (Coburn 2005). Another guest commentary accused 
Dare County officials of blocking the long bridge in a self-dealing attempt to preserve both the 
terminal groin at Oregon Inlet and funding for another planned bridge in northern Dare County 
(the mid-Currituck bridge) (Pilkey and Coburn 2005).   
 
Editorials by newspaper staff shifted in tone over the course of the policy phase. In early years, 
the editorials favored the long bridge but kept a neutral tone. For example, a 2006 News & 
Observer editorial described the short bridge as follows:   
For all its soaring elegance, the Bonner Bridge is overdue for replacement. It has 
served Bankers and tourists well, but even a mighty bridge can withstand only so 
much battering by storms, collisions with vessels and pressures from the strong and 
ever-shifting currents of Oregon Inlet (Raleigh News & Observer 2006).  
 
In 2007, the tone had shifted to more colorful and negative language, as the same 
newspaper labeled the bridge “a high-maintenance money eater” and a “maintenance 
nightmare” (Raleigh News & Observer 2007a). By 2010, the editorial staff wrote  
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Combine an aging bridge and an erosion-prone inlet plagued by some of the 
harshest tidal conditions on the East Coast with the thousands of island residents 
and tourists who must be evacuated ahead of hurricanes and you’ve got a formula 
for disaster, or at least a disaster movie (Raleigh News & Observer 2010). 
 
This attitude shift carried over to descriptions of the bridge decision process. The short 
bridge was described in 2006 as “favored by many state and local officials, primarily 
because it would be faster and cheaper to build” (Raleigh News & Observer 2006). By 
2007, the short bridge was potentially “the ultimate ‘bridge to nowhere’” (Raleigh News 
& Observer 2007b). In 2010, it became “the path of least resistance . . . that gets the 
immediate job done but which promises trouble – and more expense – down the road”  
(Raleigh News & Observer 2010). 
 
 Public Hearings and Comments 
NCDOT was statutorily required to hold public hearings and accept written public 
comments for each version of the environmental impact studies. These hearings and 
comments provided both advocacy organizations and the general public the opportunity to 
be heard. The ACF policy framework used in this project does not usually include the 
general public in advocacy coalitions; here, the public’s input was formally submitted as 
part of the debate. As such, public commenters are incorporated into the appropriate 
coalition. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the number of comments by coalition members, broken down by date, 
forum, and speaker. The data shows a pattern of declining participation even as the policy 
debate became more public and heated. Comparing the comment periods for the 
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environmental studies (EIS or EA) that analyzed new alternatives, there was a 53 percent 
decline in submitted comments between the 2005 SDEIS and 2007 SSDEIS. There was an 
additional 60 percent decline in comments between the SSDEIS and the 2010 EA. Overall, 
organization staff submitted around 23 percent of Long Bridge comments, with the 
remainder coming from the public. No local officials submitted comments in support of 
the Long Bridge. 
 
Miscellaneous Strategies 
Coalition members attempted to use federal agency oversight to overturn the Review 
Board’s 2007 designation of the short bridge as the Preferred Alternative. They requested 
that the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) review the adequacy of 
the environmental impact statement; the request was denied because the coalition 
members did not have standing to request a review. Coalition members also wrote letters 
to higher political figures, including US Senators and the President, in response to letters 
from the opposing coalition. 
 
Long Bridge Coalition Narrative Strategies 
In Policy Phase 3, the coalitions had emerged and were actively trying to influence policy 
outcomes through their choice of key issues and narrative strategies. With both coalitions 
producing unfiltered narrative statements of their positions, it is possible to track and 
compare these NPF narrative strategies at this point. The following section first examines 
key narrative issues, then examines the NPF strategy of assigning costs and benefits. 
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Table 6.2: Long Bridge Coalition Phase 3 – Numbers of Public Comments Sorted  
by Speaker Category 
 
 
Organization 
Staff 
 
Local 
Officials 
 
General 
Public 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
2005 SDEIS 
Public 
Hearings 
 
4 
 
0 
 
4 
 
   8 
 
2005 SDEIS 
Comment 
Letters 
 
5 
 
0 
 
30 
 
    
 35 
 
 
2007 SSDEIS 
Public 
Hearings 
 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
   3 
 
2007 SSDEIS 
Comment 
Letters 
 
3 
 
0 
 
14 
 
 17 
 
2008 FEIS  
Comment 
Letters 
 
3 
 
0 
 
2 
 
   5 
 
2010 EA 
Public 
Hearings 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
   0 
 
2010 EA 
Public 
Comments 
 
1 
 
0 
 
7 
 
   8 
 
Total 
Comments 
 
 
18 
 
 
0 
 
 
58 
 
 
 76 
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Choice of Key Issues 
The Long Bridge Coalition made strategic choices to emphasize some issues more than 
others. These choices demonstrate both the differences between the coalitions and how 
they responded to changing events. Table 6.3 lists the topics most frequently mentioned in 
Long Coalition narratives in this policy phase, as well as typical examples of how those 
topics were discussed. The coalition devoted roughly equal attention to (1) addressing the 
Dare County Commissioners’ 2003 concerns about Refuge access, (2) arguing that NC 12 
was an unreliable transportation corridor because of barrier island processes, (3) 
comparing the long-term and short-term costs of both bridge plans, and (4) discussing the 
unlikelihood of a short bridge receiving permits. Other topics mentioned to a lesser degree 
included long-term versus short-term planning, agency roles, general environmental 
concerns, transportation, and the economy.  
 
Assignment of Costs/Benefits (NPF) 
The NPF narrative strategy of assigning costs and benefits is a way of expanding or 
contracting the policy issue. According to the NPF, a coalition that perceives itself as 
“losing” will portray an opponent’s policy as concentrating benefits on a select few while 
diffusing costs among a large group. In reverse, the “winning” coalition will depict its 
policy as delivering benefits to a diffuse group while concentrating costs on only a few 
individuals.  
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Table 6.3: Most Frequently Mentioned Narrative Topics - Long Bridge Coalition, Phase 3 
Topic 
Percentage 
of coded 
sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Refuge 
Access 
36% 
43/120 
 
“Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge is mandated to 
provide access to the public. They can’t determine 
what type of access will be provided until public 
meetings, etc. are held” (NCDOT 2008, B.103). 
 
“The text overlooks the fact that those who do not 
return to visit the Refuge because of changes in access 
may be replaced by those who prefer the new means of 
access, relative isolation, and improved scenery and 
wildlife viewing opportunities afforded by the Pamlico 
Sound Bridge Corridor alternatives” (NCDOT 2008, 
A.17).  
 
“It is very likely that visitors to Pea Island National 
Wildlife Refuge will have a better quality and safer 
visit without the constant drone of vehicles whizzing 
by at high speeds traveling down the island on the way 
to other destinations” (NCDOT 2008, B.104).  
 
Barrier 
Island 
Processes 
32% 
38/120 
 
“Since Highway 12 obviously has a number of “hot 
spots” on Pea Island Refuge, keeping this open is not 
only expensive for the state, but potentially harmful 
for the Refuge” (NCDOT 2008, B-148).  
 
“The Refuge is subject to ocean overwash and high 
ocean shoreline erosion rate, inlet formation, and other 
impacts associated with large storm events, sea level 
rise and general barrier island dynamics” (NCDOT 
2008, B.31). 
 
 140 
Topic 
Percentage 
of coded 
sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Reliability 32% 38/120 
 
“[The long bridge] seems to provide a more reliable 
travel route should NC 12 be covered by wind-blown 
sand, overwashed, flooded or breached by a storm 
north of Rodanthe” (NCDOT 2008, A.18).  
 
“What happens when a person has a stroke or heart 
attack and weather conditions won’t allow med 
flights? How many times have we heard that the first 
hour can make the difference in life or death? These 
folks can’t afford to wait for low tide or winds to 
decrease, or machinery to clear the roads” (NCDOT 
2008, B.219). 
 
 
Cost 31% 37/120 
 
“The initial cost of constructing the Pamlico Sound 
Bridge is much higher than that of the parallel bridge.  
But the overall long-term costs of a parallel bridge 
greatly exceed those of the Pamlico Sound Bridge” 
(Pilkey and Coburn 2005). 
 
“In reality, the costs of maintaining NC 12 for decades 
to come will require hundreds of millions of dollars 
more in removing over-washed sand, repairing 
pavement, and spanning so called “hotspots” with 
additional bridges” (Defenders of Wildlife 2006a). 
 
Permitting 26% 31/120 
 
 “It is our further belief that the Pamlico Sound Bridge 
Corridor options will be easier to move through the 
permitting process and, as such, will be better able to 
meet the urgent demands of the bridge replacement 
schedule” (NCDOT 2008, B.266). 
 
“The idea that you can segment the bridge from the 
road it connects is absurd. It puts off serious 
compatibility issues, i.e. moving Highway 12” (Kozak 
2006). 
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Table 6.4 shows how the Long Bridge Coalition assigned costs and benefits in its Policy 
Phase 3 NPF narratives. Again, if a narrative described a group as suffering the 
consequences or reaping the benefits of a policy, that group is included under costs or 
benefits, respectively. As this is specifically a NPF strategy, the analysis was limited to the 
NPF narratives subset. The coalition primarily identified diffuse costs for the short bridge, 
with the costs falling on taxpayers, Refuge function and habitat, and traveler safety. The 
coalition devoted little attention to identifying benefits of the short bridge; the benefits 
identified were concentrated on NCDOT and the local officials who wanted to preserve 
funding for the Mid-Currituck bridge. This pattern is characteristic of a coalition that 
perceives itself as losing and is seeking allies. 
 
Table 6.4: Long Bridge Coalition Phase 3 - Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Costs of 
Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits of 
Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits of 
Long 
Bridge 
Frequency 
taxpayers 
(diffuse) 12 
 
Mid-Currituck   
bridge 
(concentrated) 
2 safety (diffuse) 4 
Refuge  
(diffuse) 11 
NCDOT  
(concentrated) 2 
Refuge 
(diffuse) 3 
habitat 
(diffuse) 10     
safety 
(diffuse) 6     
 
Other Narrative Strategies 
The NPF literature suggests that coalitions may also identify policy surrogates or 
condensation symbols. Coalitions use a policy surrogate when they link the policy 
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subsystem to a larger policy debate, such as tying offshore windmills to energy 
independence. A condensation symbol is a form of symbolic shorthand, where a complex 
issue is reduced down to a phrase that most people immediately recognize and emotionally 
respond to, such as the “American Dream.” Here, the coalition did not appear to 
strategically use policy surrogates. There were a few references to local Refuge regulatory 
decisions affecting the management of the entire Refuge system, but this was not a clear 
policy surrogate. Likewise, the coalition did not use a condensation symbol strategy.  
Several comments invoked Alaska’s “Bridge to Nowhere” scandal, which could be 
considered a condensation symbol, but these were only sporadic references. 
 
Short Bridge Coalition Position 
The Short Bridge Coalition viewed the bridge issue from a strikingly different perspective. 
The central issue in their narratives was not how to replace the bridge, but rather when to 
replace it. The question was not which design was best, but which could be finished first? 
The coalition argued that the upfront costs of the long bridge exceeded the available 
funding and would delay construction for years. The short bridge, with its costs spread 
over decades, was presented as the only option that could be funded and constructed in the 
near future. Therefore, they preferred the short bridge.   
 
The coalition formed around a central assumption that traveler safety should be the top 
priority. Any plan that delayed construction posed a risk to the lives and safety of 
residents and visitors. The long bridge was synonymous with indefinite delay. The 
coalition also expressed frustration with the speed of bridge replacement planning, noting 
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that it had been ongoing for more than a decade. They stressed that the bridge was part of 
the only road servicing the Hatteras Island communities. These arguments are examined in 
greater detail below. 
 
Safety 
Short Bridge Coalition advocates often noted that the Bonner Bridge was many years past 
its intended service life, with a bridge sufficiency rating of 2 out of 100. While this rating 
was due more to its projected service life than structural safety, the rating was seen as a 
sign that replacement could not be postponed. Delays posed “a clear and present safety 
issue for all concerned,” according to an advocacy organization (Replace the Bridge Now 
2007b). As described by the Outer Banks Chamber of Commerce,  
. . . each hour that passes puts disaster an hour closer. Our residents and visitors 
should be afforded a safe, reliable trip across the inlet. Our children should be able 
to travel to or from Hatteras Island so that they can go on field trips or to a routine 
doctor’s visit without fear of becoming a victim of a catastrophic bridge failure. 
Our residents don’t need to cross the bridge daily with trepidation (NCDOT 2010b, 
103). 
 
Along with routine travel concerns, the coalition pointed out that the bridge was the 
primary evacuation route. As the Replace the Bridge Now advocacy group noted, this 
problem was “greatly magnified when considering peak season populations estimated to 
reach over 50,000 some weeks on Hatteras Island” (Replace the Bridge Now 2007b). 
 
Time 
Coalition members were frustrated with the pace of the bridge project. As a resident 
commented in 2010, “Since 1990, study after study after study has been done on replacing 
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this bridge. . . [it] has been studied ad nauseum, and the sheer number of Environmental 
Impact Statements and their supplements and their supplements’ supplements is simply 
ridiculous” (NCDOT 2010b, 89). The coalition largely blamed the delay on a “lack of 
cooperation by the US Fish and Wildlife Service and by an ominous cloud of threatened 
litigation by environmental groups” (Basnight 2010c).  
 
The opposing coalition’s ongoing insistence on the expensive long bridge was also seen as 
contributing to the delay. As Senator Basnight commented in 2005, the long bridge was 
“not fully funded, and would exhaust the [regional NCDOT] Division’s total federal 
highway funds and state trust funds allocation for the next seven years” (NCDOT 2008, 
B.58). The long bridge was regarded as a project that would never be funded, so the Long 
Bridge Coalition’s insistence on that option added pointless delay. 
 
 Transportation 
According to the coalition, delays in replacing the existing bridge increased the likelihood 
that the main transportation route to Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands would be closed. Not 
only was NC 12 the designated evacuation route, it was the primary travel route for more 
than 4,000 local residents and 2.2 million annual visitors. If the existing bridge were 
closed, emergency ferry capacity could not handle the 5,000 vehicles that crossed the 
bridge each day on average, let alone the 10,000 daily vehicle crossings in peak summer 
season. A local resident explained at a public hearing that loss of the transportation route 
would affect “essential medical emergency services, mail service, logistical and supply 
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support, and the interruption of the reliable commercial electrical power” (NCDOT 2010c, 
line 1137). 
 
 Economy 
Extending their transportation concerns, the coalition contended that the loss of tourism 
from a bridge closure would devastate Dare County’s economy. Citing statistics that 
Hatteras Island’s economy accounted for over 27 percent of the county’s occupancy taxes, 
coalition members predicted economic devastation if the bridge were closed (NCDOT 
2008, A.79). They buttressed those arguments with recollections of the nearly four-month 
bridge closure in 1990. Aside from the loss of tourism income, re-routing and delay of 
trucks carrying groceries, building supplies, and other commercial goods would cause 
higher prices for goods and services for residents.  
 
 Opponents 
To many within the coalition, the problem was the environmentalists’ and lawyers’ 
insistence on building an “unfundable” long bridge. This argument surfaced primarily in 
public comments and hearings. They expressed anger at the groups for keeping the debate 
alive, viewing the ongoing discussion as a pointless delaying tactic. As the NEPA process 
concluded, the environmental advocacy groups’ efforts to set aside the Record of Decision 
with agency appeals strengthened the resentment. Senator Basnight, in a 2010 letter to 
President Obama, wrote that coastal families’ heritage and livelihoods were threatened by 
“out-of-state and out-of-touch environmental groups whose ultimate goal is to remove all 
human activities from Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands” (Basnight 2010b). The Dare County 
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Board of Commissioners accused these groups of “circumvent[ing] the process to achieve 
their goals, to the detriment of the public” (Dare County Board of Commissioners 2007). 
 
 Cost and Access 
Cost of the long bridge design featured frequently in narratives from Dare County 
officials, Senator Basnight, and the Replace the Bridge Now group. Descriptions of the 
long bridge as “unfundable” increased after 2007 when revised cost estimates put the up-
front costs for long bridge construction over $1 billion dollars. The coalition distinguished 
these sums from the comparable long-term costs of the short bridge, noting that the short 
bridge costs were spread over decades. Coalition members continued to express concerns 
about Refuge access, but to a much lesser degree than in Policy Phase 2. Public comments 
addressing access issues without identifying a bridge preference were not included within 
the coalition. 
 
Short Bridge Coalition General Strategies  
The Short Bridge Coalition membership included an array of politicians, citizens, 
grassroots groups, local civic groups, area business groups, local media, and visitors 
(Table 6.5). Generally, the Short Bridge Coalition should be read as a loose organization 
of private individuals, public officials, and organizations. NCDOT was, in some sense, 
both part of and outside of the coalition. NCDOT’s primary role was as a decision maker.  
Once the preferred alternative was selected, NCDOT shifted to defending that choice. At 
times, those efforts included media statements and advocacy. Coalition members 
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continued to pursue a political strategy, adding grassroots public mobilization to increase 
political pressure on decision makers.   
 
Table 6.5: Short Bridge Coalition Phase 3 – Prominent Members 
Governmental 
and Political 
Figures 
 
Civic and Business 
Organizations 
Local Advocacy 
Groups 
News Outlets 
-NCDOT 
-FHWA 
-NC Governors 
Easley and 
Perdue 
-US Senators 
Hagan, Burr, 
Dole 
-NC Senate 
President 
     pro tem  
Basnight 
-various state 
legislators 
-Dare County 
Board of 
     Commissioners 
-various town 
boards 
     and mayors 
-Outer Banks Chamber 
of Commerce 
-Outer Banks Visitors 
Bureau 
-Outer Banks Board of  
 Realtors  
-Dare County Marine  
Association 
-Outer Banks Association 
of Home Builders 
-Mirlo Beach 
Homeowners Assoc. 
-Chicamacomico  
     Livesaving Station 
     Historical Site 
-Cape Hatteras EMC 
 
-RTBN Citizens 
Action Comm. 
-BridgeMoms 
       Facebook 
       group 
  
     
 
 -Outer Banks 
Voice 
 -Island Free 
Press 
 
 
Recruitment of Political Officials 
After its political strategy failed at the federal level in Phase 2, the coalition expanded its 
strategic recruitment of political figures to include both state and federal legislators. The 
Dare County Board of Commissioners reached out with letters to state and federal 
politicians, including the Congressional delegation, NC Attorney General, and NC 
Governor. This political outreach was effective, with NC Senators Burr (R-NC), Dole (R-
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NC), and Hagan (D-NC) joining US Representative Jones (R-NC) and NC Governors 
Easley (D) and Perdue (D) in publicly supporting the short bridge. Governor Perdue 
communicated her support for the short bridge in a 2010 letter to the NCDOT. NC Senator 
Basnight (D-Dare) tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade President Obama, via two letters in 
2010, to intervene in the bridge permitting dispute. 
 
This political outreach strategy yielded results. In 2005, the North Carolina General 
Assembly passed a legislative provision expediting the state bridge project permits and 
expressing support for the short bridge. In 2006, US Senator Burr (R-NC) raised the issue 
of Bonner Bridge during the confirmation hearing for the incoming Interior Secretary. 
Three months later, the newly-appointed Secretary Kempthorne issued a letter advising 
that the short bridge could receive USFWS permits if the bridge and NC 12 were 
permitted as separate projects. Multiple political figures submitted written comments on 
one or more environmental impact statements during this policy phase, including NC 
Senator Basnight, NC Representative Spear (D-District 2), NC Governor Perdue, the Dare 
County Board of Commissioners, and the city councils of several Dare County 
communities. Additionally, NCDOT and the Dare County Board of Commissioners sent 
letters to several political figures in response to letters from the SELC. 
  
 Public Outreach Efforts 
The RTBN Citizens Action Committee emerged in this policy phase as the most 
prominent public outreach group working to promote the short bridge. The group formed 
in 2006 as a grassroots effort, then was quickly brought under the umbrella of the Dare 
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County Board of Commissioners as an advisory committee. RTBN described its mission 
to “bring a human face to what we felt had become a stalled and detached scientific debate 
over the bridge replacement” while promoting both the replacement of the bridge and 
maintenance of the entire NC 12 corridor as “a sustainable and viable transportation link” 
(Replace the Bridge Now 2013). When the RTBN group became an advisory committee, it 
established a website intended to serve as an information hub to counter misinformation 
and rumor. RTBN initially expressed neutrality, favoring whichever design could be 
completed the quickest. By 2007, they favored the short bridge as the fastest replacement 
option.   
 
The RTBN website included a timeline, fact sheet, and news updates. These materials 
maintained a fairly neutral tone, focusing on the age and safety of the Bonner Bridge, 
traffic demand, and the economic importance of Hatteras Island tourism. The site also 
featured advocacy materials, including sample letters to Congress and “Speaking Points.” 
The tone of these materials was less neutral, urging lawmakers to support those 
“desperately working to save the lives of those who must travel across this bridge” 
because “without an expedited replacement schedule, we feel we are another tragedy 
waiting to happen” (Replace the Bridge Now 2007a). These materials expressed 
frustration with bureaucratic delays, arguing that residents “are losing confidence in some 
of our government officials to act responsibly” (Replace the Bridge Now 2007a). 
 
A second local advocacy group, the BridgeMoms Facebook group, was formed in 2010. 
Organized by a prominent member of the RTBN, the BridgeMoms shared information and 
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updates on the bridge project and road issues. The group described its purpose as “gi[ing] 
voice to the fears and concerns of the mothers who have children on Hatteras Island and 
Ocracoke Island whose well being is dependent on the lifeline of Herbert C. Bonner 
Bridge” (BridgeMoms 2010). This group mobilized letter-writing campaigns, but was a 
latecomer and less active than RTBN. 
 
 Newspaper Letters to the Editor  
The coalition’s newspaper access in this policy phase was limited to sporadic letters to the 
editor. Time was a central theme running through these letters. The writers attributed 
delays in planning and construction to agency and advocacy group obstruction. Again, the 
long bridge was described as impossible to fund and the cause of ongoing delay and 
hazard. Senator Basnight wrote a 2006 open letter to newspaper editorial boards 
addressing, in part, the role of USFWS in the bridge delay:   
It is simply incredible to me that one single federal agency can stall this 
project for years, and potentially force us into the position of building a 
bridge that we don’t want, can’t afford (and in fact, do not even have 
enough funding to construct), and threaten our ability to fully enjoy lands 
that the public owns and which are an integral part of our economy and 
indeed, our heritage. And yet, this appears to be exactly the case (Basnight 
2006).  
 
In a 2007 letter to the editor, Beth Midgett of the RTBN similarly chastised political 
leaders as “more interested in political posturing than in the urgent need of the people 
behind this debate” (Midgett 2007).  
 
Jim Trogdon, transportation planning director for the NC General Assembly, wrote a 2007 
guest column in an Outer Banks online newspaper discussing the long bridge funding 
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problems. He described the long bridge as “a classic example of an unreasonable and 
unfeasible alternative . . . if approved, it would have been a project that could never have 
been built.” He concluded that, “Despite all efforts to endorse the goodness of the long 
bridge in the Pamlico Sound, it is an alternative that guarantees that the Bonner Bridge 
will not be replaced – except following catastrophic failure, under an emergency contract 
and where it currently stands” (Trogdon 2007). Senator Basnight echoed this sentiment in 
a 2010 letter to the editor, arguing that, “Construction cannot begin until the funding is 
secured, so a replacement will be delayed indefinitely if we continue advocating for the 
long bridge” (Basnight 2010a). 
 
 Public Hearings and Comments 
Short Bridge Coalition members actively participated in the public hearing and comment 
periods for each environmental study, with participation increasing over time. The public 
participated to a greater degree than organizations or public officials, with a RTBN 
grassroots campaign producing a record number of written public comments for the EA  
(Nolan 2010). In 2010, the EA received 3,970 written comments favoring the short bridge; 
most were form letters, but 863 unique written comments were sent individually or 
appended to form letters. This was a remarkable increase over the previous environmental 
studies, which saw comment totals in the double digits. This increase was largely due to 
the efforts of RTBN’s volunteers. Beth Midgett of RTBN described these efforts in her 
public hearing comments: “In the midst of the summer heat, these volunteers turned out to 
do a face to face and talk with people at fish fries, community events, church gatherings, 
grocery stores, local businesses, and door-to-door” (NCDOT 2010c, line 799).  
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Table 6.6 depicts this coalition public comment activity. Unlike the Long Bridge 
Coalition, which saw large declines in participation throughout the policy phase, the Short 
Bridge Coalition saw a 24% decline in numbers of comments between 2005 and 2007, and 
a remarkable 5,549% increase in 2010 that reflected the RTBN grassroots letter campaign. 
While the massive public comment response skews the results of calculating the 
percentage of comments from organizations and elected officials, it is worth noting that all 
comments from elected officials favored the short bridge.  
 
The public comments reflected the usual short bridge focus on the risks of continuing to 
rely on the existing bridge. They referenced the bridge’s age and safety rating along with 
the economic and transportation consequences of a bridge collapse before the replacement 
was built. By 2010, a common refrain in hundreds of written comments was “enough is 
enough” and “build the bridge now!” 
 
Short Bridge Coalition Narrative Strategies 
Choice of Key Issues 
As discussed previously, the two coalitions differed in the issues they chose to emphasize 
in their narratives. Table 6.7 lists the topics most frequently mentioned in Short Bridge  
Coalition narratives in this policy phase, along with typical examples of those discussions. 
The coalition devoted the greatest attention to the safety threat from delaying the bridge 
replacement and the length of time spent on planning. A secondary set of topics focused 
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on (1) the importance of the bridge to the transportation system and economy and (2) 
expressing anger at the opposition.  
Table 6.6: Short Bridge Coalition Phase 3 – Numbers of Public Comments Sorted 
by Speaker Category 
 
 
 
Local Civic & 
Business Groups 
 
Elected 
Officials 
General 
Public 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
2005 SDEIS 
Public 
Hearings 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
16 
 
20 
2005 SDEIS 
Comment 
Letters 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
19 
+50 form 
letters 
 
74 
 
2007 SSDEIS 
Public 
Hearings 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
22 
 
28 
2007 SSDEIS 
Comment 
Letters 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
42 
 
43 
2008 FEIS  
Comment 
Letters 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
9 
 
10 
2010 EA 
Public 
Hearings 
 
 
8 
 
6 
 
27 
 
41 
2010 EA 
Public 
Comments 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
863 
+ 3,097 form 
letters 
 
 
3,970 
Total 
Comments 
 
23 18 4,145 
 
4,186 
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Table 6.7: Most Frequently Mentioned Narrative Topics – Short Bridge Coalition, Phase 3 
Topic 
Percentage of 
coded sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Safety 42% 398/954 
 
“I hold my breath when we cross the bridge for fear 
that it might be our vehicle that is the first to ‘take 
the plunge’. Please take this replacement issue more 
seriously!” (NCDOT 2010b, 64)  
 
“To undertake another study and further litigation 
puts the safety of citizens who use the bridge on a 
daily basis and the visitors to Hatteras Island at 
risk” (NCDOT 2010b, 94). 
 
“I support the construction of the new bridge as 
outlined as soon as possible and hope the federal 
government can be convinced of same before the 
bridge falls and people are killed or hurt” (NCDOT 
2010b, 176) 
 
Time 37% 356/954 
 
“It is time to take action.  A decision must be 
made, NOW.  The Bonner Bridge replacement 
must begin, NOW, before tragic circumstances 
occur.  PLEASE stop the delays.  Make a decision 
on which span to build and build it” (NCDOT 
2008, B.229).  
 
“Enough with the studies, enough with the delays, 
and enough ignoring the men and women who 
make their livings because of the deteriorating 
Herbert C. Bonner Bridge. The time for studies has 
passed. Environmental groups have had 20 years to 
gather data, and if they do not have enough now, 
they never will” (NCDOT 2010b, 90). 
 
 
“I want to comment that I have attended meetings 
for over 15 years and seen many changes in 
administrations with the only result being more 
meetings. We need some action and need it now” 
(NCDOT 2010b, 33). 
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Topic 
Percentage of 
coded sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Transportation 17% 166/95] 
 
“Not only does this structure provide the sole means 
of access to and from our homes and to medical 
care, but the power lines that provide us electricity 
and the phone/data lines that connect us to the 
outside world run under it” (NCDOT 2010b, 76). 
 
“The bridge is our everyday highway to transport 
kids for shopping, school events, sports, and 
entertainment, and non-everyday activities such as 
doctor’s appointments and trips to the Emergency 
Room. Again, you know that there is no way that 
we could accomplish this with a ferry system when 
the 10,000+cars per day (summer) would be shifted 
to a system that could accommodate merely 
hundreds of cars” (NCDOT 2010b, 148). 
 
“[W]e consider the replacement of the Bonner 
Bridge to warrant the highest possible NCDOT 
priority. It is our only link to the mainland. In 
storms and when medical emergencies arise, the 
bridge is vital to our health, welfare, and safety” 
(NCDOT 2010e, 443).  
 
Economy 17% 164/954 
 
“We own a store that is totally dependent on the 
bridge not only for transporting all our products 
here but for also transporting 80% of all our 
customers here” (NCDOT 2010e, 503). 
 
“Please, our livelihood is dependent on tourism, and 
without an easy way to get here, the tourists won’t 
come” (NCDOT 2010d, set 17 of 33, 88). 
 
“While safety and convenience are important 
considerations, the pivotal role of the bridge in our 
economy must not be overlooked. The survival of 
the Ocracoke and Hatteras economies depends upon 
free access from the upper regions and the 
mainland” (NCDOT 2010b, 52). 
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Topic 
Percentage of 
coded sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Opponents 13% 125/954 
 
“While I may be “preaching to the choir” all of us 
realize that the pendulum has gone too far in the 
direction of the environmentalists. For 
environmentalists and people like the 
Environmental Law Center to control the lives of all 
of Hatteras Island citizens as well as the millions of 
visitors wishing to come to enjoy Hatteras Island is 
unconscionable and fundamentally wrong” 
(NCDOT 2010b, 163). 
 
“I would like to direct several comments to the 
Southern Environmental Law Center and the 
Audubon NC. How dare you sit in your homes and 
offices in Chapel Hill, NC and dictate an issue of 
health and safety for the residents of Hatteras 
Island and Dare County?” (Judge 2007) 
 
 
Assignment of Costs/Benefits (NPF) 
The Short Bridge Coalition’s assignment of costs and benefits in this policy phase is 
shown in Table 6.8. The coalition depicted diffuse costs for the long bridge plan, with 
residents, the local economy, and taxpayers likely to suffer. The coalition described only a 
few concentrated benefits of the long bridge, aiding the SELC and environmental groups. 
Like their opponents, this pattern indicates that the coalition perceived itself as losing.  
 
 
Other Narrative Strategies 
While the coalition occasionally used colorful language, the strategic use of condensation 
symbols was marginal. They did refer to “bureaucrats” in a number of coalition narratives, 
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but this is questionable as a condensation symbol. Likewise, they made several references 
to the 2007 collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis. At the time, the collapse would 
have been a vivid symbol to many people. There did not appear to be strategic use of 
policy surrogates, although a few narratives did describe the long bridge plans as 
attempting to deprive the “common” “working man” of access to the ocean and beaches.  
 
Table 6.8: Short Bridge Coalition Phase 3 - Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Costs of 
Long 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits of 
Long 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits 
of Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
safety 
(diffuse) 21 
 
SELC & 
environmental 
groups 
(concentrated) 
 
4 taxpayers (diffuse) 
3 
economy  
(diffuse) 
 
13 Refuge (concentrated) 
1 
 
residents 
(diffuse) 
3 
residents’ 
welfare 
(diffuse) 
11     
taxpayers 
(diffuse) 6    
 
 
 
Policy Phase Summary 
The coalitions emerged and assumed their broadest membership in this policy phase as the 
multiple rounds of environmental impact statements and increasing cost estimates 
attracted public attention. The Long Bridge Coalition continued to work within agency 
channels and appeals, but also initiated public outreach efforts to recruit support to 
pressure decision makers. The Short Bridge Coalition continued its political strategy,  
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recruiting state and federal elected officials. They also coordinated a grassroots public 
campaign that produced a record number of public comments in 2010. Both coalitions 
depicted diffuse costs and concentrated benefits, indicating a “losing” strategy and an 
effort to recruit allies (Table 6.9).  
 
Table 6.9:  Summary of Narrative Issues and Strategies by Coalition, Policy Phase 3 
 
 
 
Long Bridge Coalition 
 
 
Short Bridge Coalition 
 
 
Lead Actors 
 
 
USFWS 
environmental advocacy 
groups 
 
 
NCDOT 
elected officials 
civic and local organizations 
 
 
Narrative Issues 
 
reliability and safety 
cost comparisons 
altered Refuge access 
politics 
 
safety risks of delay 
duration of planning 
transportation and economy 
opponents 
 
 
General Strategies 
 
permitting leverage 
outreach 
 
political efforts 
outreach 
 
 
Cost/Benefit Assignment 
 
 
 
 
 
costs: taxpayers, Refuge, 
habitat, safety 
 
benefits: mid-Currituck 
bridge, NCDOT 
 
 
costs:  safety, economy, 
welfare, taxpayers 
 
benefits: environmental 
groups, Refuge 
 
 
Policy Phase 4:  2011-2014 
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Policy Phase Preview: In this policy phase, the Long Bridge Coalition filed a federal lawsuit 
seeking to overturn the Record of Decision, arguing that the multiple rounds of NEPA analysis 
and the 4(f) analysis were inadequate. The two coalitions shifted their primary narrative focus, 
with the Long Bridge Coalition criticizing the NCDOT plan and the Short Bridge Coalition 
accusing their opponents of deliberately delaying bridge construction, putting lives and welfare 
at risk. After losing in the US District Court, the SELC appealed the ruling, setting off a 
remarkable exchange of personal attacks by coalition leaders.   
 
Context:  Civil Suits and Uncivil Comments 
After the Record of Decision was published in 2010, the bridge debate was quiet until the SELC 
filed a federal lawsuit in July 2011 on behalf of the Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife 
Refuge Association. The lawsuit alleged that the FEIS and EA were inadequate and violated 
NEPA by improperly segmenting, or separating, the bridge and NC 12 projects. Further, they 
argued that the Section 4(f) analysis improperly deemed the long bridge to not be a “feasible and 
prudent alternative” to road construction within the Refuge.   
 
NCDOT expressed frustration with the lawsuit, but continued with bridge planning, awarding a 
$216 million contract for bridge construction in August 2011. That same month, Hurricane Irene 
breached Hatteras Island in four places. The largest breach required installation of a temporary 
bridge. The Long Bridge Coalition took the opportunity to again suggest either a long bridge or 
high-speed ferries as a solution. After Hurricane Sandy struck a glancing blow to the Outer 
Banks in 2012, leaving Highway 12 buried under sand and overwash in several areas, the 
coalition again suggested NCDOT reverse course on the short bridge.  
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In 2013, the US District Court ruled in favor of NCDOT and FHWA, finding both the NEPA 
Environmental Impact Statements and the 4(f) analysis adequate. NCDOT praised the decision, 
noting that SELC had raised similar claims in a pending state suit. Construction could begin 
upon resolution of those claims. Plans were put on hold, though, when the SELC appealed this 
ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. A few months later, a very public war of words 
broke out between the two coalitions over the appeal. In August 2014, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that the NEPA analysis was adequate, but remanded the case back to the District Court for 
further review of the 4(f) analysis.  
 
Both sides claimed a partial victory. NCDOT announced that “the Fourth Circuit said the 
environmental studies and Record of Decision are complete and valid” (NCDOT 2014) and 
noted that the Section 4(f) analysis had been remanded for further review to a federal judge who 
had previously found the analysis adequate. The SELC, in turn, focused on the 4(f) analysis, 
saying that “The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit today ruled that the NC 
Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration have a duty to provide and 
disclose to the public a long-term plan . . . [and] minimize harm to the Refuge and fully assess 
alternative solutions to NCDOT’s current plan . . .” (Southern Environmental Law Center 
2014a). Despite each side claiming partial victory, they faced an uncertain result on remand.  
Their partial victories were also partial defeats. The two sides chose to enter into settlement 
negotiations in August 2014. 
 
Long Bridge Coalition Position 
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The Long Bridge Coalition’s positions on core issues were consistent in this policy phase, even 
though the order of priority shifted. Their narratives addressed reliable access, barrier island 
harm, ongoing costs of NC 12 maintenance, and politics, with the tone of the arguments shifting 
over time as the coalition responded to its opponents. After NCDOT issued its Record of 
Decision, the coalition filed a legal suit and shifted its focus to issues raised in the court filing.  
For most of the policy phase, coalition statements focused on attacking NCDOT’s plan rather 
than promoting the long bridge. 
 
 
 Reliable Access 
The coalition stressed that NCDOT’s plan to build a series of bridges along NC 12 as conditions 
warranted would leave travelers dependent on “the same unreliable highway through the same 
narrow, exposed stretch of a shifting barrier island” (Youngman 2012). Overwash and/or island 
breaches from winter storms and Hurricanes Ida (2009), Irene (2011), and Sandy (2012) 
reinforced their argument that NCDOT’s plan would not ensure a reliable transportation route to 
Hatteras Island. As Defenders of Wildlife explained, “The proposed NCDOT project would 
replace the existing Bonner Bridge over Oregon Inlet without a long-term plan to address the 
frequent washouts, breaches, and floods along the twelve miles of NC 12 . . . [S]torms and high 
tides regularly over wash NC 12 and cut off access to the mainland for residents, businesses and 
tourists for weeks at a time” (Defenders of Wildlife 2014). The coalition continued to suggest 
either the long bridge or a system of high-speed ferries to bypass high-erosion areas within the 
Refuge. 
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 Barrier Island Erosion and Migration 
The coalition also argued that NCDOT’s plan failed to account for the ongoing erosion and 
westward movement of the island. Following Hurricane Irene in 2011, several additional coastal 
scientists joined the coalition in arguing that efforts to maintain NC 12 on Hatteras Island were 
both futile and harmful to the island itself. As one coastal geoscientist explained, “[w]hat we’ve 
done with that beach ridge, the sandbags and the road, is give those islands a death sentence” 
(Tennant 2013). The coalition described NCDOT’s plan for continued beach nourishment and 
dune maintenance as reckless and short sighted. They argued that erosion and westward island 
migration would leave the new bridges in the surf and, eventually, the open ocean. A SELC 
attorney argued that, “[l]ike Alaska’s ‘bridge to nowhere,’ this plan will create North Carolina’s 
‘bridge you can’t get to’ as the island continues to erode” (Defenders of Wildlife 2011).  
 
 Cost 
Coalition members viewed the short bridge and NC 12 maintenance plan as fiscally 
irresponsible. After Hurricane Irene breached the island in several places, a coalition scientist 
dismissed repair efforts as “just filling those holes in the road with money” (Zucchino 2011). The 
SELC questioned NCDOT’s fluctuating cost estimates, alleging that they were manipulated to 
prevent a fair comparison of costs and benefits. They cited more recent data that revised the long 
bridge costs downward and suggested that funding could be diverted from the proposed  
mid-Currituck bridge in the northern Outer Banks. In 2013, the lead SELC attorney seemed to 
suggest that NCDOT was acting in bad faith: 
After local political opposition redirected NCDOT to favor the short bridge, 
NCDOT increased its estimate of the cost of a longer bridge just four years later, 
from $260 million to $929 million to $1.4 billion, and NCDOT declared it 
unaffordable. Last year NCDOT staff again estimated the cost of a long bridge at 
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a low of $569 million and a high of $629 million.  Not satisfied with lower 
numbers from its own staff, NCDOT hired a consultant for a new estimate, which 
came in at over $1 billion. The SELC repeatedly suggested an independent 
assessment of the actual cost of a long bridge not afflicted by political motivation.  
NCDOT refused these requests (Carter 2013b).  
 
Long Bridge Coalition General Strategies 
 Venue Shifting 
NCDOT’s issuance of the Record of Decision in 2010 opened the door for court challenges to 
the legal sufficiency of the process and analyses. The coalition opted to file a federal lawsuit, 
thereby shifting the venue from agencies to the courts in hopes of a different outcome. As an 
SELC attorney explained, “[t]he court will ultimately resolve this.  DOT may dismiss [coalition 
concerns], but the court will ultimately resolve the legal claims” (Rocky Mount [NC] Telegram 
2011b). This venue shift was likely always planned, but could not occur until the Record of 
Decision was issued. 
 
The SELC filed its federal lawsuit in July 2011. As described in their Complaint: 
Instead of preparing an adequate analysis of alternatives to the Project and the 
cumulative impacts of the Project as a whole, the Defendants piecemealed the 
Project into separate segments and issued a Record of Decision approving a 
selected alternative for the project in violation of NEPA. In addition, the selected 
alternative for the Project will violate Section 4(f) by requiring construction 
through the Refuge (and “use” of Refuge lands) even though feasible and prudent 
alternatives exist that will not use the Refuge, and by failing to sufficiently plan to 
minimize harm to the Refuge (Southern Environmental Law Center 2011, 2). 
 
The lawsuit asked the US District Court to set aside the Record of Decision and issue an 
injunction requiring the NCDOT to comply with NEPA and Section 4(f). The SELC also turned 
to the state administrative courts in 2012 and 2013, challenging the NC Coastal Resources 
Commission’s issuance of state CAMA permits for the project. In 2013, the US District Court 
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ruled in favor of NCDOT and FHWA. The SELC and its clients chose to appeal the ruling to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. This decision earned a quick and harsh response from the Short 
Bridge Coalition, setting in motion a war of words in the media that may have influenced public 
opinion but was irrelevant to the legal venue where the decisions would be made.   
 
 Public Outreach 
The Record of Decision signaled the end of the NEPA process for the Bonner Bridge, meaning 
there were no more public hearings or written comment periods. The coalition continued its 
public outreach efforts through organization websites, but concentrated its primary effort on 
newspaper editorials, guest commentaries, and press releases. Just as in the previous policy 
phase, SELC attorneys and coastal geoscientist Orrin Pilkey submitted multiple guest 
commentaries for publication in state newspapers. The editorial boards of several newspapers 
published numerous editorials supporting the coalition’s positions and legal actions. The 
contentious newspaper exchanges between the SELC and high-ranking state officials after the 
appeal are described in further detail in a following section. 
 
 
 
 
Long Bridge Coalition Narrative Strategies 
 Choice of Key Issues 
Table 6.10 lists the coalition’s key issues in Policy Phase 4, along with typical examples. 
The Long Bridge advocates shifted their narrative focus in response to their opponents’ 
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positions. The coalition had focused considerable effort in the previous phase on 
responding to the Dare County Commissioners’ 2003 concerns about Refuge access, while 
the Short Bridge Coalition had already shifted its attention elsewhere. In Phase 4, the 
Long Bridge Coalition again tracked its opponents, dropping Refuge access as a primary 
topic. The coalition now stressed the importance of a reliable transportation route free of 
overwash and flooding, countering the Short Bridge Coalition’s Phase 3 safety arguments.  
Overall, the coalition pursued a new strategy of attacking NCDOT’s preferred plan, 
alleging it could not provide reliable long-term transportation on a barrier island prone to 
overwash and breach without incurring unreasonable costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.10:  Most Frequently Mentioned Narrative Topics – Long Bridge Coalition, Phase 4 
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Topic 
Percentage 
of coded 
sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Reliability  45% 26/58 
 
“The concept from the beginning was that replacing 
the bridge at its current location would not meet the 
objective of providing reliable transportation 
between the two islands because if those areas 
overwashed or new inlets formed, you couldn’t get to 
the bridge” (Tennant 2013).   
 
“NCDOT admits its proposed bridges will end up in 
the ocean, and the people of Hatteras Island will 
continue to be stranded by NCDOT’s poor planning 
for decades to come” (Southern Environmental Law 
Center 2013d).  
 
Barrier 
Island 
Processes 
31% 
18/58 
 
“Instead of constructing a safe, reliable route that 
would serve North Carolinians for the next 50 years, 
NCDOT is pushing a piecemeal plan for NC12 that 
ignores the basic problem: this stretch of highway 
continually washes out because the island is eroding 
out from underneath it” (Southern Environmental 
Law Center 2013b). 
 
“Storms, erosion, washouts, and breaches will 
continue to disrupt transportation along NC12 in the 
Refuge. NCDOT still has no long-term plan to 
maintain access to and from Hatteras Island” 
(Southern Environmental Law Center 2013a).  
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Topic 
Percentage 
of coded 
sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Cost 29% 17/58 
 
“NCDOT says it can’t fund a Pamlico Sound bridge 
upfront, but that claim doesn’t hold water. NCDOT is 
planning to fund and build multiple phases of its own 
plan simultaneously, using unspecified sources, for an 
up-front cost comparable to that of a Pamlico Sound 
bridge, without addressing any of the erosion-prone 
areas along NC 12” (Torrey 2012).   
 
“Now NCDOT contends a Pamlico Sound bridge is 
unaffordable.  But its estimates of the cost of long 
bridge vary wildly: $260 million in 2003, up to $1.44 
billion in 2007, and as low as $569 million and as 
high as $1.1 billion in 2012. NCDOT has refused our 
repeated requests for an independent cost assessment” 
(Carter 2013a).  
 
 
Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Table 6.11 shows the coalition’s assignment of costs and benefits in Phase 4. They 
continued to describe the short bridge as imposing diffuse costs on taxpayers, travelers, 
and the Refuge’s habitat and wildlife. The short bridge benefits were portrayed as 
concentrated on developers, business owners, and property owners.  This pattern continues 
to indicate that the coalition perceived itself as losing. 
 
Other Narrative Strategies 
Again, the coalition did not adopt a strategy of using policy surrogates or condensation 
symbols. The recurring phrase of “permanent construction zone” appeared four times in 
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coalition narratives and comes the closest to being a condensation symbol. There were no 
policy surrogates. 
 
Table 6.11:  Long Bridge Coalition Phase 4 - Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Costs of 
Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits 
of Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
Benefits 
of Long 
Bridge 
Frequency 
taxpayers 
(diffuse) 13 
developers and             
business  
(concentrated) 
4 taxpayers (diffuse) 1 
travelers 
(diffuse) 10 
 
property 
owners 
(concentrated) 
2   
Refuge and 
wildlife 
(diffuse) 
8     
 
Short Bridge Coalition Position 
The Short Bridge Coalition also maintained its positions on core issues, but shifted the 
emphasis to expressing frustration with the length of the planning process. They directed 
anger and resentment towards environmental groups and attorneys, who were seen as 
prolonging an approval process that had dragged on for too many years. The coalition 
continued to dismiss the feasibility of the long bridge or high-speed ferries based on cost 
projections.   
 
 Opponents 
In this policy phase, prominent coalition figures began explicitly blaming environmental groups 
and lawyers for the perceived delay in bridge replacement, especially after the SELC filed its  
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federal lawsuit. This marked a change from the last policy phase, where members of the public 
expressed similar resentments in public comments and hearings, but high profile coalition 
members limited their ire to agency “bureaucrats.” Following SELC’s appeal in 2013, the gloves 
came off. Coalition members argued that the environmental groups and lawyers were needlessly 
prolonging the process to increase their visibility and gain donations and supporters. Some in the 
coalition viewed the legal action as a means of circumventing the outcome of 20 years of NEPA 
proceedings. They argued that environmental groups and the SELC were intentionally delaying 
bridge construction and recklessly endangering both residents and visitors to suit their own 
purposes. The Chairman of the Dare County Board of Commissioners shared this sentiment. “I 
cannot believe the SELC and Defenders [of Wildlife] are gambling with people’s lives in this 
great country. This is a safety issue, and their claims are preposterous. All I’ve got to say is shame 
on them” (Rocky Mount [NC] Telegram 2011a). 
 
 Time 
The coalition adjusted its message regarding time, giving less emphasis to the duration of 
the bridge planning process and instead stressing the age of the bridge and the increasing 
likelihood of its closure before a new bridge was completed. As a NCDOT spokesman 
explained in 2013, “Something could pop up on a moment’s notice that would require its 
closing. We’re in a race against time” (Waggoner 2013). A 2011 newspaper editorial 
offered a similar warning that “The state has pushed its luck long enough. It’s past time to 
start building a replacement” (Greensboro [NC] News & Record 2011). There was an 
increased sense of urgency throughout the policy phase.  
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 Cost 
The coalition continued to argue that upfront costs of the long bridge made it unaffordable 
and unfeasible. A NCDOT official reiterated that construction costs for the long bridge 
would “require spending the entire NCDOT budget for this 14-county region for ten years 
on a single project” (Trogden 2012). As litigation delayed replacement, a new argument 
emerged focusing on the ongoing costs of maintaining the Bonner Bridge. As an editorial 
pointed out, the NCDOT was spending “about $300,000 a year on maintenance and 
repairs on the existing bridge” (Virginian-Pilot 2011). 
 
Short Bridge Coalition General Strategies 
The coalition’s strategies of using political pressure and public mobilization to sway decision 
makers were less apparent after the Record of Decision was issued. With the bridge selection 
completed, the coalition was generally inactive until the SELC filed its federal lawsuit in 2011. 
The more prominent coalition members spoke to the media about the lawsuit, but remained 
relatively passive until the SELC appealed the U.S. District Court’s ruling. That appeal, which 
further delayed the start of construction, prompted a vigorous media offensive by high-ranking 
political figures within the coalition, including the NC Governor and the NC Secretary of 
Transportation. As mentioned above, the highly visible debate that ensued is discussed in a 
following section.   
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Short Bridge Coalition Narrative Strategies 
 Choice of Key Issues 
The issues emphasized by the coalition in its NPF narratives reflect a general shift toward 
criticism of its opponents, with 49 percent of narratives singling out the SELC and 
environmental groups for prolonging the delay in replacing the Bonner Bridge. Once the Record 
of Decision was signed, the Long Bridge Coalition’s legal tactics were the only thing delaying 
construction. Accordingly, the coalition dropped its focus on safety to concentrate on its 
opponents’ motives, their role in the ongoing delay, and the costs of continuing to repair Bonner 
Bridge. Table 6.12 shows the most common coalition topics and examples. 
 
Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Again, the coalition described the long bridge as imposing diffuse costs, with taxpayers, 
travelers, the economy, and residents all suffering from its opponents’ ongoing insistence on a 
long bridge. They portrayed benefits from a long bridge as concentrated on those who wanted to 
make Refuge access more exclusive as well as helping fundraising efforts for environmental 
groups. Again, this pattern shows a coalition that perceives itself as losing. Table 6.13 shows the 
coalition’s assignment of costs and benefits in this policy phase. 
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Table 6.12: Most Frequently Mentioned Narrative Topics – Short Bridge Coalition, Phase 4 
Topic 
Percentage 
of coded 
sources 
mentioning 
topic 
Examples 
Opponents 49% [38/78] 
 
“Look, if bird worshippers want to turn Hatteras into an 
uninhabited barrier island accessible only to strong 
swimmers or those with boats, they should buy the land 
and do it. Barring that, they should take their extreme 
agenda elsewhere and let the Outer Banks thrive.  And 
to thrive, there must be a bridge” (Dougherty 2013).  
 
“. . . [the SELC and clients] are willing to use their vast 
amounts of money and power to distort the truth for 
their own selfish purposes. Instead of working with the 
local community and playing a productive role in the 
development of a replacement to the Bonner Bridge, 
they have merely tried to block every attempt at 
improving the safety and efficiency of access to 
Hatteras Island” (Midgett 2013). 
 
Time 29% [23/78] 
 
“We have been more than patient by playing by the 
rules and allowing this to work through the system, but 
enough is enough. The federal judge has ruled.  
Whatever we need to do to get this bridge started, we 
will do. Time has run out” (Kozak 2013).  
 
“The appeal will mean further delay in building a 
parallel bridge to replace the current bridge, which is 
already 30 years beyond its expected life cycle and in 
constant need of repair and maintenance to keep it safe 
for travel (NCDOT 2013b).  
 
Cost 22% [15/78] 
 
“We’ve spent enough taxpayer money already, fixing 
the old bridge.  And it’s time to build a new one” 
(Siceloff 2013). 
 
“The long bridge would cost about $1.15 billion in 
taxpayer money to build.  That is not a financially viable 
option, nor the most efficient way to get this project 
done” (NCDOT 2013a). 
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Other Narrative Strategies 
The coalition did not appear to use policy surrogates in this policy phase. At the end of the 
policy phase, prominent political figures in the coalition used the phrases “ivory tower 
elitists” and “liberal elitists” to describe the opposing coalition. This phrase may function 
as a condensation symbol, but it was only mentioned twice in coalition narratives. Such 
limited use makes it more likely that this was a colorful turn of phrase by individuals 
rather than a strategic choice. 
 
 
Table 6.13: Short Bridge Coalition Phase 4 - Assignment of Costs and Benefits 
Costs of 
Long Bridge Frequency 
Benefits of 
Long Bridge Frequency 
Benefits 
of Short 
Bridge 
Frequency 
 
taxpayers 
(diffuse)  
12 
restricted Refuge 
   access      
(concentrated) 
4 n/a n/a 
travel safety 
(diffuse) 6 
 
SELC &  
   advocacy group  
(concentrated) 
3   
economy 
(diffuse) 5     
residents 
(diffuse) 5     
 
Shift in Coalition Interaction 
For much of the Bonner Bridge case study, the two coalitions behaved like debaters on a stage. 
Each used the available forums to explain their positions and persuade the audience of policy 
makers and the public that their side was correct. Following the 2010 Record of Decision, the 
debate grew heated. To extend the analogy a bit further, the two debaters were clearly growing 
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 frustrated with one another, alternately making increasingly pointed remarks through clenched 
teeth, but never directly engaging with and attacking one another. That all changed in Fall 2013 
when the SELC appealed the US District Court ruling. The hint of things to come could be seen 
in dueling press releases from the NCDOT and SELC on October 1, 2013. 
 SELC:  NCDOT’s insistence on this outdated route for NC12 has gone beyond 
the impractical to the absurd. The agency itself has acknowledged that erosion 
will undo the time, labor and expense of this futile project in less than a decade. 
There are sustainable alternatives that provide reliable transport and protect the 
Refuge at the same time (Southern Environmental Law Center 2013b).  
 
NCDOT:  The additional stall tactics of the SELC continue to put a strain on 
taxpayer money and our ability to keep this vital lifeline open for the people of 
eastern North Carolina and the millions of visitors who travel to the area each 
year. As the federal judge’s ruling confirmed last month, NCDOT cares about the 
economy, the environmental impact, and the people in all that we do (NCDOT 
2013b).  
 
The turning point was the December 3, 2013 emergency closure of the bridge after routine 
scanning indicated that scour was undermining bridge pilings. The sudden closure alarmed locals 
and triggered an outpouring of blame from both sides in the following days. The first volleys 
came at a press conference by public officials held the day after the bridge closure. A selection of 
comments is presented below. 
 
•   Dare County Commissioner Warren Judge described the bridge closure as “a manmade 
disaster” and called on the people to “stand with us and tell these special interest groups 
that have stalled, delayed, and obstructed the replacement of this bridge that they need to 
stop.  They need to put this down” (Judge 2013).  
•   NC Representative Tine (D- District 6) also called on the public to contact the “special 
interest groups that have put us in this situation” (Tine 2013). 
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•   NC Senator Cook (R-District 1) was less diplomatic, expressing his frustration at the 
“stupidity of what these environmental nuts have been doing to us down here. This has 
got to stop. This is insane. . . . We have let overzealous environmental folks . . . delay a 
bridge for twenty years. . . . I call for the Southern Environmental Law Center to give it 
up.  You’ve done enough damage. Quit” (Cook 2013). 
•   NC Board of Transportation member Malcolm Fearing asked the SELC to “look within 
yourselves, look deep within yourselves and to see what you’re doing. I know you’re 
committed to this cause of the environment, I believe that. But are you right? Is it about 
winning, or is it about doing the right thing?” (Fearing 2013) 
•   Department of Transportation Secretary Tata emphasized the US District Court’s ruling 
that NCDOT had complied with all legal requirements in the bridge planning. To him, the 
appeal showed the SELC’s “lack of concern and contempt for the people” of the Outer 
Banks.  He described the SELC as:  
an organization that pretends to care about the environment.  What they care 
about is winning . . . They’re ivory tower elitists down here that, I don’t even 
know if they have been here. They are ivory tower elitists who file these lawsuits 
from their air-conditioned offices in Chapel Hill or Charlottesville or wherever. 
And they do so with their lattes and contempt and chuckle while the good people 
of the Outer Banks are fighting hard to scratch out a living here based on tourism 
and based on access (Tata 2013).  
 
The SELC responded the next day with a press release blaming NCDOT and county officials for 
the closure, implying that NCDOT acted for political purposes:   
NCDOT’s inability to secure all the necessary permits for its faulty plan to build a 
new bridge in the same unstable location is delaying construction of any new 
bridge. In 2003, NCDOT and the Secretary of Transportation warned Dare 
County officials that if they pushed for a replacement plan that could not receive 
the necessary permits, it “will only cause further delay.” But NCDOT noted that 
to get what they wanted, Dare County officials were “willing to take the risk that 
Bonner Bridge might deteriorate to the point that it would be closed to traffic.”  
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One way around these continuous problems is a more reliable and safer bridge 
through the Pamlico Sound . . . We were surprised to see the Bonner Bridge 
closed so suddenly, without warning to the public after the bridge had been 
declared safe for travel just days before. SELC has submitted a public records 
request seeking information regarding NCDOT’s abrupt decision and the reasons 
behind it (Southern Environmental Law Center 2013d).  
 
The following day, December 6, saw a flurry of public statements and exchanged letters, 
all closely followed by the media. Governor McCrory joined Dare County officials at a 
press conference at the Outer Banks, offering the following remarks: 
The Bonner Bridge was a thirty-year bridge, it is now in its fiftieth year. The 
construction of a new bridge is two decades too late at this point in time. And we 
are being blocked by groups, including the Southern Environmental Law Center, 
who I don’t think have the best long-term interests of our state and especially this 
area in mind and especially the citizens in this area. And right now I’m asking for 
public support to convince the Environmental Law Center and other groups that 
have signed on to the lawsuit against North Carolina to tell this group to get out of 
our way, and do what’s good for the public interest of North Carolina, the public 
interest for the safety of our citizens, and the public interest of saving jobs and 
creating jobs for this area. Get out of the way (McCrory 2013).  
 
The SELC responded by publicly releasing a letter to the Governor, saying: 
 [W]e find it disingenuous and irresponsible that you have chosen to aggressively, 
publicly, and inaccurately blame environmental organizations for this bridge 
closure. As a result of your urging, we have been at the receiving end of multiple 
threats based on misinformation you have provided. . . If objections from the Dare 
County Commission and local political leaders had not derailed [the 2003 long 
bridge] proposal, construction was scheduled to begin in 2006 with completion of 
a new bridge three years ago in 2010. The current bridge problem would have 
been avoided, and a long range solution in place” (Southern Environmental Law 
Center 2013c).  
 
Later that same day, the Governor and Secretary of Transportation responded with a letter to the 
SELC Board of Trustees and clients asking them to immediately withdraw their appeal and all 
other legal challenges. The letter read, in part: 
Continued delays of the construction of a new bridge and the remainder of NC 12 
will jeopardize the health, education, safety, welfare, and economy of the citizens 
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of Hatteras Island. You and your organization are responsible for these delays and 
should consider yourselves accountable for the impacts to the people of Hatteras 
Island and the taxpayers of North Carolina (McCrory and Tata 2013). 
 
NC Senate President Pro Tempore Berger (R-Rockingham) and NC House Speaker Tillis (R-
Mecklenburg) joined the fray, issuing a joint statement condemning the SELC’s “frivolous 
lawsuit” as only another episode in “their scheme to agitate the left and raise funds for an 
extreme, fringe agenda – this time, at the expense of Northeastern North Carolina’s economy.  
We’d expect no less from liberal elitists from Chapel Hill and Charlottesville who want to turn 
the Outer Banks into a private nature retreat they can visit on the weekends” (Berger and Tillis 
2013).  
 
Following this wave of criticism, SELC supporters jumped to their defense. A NC League of 
Conservation Voters newsletter asked, “What do you do when you’re stalled in the courts on a 
major transportation project? If you’re Governor Pat McCrory, you launch a personal attack 
against the citizen conservation group that’s challenging you” (North Carolina League of 
Conservation Voters 2013). The News & Observer editorial staff argued that the Governor “has 
chosen to pander to the short-term needs of Outer Banks business interests,” and argued that 
“[t]his demagoguery is bad on its own, but it’s even worse for being inaccurate. There’s nothing 
elitist or extreme about the long bridge option” (Raleigh News & Observer 2013). 
 
NC Policy Watch, a political advocacy group, responded to Secretary Tata’s remarks with 
similar personal attacks. An opinion piece in a Durham, NC newspaper noted that “it’s a really 
bad idea for rich guys with big salaries, big houses, big offices, big staffs and big cars who live 
in big, swanky homes to lambast committed advocates with whom they disagree. . . as latte-
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sipping, air-conditioned elitists” (Schofield 2013). They accused the administration of deflecting 
blame and resorting to “theater and hyperbole” to cover their lack of understanding of the issue. 
 
Amidst this highly charged back and forth, there were guest commentaries from each side 
purporting to lay out the facts to correct “inaccuracies” in opponents’ statements. A few cooler 
heads on editorial boards acknowledged fault on both sides and called for an end to the 
bickering. This burst of rhetorical activity ceased almost as abruptly as it began. Lasting roughly 
a month, this interlude peeled back the veneer of civility to expose strong undercurrents of anger, 
resentment, and contempt between the coalitions. 
 
The sudden flare of insults is intriguing from a strategic level. The Short Bridge Coalition 
encouraged its supporters to contact the SELC to urge them to drop their appeal. The likelihood 
of such efforts succeeding was highly doubtful. The war of words played out entirely in a public 
forum. At that point, the bridge decision had moved beyond political figures and agencies to the 
federal courts. An appellate court in Virginia would make the decision months later, without 
public input. This public exchange of insults and blame was brief, but was a noteworthy 
deviation from the coalition patterns established in previous years. 
 
Policy Phase Summary 
In this policy phase, the two coalitions maintained their core positions on the issues, but took 
more aggressive stances regarding their opposition. The Long Bridge Coalition’s decisions to 
shift the venue to the courts with a lawsuit and appeal led to accusations from the opposing 
coalition that they were deliberately delaying replacement of the deteriorating bridge for their 
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own purposes. The Long Bridge Coalition took the offense, criticizing NCDOT’s plan both in 
the media and the courts. Both coalitions viewed themselves as losing, portraying their 
opponents’ plan as imposing diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. The Policy Phase ended 
with the coalitions entering settlement negotiations. Table 6.14 summarizes these positions. 
 
Table 6.14:  Summary of Narrative Issues and Strategies by Coalition, Policy Phase 4 
 
 
 
Long Bridge Coalition 
 
Short Bridge Coalition 
 
Lead Actors 
 
environmental advocacy 
groups 
 
elected officials 
 
Narrative Issues 
 
reliability 
barrier island processes 
cost comparisons 
 
opponents 
duration of planning 
bridge getting older 
 
General Strategies 
 
venue shifting to courts 
media outreach 
 
 
media outreach 
 
Cost/Benefit Assignment 
 
 
 
 
 
costs: taxpayers, travelers, 
Refuge and wildlife 
benefits: developers, 
business owners, property 
owners 
 
costs: taxpayers, safety, 
economy, residents 
benefits: restricted Refuge 
access, environmental 
group fundraising 
 
 
 
Policy Phase 5:  2015 
 
Context:  Finding a Middle Ground 
Policy Phase 5 saw a negotiated resolution to the bridge dispute and practically no public 
coalition activity. In Phase 4, SELC and NCDOT had agreed to enter into closed settlement 
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negotiations following the appellate ruling in 2014. The US Court of Appeals had found that 
NCDOT’s environmental studies satisfied NEPA requirements, but remanded the case back to 
the District Court for further review of the Section 4(f) analysis. The outcome of that review was 
uncertain. While the Appellate Court ordered another review, the same lower court judge had 
already found the 4(f) analysis adequate in the first analysis. If NCDOT prevailed, the SELC 
would gain no concessions. If the SELC prevailed on the 4(f) analysis, the bridge landing and 
road maintenance within the Refuge would not be allowed, meaning NCDOT would possibly 
have to start over with bridge planning. The prospect of further litigation and delays loomed. 
Each passing day meant further delay in replacing the deteriorating Bonner Bridge, increasing 
the chances of the bridge being closed to traffic. These all served as strong incentives to 
negotiate a settlement. 
 
The two sides entered into closed negotiations in September 2014. They issued a joint statement 
at the outset of negotiations, with NCDOT remarking, “We remain committed to building a new 
parallel bridge over the Oregon Inlet to ensure the safety of Outer Banks residents and visitors. 
We have been in conversations with the SELC about the Bonner Bridge project for more than a 
year and believe these recent proactive discussions are a positive step toward a permanent 
solution” (Southern Environmental Law Center 2014b). The SELC agreed, saying “We are 
continuing to work together with NCDOT to resolve this matter with a reliable, long-term 
solution that ensures the safety of the traveling public and avoids the problems that currently 
threaten NC 12” (Southern Environmental Law Center 2014b).  
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No further statement was made by NCDOT or SELC during negotiations. In February 2015, the 
two sides requested the appointment of a federal court mediator to facilitate negotiations. In June 
2015, NCDOT and SELC jointly announced a settlement on the bridge project, touting an 
agreement that would allow “NCDOT to replace the aging Herbert C. Bonner Bridge over 
Oregon Inlet with a new parallel bridge. Under the agreement, NCDOT will also consider 
options that would move vulnerable portions of NC 12 out of the southern half of Pea Island 
National Wildlife Refuge and into Pamlico Sound” (NCDOT 2015b). 
 
Each side emphasized different aspects of the settlement. NCDOT explained “the settlement 
agreement will allow NCDOT to provide a safe and reliable bridge for thousands of residents 
who rely on this lifeline to get to work, school, and healthcare and for millions of visitors who 
travel to the Outer Banks every year” (NCDOT 2015b). The SELC was “pleased that NCDOT 
and its partner agencies will consider additional options for NC 12 that will provide safe, reliable 
transportation by avoiding the areas where erosion and washouts shut down the road in its 
current location. This is a win-win for the Refuge and everyone who relies on NC 12” (NCDOT 
2015b).  
 
SUMMARY AND COMPARISONS 
 
Twenty-five years elapsed between the first scoping efforts for replacement of the bridge and the 
final agreement on the bridge design and route. Within that period, two sides emerged, first as 
factions within formal agency interactions, then as advocacy coalitions with stable positions and 
clear strategies. The Long Bridge Coalition used the USFWS’s permitting authority to 
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advantage, succeeding in getting the long bridge selected as the only corridor for further study in 
2002. In response to this “behind the scenes” agency strategy, the Short Bridge Coalition formed 
around the Dare County Commissioners’ successful efforts to use political pressure to add a 
short bridge design to the environmental studies.   
 
Once the multiple rounds of environmental studies commenced, the Long Bridge Coalition 
focused its arguments on the reliability and long-term cost savings of moving NC 12 off of the 
migrating barrier island within the Refuge. The Short Bridge Coalition countered with arguments 
that the upfront costs of the long bridge were unaffordable, meaning the bridge would not get 
built. This would force residents and visitors to continue to travel over a deteriorating bridge. 
This reliance on a bridge decades beyond its service life risked the safety of travelers and the 
tourism economy of Hatteras Island.   
 
The coalition memberships differed significantly, with the Long Bridge Coalition largely 
consisting of environmental advocacy groups, agency personnel, coastal scientists, and 
newspaper editorial boards. The Short Bridge Coalition included local, state, and federal elected 
officials, local civic and business organizations, local grassroots advocacy groups, and many 
residents and visitors. In keeping with these differing memberships, the coalitions opted for 
different general strategies, with the Long Bridge Coalition relying primarily on permitting 
authority, agency influence, venue shifting, and media outreach. The Short Bridge Coalition used 
a political strategy, recruiting politicians and mobilizing the public to exert political pressure on 
decision makers through the NEPA public comment process. The two coalitions, interestingly, 
used the same NPF narrative strategies, describing the opposing plan as imposing costs on many 
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while concentrating benefits on a select few. This suggests that both coalitions viewed 
themselves as ‘losing’ the debate. Neither coalition used condensation symbols or policy 
surrogates as a strategy. The coalitions are compared directly in Table 6.15, and are compared 
over time in Tables 6.16, 6.17, and 6.18. 
 
 
Table 6.15:  Summary Comparison of Coalitions 
 Long Bridge Coalition Short Bridge Coalition 
Core 
Position: 
 
The key issue is not the bridge 
replacement, but the future of NC 
12 within the Refuge. The short 
bridge commits NCDOT to 
maintaining the road through the 
Refuge for decades. The beach 
nourishment and road construction 
required to maintain NC 12 
undermine the ecological integrity 
of the Refuge and the long-term 
function of the barrier island. It 
also keeps the primary 
transportation route in high-
erosion areas prone to overwash 
and island breaches. Over the long 
term, the costs of building the 
short bridge and maintaining NC 
12 are higher than the long bridge 
costs. 
 
The existing bridge exceeded its 
design life in the early 1990s and must 
be replaced as quickly as possible. 
The bridge is the lifeline for the 
residents, visitors, and economy of 
Hatteras Island and Dare County. 
Delaying the bridge replacement puts 
lives at risk. The Short Bridge can be 
funded and constructed quickly. The 
Long Bridge is unaffordable and will 
never be built. The Short Bridge plan 
allows the bridge to be replaced 
quickly and maintains vehicular 
access to the Refuge.   
 
Key Issues: 
 
 
 
reliability 
barrier island processes 
cost comparisons 
permit issues 
Refuge access 
politics 
 
 
 
safety 
time 
cost comparisons 
transportation 
economy 
opponents 
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Key 
Coalition 
Actors: 
 
USFWS  
SELC 
environmental advocacy groups 
coastal scientists 
newspaper editorial boards 
 
NCDOT  
local and state elected officials  
local and civic groups 
residents & visitors 
Primary 
Strategies: 
 
permitting leverage 
agency procedures 
public outreach (media) 
venue shift (courts) 
 
political efforts 
public outreach (grassroots) 
 
Costs and 
Benefits: 
Costs (diffuse):   
      taxpayers, Refuge & habitat,    
safety, transportation 
Benefits (concentrated): 
     NCDOT, mid-Currituck bridge,  
     developers & business owners 
 
Costs (diffuse): 
     safety, economy, residents,  
     taxpayers 
Benefits (concentrated): 
     environmental groups & SELC, 
     Refuge, limited access 
Condensation 
Symbols & 
Policy 
Surrogates 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
 
Table 6.16:  Coalition Lead Actors, by Policy Phase 
 Long Bridge 
  
Short Bridge 
 
Phase 1 
 
USFWS 
 
NCDOT 
 
Phase 2 USFWS 
NCDOT 
 
Dare County Commissioners 
 
Phase 3 
USFWS 
environmental advocacy groups 
editorial boards 
NCDOT 
elected officials 
civic and local organizations 
 
Phase 4 environmental advocacy groups 
editorial boards 
elected officials 
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Table 6.17:  Coalition Narrative Issues, by Policy Phase 
 Long Bridge  Short Bridge  
 
Phase 1  
road/bridge link 
limited future options 
 
transportation needs 
design costs 
 
Phase 2 road/bridge link 
permit issues 
Refuge access 
terminal groin 
quick replacement 
 
Phase 3 altered Refuge access 
reliability & safety 
cost comparisons 
politics 
safety risks of delay 
duration of planning 
transportation & economy 
opponents 
 
Phase 4 reliability 
barrier island processes 
cost comparisons 
opponents 
duration of planning 
age of bridge 
 
 
Table 6.18:  Coalition General Strategies, by Policy Phase 
 Long Bridge  
 
Short Bridge  
Phase 1 agency procedures agency procedures 
 
Phase 2 permitting leverage political efforts 
 
Phase 3 permitting leverage 
public outreach (media) 
political efforts 
public outreach (grassroots) 
 
Phase 4 media outreach media outreach 
 
 
 
After all this effort and conflict, did the final result differ from the plan at the outset 25 years 
earlier? In the 1990s, the original plan was to build a short parallel bridge to tie into the northern 
end of Hatteras Island. The initial planning acknowledged that overwash and island migration 
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were problems on NC12 through the Refuge, especially in the “hot spots.” The plan was to build 
the bridge and defer planning for the road’s future until the OBTF completed its work and made 
long-term planning recommendations for the road. Twenty-five years later, the plan called for a 
short parallel bridge to be built to tie into northern Hatteras Island. A number of options for NC 
12 within the Refuge had been studied, including a combination of road, bridges, and beach 
nourishment. While the Bonner Bridge replacement is constructed, planning will commence for a 
2.4 mile bridge through the Pamlico Sound just north of Rodanthe to bypass the ‘S’ Curves “hot 
spot.” Future projects will be implemented in phases as conditions warrant, guided by a coastal 
monitoring program. The combination of road, bridge, and nourishment for those future projects 
will be determined by prevailing conditions. 
 
All said and done, the plan at the end of the process bears a remarkable resemblance to the 1993 
version of the bridge. An extraordinary amount of time, money, and passion have been expended 
in the interim, resulting in minor policy change. The implications for the case study and research 
questions are explored in the final chapter. 
 
  
 Chapter Seven:  Discussion and Conclusions  
 
 
After the dust has settled, NCDOT’s policy for the Bonner Bridge and NC 12 in 2017 looks 
strikingly similar to its 1990 policy. The current plan is to build a short parallel replacement 
bridge over Oregon Inlet in the general location described in the 1993 plan. Future bridges and 
road maintenance along NC 12 will be designed and built as conditions warrant. These future 
projects will require USFWS permitting and NEPA environmental impact studies and may face 
legal and funding challenges. Although NCDOT’s coastal infrastructure policy appeared on the 
brink of significant change in 2003, the Short Bridge Coalition’s political strategies aligned with 
NCDOT’s funding concerns to tip the balance of priorities and values in favor of maintaining the 
status quo. This chapter addresses the research questions to explore how and why decades and 
millions of dollars spent in the bridge planning and debate resulted in no significant policy 
changes. 
 
Research Question 1: Did the bridge replacement project act as an internal shock to the 
policy area? Could the bridge replacement be considered a potential focusing project? 
 
One thing is clear – something significant happened in the bridge debate around 2003. Between 
1990 and 2002, the bridge debate was limited to agency interactions, largely out of the public 
eye. Figure 4.7 showed a flurry of news coverage surrounding the partial bridge collapse in late 
1990, followed by a decade averaging one to three articles per year. This pattern abruptly shifted 
in 2003, with the number of articles more than doubling from the previous year. The heightened 
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attention lasted for the remaining 12 years of the case study, with fluctuations corresponding to 
the cycles of environmental impact statement revisions and public comment periods. The 
increased coverage reflects the emergence of the coalitions and rapid expansion of the debate 
into a matter of public concern.  
 
What happened in 2003 to trigger this sea change in the bridge debate? It was not the bridge 
replacement itself – planning had been underway for more than a decade by that point. A 
comparison of the case timeline with the content analysis shows that the change was a response 
to the introduction of the long bridge design as the sole replacement alternative for further study. 
Over the following decade, thousands of public comments were submitted, dozens of newspaper 
commentaries were written, petitions were circulated, lawsuits were filed, and local and state 
elected officials offered comments and support. 
 
ACF Internal Shock Analysis 
Did this surge in coalition activity signal an internal shock in the ACF formulation? Close 
analysis suggests the answer is both yes and no. The ACF literature has limited treatment of 
internal shocks, with Sabatier and Weible’s 2007 initial formulation remaining the definitive 
description. A close look at this formulation suggests that the bridge debate may satisfy the spirit 
of an internal shock while not fitting within the actual definition.  
 
The introduction of a long bridge design triggered a reaction that clearly upset the status quo and 
brought many new voices and resources to a quiet policy area that had previously been limited to 
agency negotiations. This is similar to the general idea of ACF internal shocks as events or 
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crises, generally within the control of subsystem actors, that upset the status quo and give a 
minority coalition an opportunity to exploit the situation to shift the balance of power, resulting 
in policy change.  
  
Sabatier and Weible (2007) presented internal shocks as a potential pathway to major policy 
change. This pathway has a series of steps: (1) an internal shock occurs, attracting public 
attention and revealing flaws in the majority coalition’s policy; (2) a minority coalition may 
exploit the internal shock, recruiting new allies and taking advantage of any redistribution of 
critical political resources following the shock; and (3) this active minority coalition’s efforts 
may shift the balance of power in the subsystem, creating the possibility of policy change. In the 
bridge case, the steps outlined above appear to have been reversed.   
 
In the previous chapters, the following series of events were presented: 
(1)   NCDOT pursued a plan in the 1990s to replace the existing bridge with a short parallel 
bridge, categorically dismissing any attempts to link the bridge project with planning for 
the future maintenance of NC 12 on Hatteras Island;  
(2)   NCDOT deemed coastal conditions sufficiently changed since the 1993 DEIS to warrant 
preparation of a Supplemental DEIS (SDEIS);  
(3)   This new SDEIS gave the Refuge Manager and USFWS a chance to participate in 
planning as part of the Merger Team. Using permitting leverage created by the 1997 
Refuge Act, the Refuge Manager warned that he likely would not issue a permit for a 
bridge landing within the Refuge;  
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(4)   The Merger Team, including NCDOT, designated a long bridge as the sole alternative 
for further study in the SDEIS;   
(5)   Local elected officials opposed the long bridge, using political pressure at the state level 
to get a short bridge alternative added to the SDEIS in 2004. The two coalitions emerged 
soon after and the scope of the bridge debate expanded. 
 
This series of events up-ends the order suggested by the ACF. Instead of an internal shock giving 
a minority coalition an opportunity to produce policy change, here an agency representative used 
permitting leverage to force a potential policy change, creating an internal shock that triggered 
the emergence of an active coalition determined to maintain the status quo. A second coalition 
formed to counter the first. In less than a year, a quiet policy subsystem centered in agency 
interactions ballooned into a highly-visible and emotionally-charged public debate.   
  
ACF:   internal shock à coalition action à potential policy change 
Case study:   potential policy change à internal shock à coalition action 
 
What does this mean in regards to the bridge project as an internal shock for the policy 
subsystem? On the one hand, if the ACF internal shock formulation is followed rigidly, then the 
inverted sequence found in this case study does not seem to fit. On the other hand, if an internal 
shock is interpreted more generally as an internal event that destabilizes the policy subsystem 
and creates the potential for lasting policy change, then the bridge project seems to qualify. The 
state’s coastal infrastructure policy had hung in the balance for more than a decade as a public 
battle was fought, first within the agencies then in the courts, between maintaining the status quo 
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or shifting to a policy of retreat and avoidance of recurring coastal hazards. While a modified 
version of the status quo eventually won out, the potential was quite real for major policy change 
that would have shaped future coastal infrastructure projects.  
 
The question of whether this is an ACF internal shock is a judgment call. Here, following the 
spirit rather than the letter of the ACF formulation seems appropriate. Given how the bridge 
project destabilized the coastal infrastructure policy subsystem and created potential for lasting 
policy change, it seems to have functioned as an internal shock in a general, if not literal, sense.   
 
 Potential Focusing Project Analysis 
Given the awkward fit between the bridge project and ACF’s internal shocks, it is worthwhile to 
consider the project through the lens of related policy concepts. Lowry’s (2006) potential 
focusing project (PFP), briefly discussed in Chapter Two, similarly evolved from the focusing 
events literature. Like the ACF internal shocks, PFPs have not been widely explored in the 
literature, so Lowry’s presentation remains definitive. Lowry described a PFP as a routine or 
planned project that is a logical extension of policy goals, but is of such scale or impact that it 
shocks the system and draws public attention.  
 
Is PFP a good fit for the bridge case? The answer again seems to be not quite. To borrow a 
metaphor, a PFP serves as “a bridge too far,” extending a policy in such a manner that the flaws 
in that policy become impossible to ignore. In the bridge case, the coalition emergence and 
public debate were a response to the scale and cost of the proposed long bridge. As cost 
projections neared and then exceeded $1 billion dollars for what would be one of the longest 
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continuous over-water bridges in the world, the long bridge design was “perceived as excess” 
(Lowry 2006, 313) by opponents. Again, the misalignment between the bridge case and PFP lies 
in the details. A PFP logically extends existing policy goals to such an extent that it reveals the 
flaws in the policy. Here, the project in question was not an extension of existing policy, but was 
instead a significant shift in policy.  
 
It can be argued that the general idea of a PFP is applicable to the bridge case, even if the 
specific criteria do not fit. The long bridge design, if chosen, could have signaled a new era in 
the state’s coastal infrastructure policy. The potential fiscal and social costs of a long bridge were 
not out of line with the trade-offs inherent in a policy of retreat and adaptation. In this case, those 
costs were high enough to capture public attention and reveal the drawbacks of the potential new 
policy.  
 
 Policy Window Analysis 
While the potential policy change in the bridge project does not quite fit either the ACF internal 
shocks or PFP models, it is worth considering the project using the policy window concept 
borrowed from Multiple Streams Analysis (Kingdon 2013). In a nutshell, a policy window is a 
period of time when a problem arises, a policy alternative is available, political will exists to 
address the issue, and a policy entrepreneur is ready to tie the problem, solution, and political 
will together to get the issue on the decision agenda. This concept seems a reasonable 
explanation for why NCDOT reversed its previous position to support the long bridge design in 
2003. 
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Using a policy window analysis, the problem was impossible to ignore – the barrier island was 
migrating westward, the inlet was moving southward, and NC 12 was seriously threatened by 
erosion in a number of places. Engineering efforts to hold the road in place were very costly, 
threatened the island’s integrity, and were of questionable effectiveness. Geologists and 
environmental groups had been proposing variations on a long bridge alternative since the initial 
bridge scoping process in 1990. This alternative would route the road away from the island, 
allowing the natural migration to resume while maintaining a reliable transportation route. The 
only missing piece, prior to 2003, was the political will to resolve the issue. The 2002 coastal 
erosion study forced a reset of the planning process to compile the SDEIS. This reset opened a 
policy window, allowing the Refuge Manager to act as a policy entrepreneur to couple the 
different streams.   
 
The Refuge Manager’s firm stance on future bridge permitting issues posed a potential roadblock 
for the project and created the political will to shift the policy direction toward a long bridge 
alternative. The Refuge Manager’s successful coupling of the different streams during the open 
policy window resulted in NCDOT designing and agreeing to a bridge project similar to one they 
previously rejected, reversing their established position on long-term NC 12 maintenance. As 
Multiple Streams Analysis suggests, this policy window allowed policy change to get on the 
decision-making agenda (here, the NEPA process), but a combination of coalition activity and 
politics averted lasting policy change. 
 
In summary, in regards to Research Question 1, the answer is a qualified yes. The bridge project 
seems in line with the general spirit of an ACF internal shock, in that the proposed long bridge 
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modification shocked the system, resulted in the emergence of active coalitions, and redistributed 
critical political resources within the subsystem. Similarly, the bridge project is in keeping with 
the general idea of a PFP, with the long bridge design being of such a large scale and high cost 
that it captured public attention and inspired strong debate. For more than a decade, the future 
direction of the state’s coastal infrastructure policy was uncertain, due entirely to the expansion 
of the bridge replacement from a routine project into a larger debate about priorities and trade-
offs.  
 
On the technical side, the bridge project does not quite line up with the specific formulations of 
either an ACF internal shock or a PFP. If such a significant project came so close to policy 
change without qualifying as an internal shock or PFP, then the problem may lie with the way 
those concepts have been developed, or not developed, in the literature. The not-quite-fit of the 
concepts with this case study suggests that there is room for these concepts to be revised to better 
explain situations like the Bonner Bridge replacement. While this research project did not focus 
on policy windows, the cursory analysis above appears to present the best explanation of how the 
subsystem came so close to policy change. Ultimately, the bridge project seems to be a hybrid of 
all three concepts.  
 
Research Question 2:  How did the coalitions use narratives and strategies to exploit the 
opportunity for change created by the bridge replacement? 
 
As Table 6.15 showed, the two coalitions took distinctly different approaches in promoting their 
preferred bridge design. The Long Bridge Coalition was a semi-formal alliance of regional and 
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national environmental advocacy groups with vocal support from several coastal scientists and 
newspaper editorial boards. Their approach, well suited to “outsiders,” was to focus primarily on 
agency procedures and regulatory leverage, with a public outreach effort through major regional 
newspapers and advocacy organization websites. When these tactics failed, the Long Bridge 
Coalition turned to the courts for relief. The Short Bridge Coalition, an informal alliance of local 
and state elected officials, local civic and business groups, and grassroots activists, used an 
“insider” strategy of political pressure and a strong public outreach campaign via word of mouth 
and local news outlets.   
 
The central messages of the two coalitions were as different as their approaches. The Long 
Bridge Coalition focused on the long-term costs of maintaining NC 12 through the Refuge, 
arguing that a long bridge would provide reliable transportation and allow a return to natural 
barrier island migration. The Short Bridge Coalition emphasized the urgency of the bridge 
replacement, noting the potential threat to safety, lives, and livelihoods if the old bridge had to be 
closed before a new bridge was completed. They argued that the short bridge was the only 
alternative that could be funded and constructed quickly, leaving NC 12 issues to be resolved 
after more planning.   
 
 ACF General Strategies 
Chapters Five and Six explored the coalitions’ strategies in depth, tracking them both over time 
and comparatively; the bigger picture of the coalitions’ strategic choices emerges when those 
analyses are consolidated. The following discussion tracks the back-and-forth of coalition 
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activities during the case study. It shows that the coalitions responded to each other and changing 
events, adapting arguments and strategies to fit what seemed most persuasive at the time. 
 
The coalitions had not formed in the first decade of the case study, yet the views that would 
become the core positions of the coalitions were already present. NCDOT represented one side, 
seeking to separate the bridge and NC 12 and stressing the urgent need to replace the old bridge.  
USFWS took the opposite position, arguing that the bridge and road must be considered together 
through long-term planning.   
 
In the late 1990s, USFWS was a consulting agency in the NEPA process, with limited influence 
in bridge planning. Agency staff warned that the project might not receive required permits, but 
had no direct input into project planning. The bridge project stalled when USFWS rejected 
NCDOT’s request for the required Endangered Species Act consultation on regulatory 
procedural grounds. It may be coincidental, but other Interior Department agencies had used 
similar tactics to delay the proposed Oregon Inlet jetties for years. Senator Basnight, a short 
bridge supporter, exerted political pressure on NCDOT in late 2001 to get the project restarted.  
 
At this point, changing conditions reset the planning process, requiring a new version of the 
Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) through the Merger Team process. This gave USFWS 
an actual seat at the table. They opted for a regulatory leverage strategy, using the 1997 Refuge 
Act to reinforce their assertions that any bridge design that landed in the Refuge would be very 
unlikely to receive USFWS permits. NCDOT, faced with nearly unanimous opposition from the 
Merger Team and pressure from the FHWA, surrendered to this regulatory opposition and turned 
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its attention to designing a long bridge outside the Refuge. This decision appeared to commit 
NCDOT to a new policy of retreat and adaptation on Hatteras Island.   
 
NCDOT’s sudden shift to a long bridge design took local elected officials and residents by 
surprise. For decades, NCDOT had reliably negotiated NC 12 maintenance permits out of sight 
of the public eye. Now, it appeared NCDOT had conceded the bridge issue before local officials 
and the public even had a chance to enter the discussion. The eventual strength of the public 
response to the long bridge design may reflect a local sentiment that a major change was being 
imposed on the residents of Hatteras Island without their input. This sentiment may have been 
compounded by a strong local resentment toward the SELC, USFWS, and National Park Service 
stemming from beach driving and access disputes. Disappointed with the outcome of the Merger 
Team process, local elected officials turned to their own area of influence, shifting the debate 
into the political realm. A combination of dogged persistence and political influence from the 
Dare County Commissioners and Senator Basnight resulted in NCDOT first adding a short 
bridge alternative, then designating it as their favored alternative in 2004. The County 
Commissioners’ political strategy was successful at the state level, though a disappointing 
meeting with USFWS regional staff in Atlanta showed the limits of their influence.  
 
The momentum appeared to have swung toward the emerging Short Bridge Coalition at this 
point. Short Bridge supporters found considerable support in the state legislature, which passed a 
bill including a provision endorsing the short bridge. As the Short Bridge Coalition notched 
political victories, long bridge supporters saw the remarkable policy change represented by the 
long bridge seeming to slip from their fingers. Environmental advocacy groups and coastal 
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scientists joined in a Long Bridge Coalition to coordinate their efforts more closely, writing 
guest commentaries and letters to the editors in major regional newspapers. Their inability to 
gain support from many residents or visitors may have been related to negative local sentiment 
toward environmental groups and the SELC, again stemming from an unrelated beach driving 
controversy. 
 
Participation in the 2005 SDEIS public comment period likely showed the relative local 
enthusiasm for each coalition. Of those expressing a bridge preference, 71 percent of oral and 68 
percent of written comments favored the short bridge. The major themes for each coalition were 
already evident in this first round of comments, though their relative importance would shift 
throughout the debate. While reliability, long-term costs, and permitting issues featured heavily 
in the Long Bridge Coalition’s remarks, many commenters directly responded to the Dare 
County Commissioners’ Refuge access concerns from 2003-2004. The Short Bridge Coalition’s 
priorities had shifted in the intervening months, though, as more voices joined the discussion and 
details of the bridge designs were presented. While Refuge access remained a concern, their 
comments now also addressed tourism, the economy, the safety risks of the long bridge, and 
potential environmental harm from the long bridge.   
 
In 2006, USFWS reiterated that it was unlikely to issue permits for the short bridge NC 12 
alternatives. Facing a looming permitting impasse, the Short Bridge Coalition again turned to 
political influence. US Senator Burr (R-NC) raised the bridge issue during confirmation hearings 
for incoming Interior Secretary Kempthorne. A few months later, Kempthorne intervened in the 
bridge project, suggesting that the bridge and road projects should be separated for USFWS 
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permitting consideration. Once again, the Short Bridge Coalition’s political influence seems to 
have trumped the Long Bridge Coalition’s permitting leverage.  
 
While NCDOT prepared a SSDEIS for a modified short bridge design, both coalitions used the 
lull to expand their public outreach efforts in 2006. The Short Bridge Coalition acted first, with a 
group of concerned residents forming “Replace the Bridge Now,” relying on word of mouth and 
a website for publicity. The Long Bridge Coalition countered a few months later with their own 
group, “Build the Long Bridge Coalition,” formed as a joint effort of five environmental 
advocacy groups. The group announced its formation via a press release, followed quickly by a 
website and radio ad campaign. They also used their own organization websites to post updates 
and position statements, many directly addressing the safety and transportation issues raised by 
short bridge supporters in their public comments. 
 
When the SSDEIS was released in early 2007, the coalition supporters were markedly different 
in their participation. Of the comments expressing a preference, 92 percent of oral comments and 
72 percent of written comments supported the short bridge. The Short Bridge Coalition’s 
concerns had again evolved, with most of the speakers addressing the safety and economic 
consequences if the bridge collapsed or was closed before the replacement was ready.   
 
The Long Bridge Coalition focused on agency channels rather than public comments. USFWS 
repeated their warning that they could not issue permits for the NC 12 alternatives in the SSDEIS 
short bridge design. Ultimately, the Merger Team agencies refused to concur on the SSDEIS 
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design in 2007, forcing NCDOT to elevate the issue to a Review Board to get the necessary 
agreements to proceed over agency objections.  
 
The 2008 FEIS, which only refined previous plans, was met with muted public response and a 
significantly lower number of public comments (Short Bridge: ten, Long Bridge: five). The Long 
Bridge Coalition’s agency allies on the Merger Team continued their firm opposition to the short 
bridge and, again, warned that the FEIS design would not receive permits. When NCDOT 
addressed agency concerns by presenting an Environmental Assessment for another short bridge 
design alternative, with the possibility of yet another supplemental EIS after that, the Short 
Bridge Coalition’s frustration spilled over in a record number of public comments in 2010. 
 
There was a striking difference in the coalitions’ response to the 2010 public comment period. 
While 42 speakers supported the short bridge, not a single person spoke in favor of the long 
bridge design at the 2010 public hearings. The Long Bridge Coalition’s eight written comments 
were dwarfed by the Short Bridge Coalition’s massive grassroots letter campaign yielding 863 
unique written comments and 3,097 form letters. A common refrain was frustration over the 
length of the planning process, citing the threats to safety and the local economy from continuing 
reliance on the aging Bonner Bridge.  
 
The reason for the Long Bridge Coalition’s silence became clear the following summer. The 
writing was on the wall regarding NCDOT’s decision, with the 2010 Record of Decision only 
confirming what everyone expected. The Long Bridge Coalition had reached the limits of what 
could be accomplished through permitting and agency channels and could not match their 
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opponents’ political influence and public mobilization. The coalition changed strategies, shifting 
the issue away from the regulatory and political realms into the courts, a move which had been 
unavailable until the Record of Decision was issued. The coalition’s lack of participation in the 
EA public comment period likely signals they saw the process as futile and had already decided 
to pursue a legal strategy.  
 
At this point, the strategies of both coalitions took a puzzling turn. A federal judge would decide 
if NCDOT could proceed with the bridge. There would be no more public hearings, comment 
periods, or opportunities for politicians to intervene in the process. Yet this is when both 
coalitions took the argument to the media with renewed vigor, casting blame and defending their 
preferred design as the only reasonable option.  
 
These guest commentaries and letters to the editor were framed as attempts to persuade the other 
side to either drop the lawsuit or drop the short bridge plan, which seem unrealistic. A 
speculative explanation is that both coalitions were emotionally involved at this point with no 
productive outlet, so they turned to the media to both vent and keep their base supporters 
engaged. Both sides went on the offensive in the media, attacking the merits of the other design 
and their opponents’ motivations. The rhetoric ramped up considerably once the SELC filed an 
appeal, culminating in the remarkable media exchange of personal insults and derision in 
December 2013.    
 
This overview shows that the “agency versus politics” strategic divide was present in the initial 
stages of the case study, even before the coalitions had formed. The Long Bridge Coalition grew 
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out of the USFWS position, while the Short Bridge Coalition formed from the Dare County 
Commissioners’ political efforts to maintain NCDOT’s longstanding policy. Each coalition 
relied on strategies and areas of influence already familiar to them. Though details varied over 
time, the coalitions kept their core strategies throughout the case study. The Short Bridge 
Coalition clearly had more effective public mobilization, allowing its key issues to evolve as 
information changed and new voices joined the chorus. The Long Bridge Coalition relied on 
standard environmental advocacy themes familiar to its members, leaving it playing “catch up” 
as it responded to its opponents’ shifting discussion points. Table 7.1 depicts the coalitions’ 
differing use of general ACF strategies.   
 
NPF Narrative Strategies 
The coalitions’ use of NPF narrative strategies was also analyzed, specifically their efforts to 
either expand or contract the policy area through depiction of costs/benefits and condensation 
symbols and policy surrogates. As explained in Chapter Six, individuals made sporadic 
references that could be interpreted as condensation symbols, but did not indicate a coordinated 
coalition strategy. Policy surrogates were not used in the case study.  
 
The NPF costs/benefits analysis in this case yielded unexpected results. The NPF, following 
Schattschneider (1960), predicts a subsystem will have a coalition that perceives itself as 
winning and a coalition that perceives itself as losing. The winning coalition will try to contain 
the policy debate by depicting diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. The losing coalition will 
try to expand the debate and recruit allies by depicting concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. 
Surprisingly, both coalitions in this case study perceived themselves as losing. Over the ten years 
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(2004-2014) that the coalitions were active, both consistently depicted the opposing design as 
creating diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. The Long Bridge Coalition saw the short bridge 
as imposing costs on taxpayers, the Refuge, wildlife habitat, and traveler safety while benefitting 
NCDOT, business and property owners, and supporters of the mid-Currituck bridge project. The 
Short Bridge Coalition depicted the long bridge as harmful to traveler safety, the local economy, 
the welfare of residents, and taxpayers. They saw the plan as benefitting environmental groups, 
Refuge management, and those favoring restricted access to the Refuge. 
 
Table 7.1:  Coalitions’ Use of General (ACF) Strategies.  X signifies a primary strategy, x 
signifies a secondary strategy.   -- signifies no consistent use. 
 
 
General (ACF) Strategies 
Long 
Bridge 
Coalition 
Short 
Bridge 
Coalition 
 
Submission of formal written/oral comments x X 
 
Public outreach through regional media X x 
 
Public outreach through local media -- X 
 
Public outreach on organization websites X X 
 
Lobbying political figures -- X 
 
Lobbying agency staff X -- 
 
Public mobilization via letter campaigns/petitions x X 
 
Litigation X -- 
 
  
 
Why did the coalitions deviate from the expected winner/loser pattern? Likely, it is because of 
NCDOT’s policy change in 2003 and reversal in 2004. For decades, NCDOT dominated the 
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policy subsystem, with environmental advocates occupying a minority position. This changed in 
2003 when NCDOT yielded to agency pressure and agreed to study a long bridge that bypassed 
the entire Refuge. The environmental advocates suddenly gained the upper hand in the policy 
area, leaving those preferring the status quo feeling left out of the process.  
 
As local elected officials and residents began to coordinate their efforts to oppose the long 
bridge, they faced powerful opponents in NCDOT, USFWS, and an array of other federal and 
state agencies. Accordingly, they adopted underdog tactics, seeking to recruit allies among island 
residents and visitors. Although NCDOT soon reversed its position to support a short bridge, the 
Short Bridge Coalition recognized that the USFWS still held a trump card in the form of a 
regulatory “veto point.” Despite now having NCDOT on its side, the Short Bridge Coalition still 
expanded the debate, needing to make use of every political resource available to overcome 
USFWS’s permitting leverage.   
 
On the other hand, although USFWS and their environmental advocacy allies had gained the 
upper hand for that brief window in 2003-2004, their momentum was stopped short when 
NCDOT reversed its position in favor of a short bridge. This put the newly-formed Long Bridge 
Coalition in the same position its members had occupied for decades, struggling to use whatever 
tools it could to overcome NCDOT’s undeniable advantage in state transportation matters. They 
also tried to recruit allies, targeting environmentally inclined outsiders and local residents, with 
mixed results. As a result, both coalitions perceived themselves as fighting an uphill battle 
against opponents with the upper hand. They both strategically expanded the debate, competing, 
in part, for the same pool of potential recruits. Ultimately, the Short Bridge Coalition’s “insider” 
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strategy and narrative themes were more persuasive, allowing them greater success in mobilizing 
supporters. 
 
Research Question 3:  What roles did scientific data and political processes play in the 
coalitions’ strategies and narratives during the bridge debate?  
 
In some respects, science underpins the debate about the Bonner Bridge replacement. The bridge 
design choice required knowledge of inlet and barrier island migration, the consequences of 
beach nourishment and maintenance efforts, long-term erosion forecasts, likely areas of future 
breaches, storm hazards, engineering capabilities, and the effects on terrestrial and aquatic 
habitats. Yet, for all the science around the bridge debate, it hardly merited a mention in the 
debate itself. The reason for this is simple:  the science is largely undisputed. The debate was not 
about the science, but about what conclusions should be drawn from the integration of scientific 
information with social, economic, and budget data.  
 
The bridge debate was political, not scientific; this shaped the coalitions’ narrative choices. The 
Long Bridge Coalition had a stronger scientific argument that barrier island migration would 
render the short bridge and long-term road maintenance efforts futile. Yet they did not explain 
the science behind this argument in their outreach materials. With the exception of one detailed 
newspaper guest commentary in 2010, the coalition addressed barrier island and inlet issues in a 
cursory manner, choosing instead to focus on political and economic issues. The Long Bridge 
Coalition discussed the environmental issues in the bridge debate with a kind of generic 
shorthand, using phrases like “erosion” and “habitat function” that would resonate with their 
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usual environmentalist constituency but would not communicate effectively with the lay 
audience they ostensibly sought to persuade. They reserved their detailed arguments for formal 
written comments on the EIS versions; even these comments addressed the sufficiency of 
NCDOT’s analyses rather than the underlying scientific arguments. The Short Bridge Coalition 
materials did not address scientific issues beyond an assurance that NCDOT’s engineering 
capability could adequately address island breaches and erosion. Table 7.2 shows both 
coalitions’ focus on political issues 
 
Table 7.2:  Coalitions’ Primary Narrative Issues 
 
Long Bridge Coalition 
 
Short Bridge Coalition 
 
 
refuge access 
barrier island concerns 
reliable transportation 
cost comparisons 
permitting concerns 
 
safe transportation 
length of planning process 
key transportation corridor 
economic impacts 
opponents’ motivations 
cost comparisons 
 
 
 
Contributions and Directions for Future Research 
 
This case study of the Bonner Bridge replacement demonstrates that a qualitative analysis of 
ACF coalitions’ narratives and strategies is a viable method for exploring how the interplay of 
agencies, interest groups, and the public may shape coastal management conflicts. When coastal 
management literature addresses policymaking, the focus is often on the effective exchange of 
information between scientists and decision makers. This research demonstrates that 
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communication between scientists and policymakers is only one part of the policy discussion. 
When a policy subsystem has active coalitions, they can effectively shape the public debate on 
an issue. Their goal is to put political pressure on a decision maker, who must consider not only 
the science but also the economic, social, and legal aspects of a policy.  
 
This case study focused specifically on ACF coalition strategies during and after an internal 
shock.  In general, ACF concepts were effective for tracking the evolution of the bridge debate, 
but the case study suggests that certain aspects of the framework need further development. 
Specifically, the ACF’s view of internal shocks and their role in policy change needs 
clarification. The 2003 long bridge proposal appears to have acted as an internal shock by 
upsetting the status quo and providing an opportunity for coalitions to shift the power balance; 
yet the sequence of events is the reverse of that suggested by the framework. The ACF suggests 
that a shock gives coalitions an opportunity to mobilize and produce policy change. Here, the 
potential policy change served as the internal shock, building on local social and economic 
undercurrents to trigger latent coalitions to become active to resist or support that change. This 
suggests that the current ACF formulation of internal shocks does not adequately explain 
situations like the bridge debate. This shortcoming could be resolved by broadening the 
formulation of internal shocks in the literature, perhaps by incorporating a variation on the MSA 
policy window.   
 
The disconnect between this case and the ACF may stem from the framework’s underestimation 
of legal and regulatory authority as a coalition resource. In recent years, there have been calls for 
the ACF to incorporate a hierarchy of coalition resources to acknowledge that some resources are 
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more powerful than others in influencing policy debates (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Nohrstedt 
2011). Such a hierarchy could inform a clearer approach to coalition strategies. Case studies, 
bolstered by the Punctuated Equilibrium and interest group literature, can be used to develop a 
list of general strategies likely to be used by coalitions. A coalition’s choices are shaped by the 
context and available resources, yet some strategies appear to be more effective than others in 
shaping a policy debate and influencing the outcome. While we cannot generalize from a single 
case study, the bridge project suggests that resources and strategies directed toward political or 
regulatory control of decision making are critical in a coalition’s effectiveness. In this case, it 
appears that one coalition “captured” the decision maker (Short Bridge Coalition – NCDOT), yet 
another coalition had access to “veto points” that weakened, and potentially negated, that 
advantage (Long Bridge Coalition – USFWS permits). Furthermore, this research suggests that 
resources or strategies directed toward mounting an effective political strategy should be 
prominent in any future hierarchy. Such a hierarchy must also acknowledge the power of the 
courts to impose a final decision over the objections of coalitions, scientists, politicians, or the 
public. 
 
This research project was originally designed to explore the intersection of the ACF and NPF. As 
the research progressed, the meso-level NPF was used more as a method of exploring ACF 
coalition strategies than as a separate framework. Elements of the NPF, including the story 
elements and depiction of winners/losers, were dropped as they did not appear to contribute to 
the analysis. This is not unforeseen in the literature, as Jones and McBeth (2010) note that one 
line of meso-level NPF literature has focused specifically on the strategic creation and use of 
narratives to shape coalition membership and influence the behavior of policy elites. Jones and 
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Radaelli (2015, 343) describe how the NPF has “contributed to, qualified and ultimately 
strengthened some popular theoretical lenses of the policy process, especially the advocacy 
coalition framework.” The question of whether this research used NPF as a method or 
framework suggests a fuzzy level of overlap between the meso-level NPF coalition strategies and 
the ACF. Perhaps one approach could be to adopt a variation of NPF narrative strategy analysis 
within a future ACF list of coalition strategies.   
 
This case study suggests that the NPF operationalization of Schattschneider’s (1960) conflict 
expansion/contraction is a viable means of assessing coalition narrative strategies. The bridge 
project deviated from the NPF literature by having two coalitions that both viewed themselves as 
losing. In part, this was due to the particular context, but Morris (2007) proposes an intriguing 
framework in which a coalition’s perception of itself as winning or losing is more fluid, changing 
in response to its opponent’s apparent gain or loss of power. Incorporating this concept into the 
NPF narrative strategies may provide a more dynamic approach to coalition strategies.   
 
The findings in this case suggest several avenues of future research. The clear distinction 
between the coalitions’ insider vs outsider strategies in the bridge debate could be further 
explored through network analysis. Such an analysis could further reveal coalition strategies by 
showing how coalition members used (or formed) relationships with influential political figures, 
academics, and media in the state. Another future analysis could supplement the existing 
database with interviews to explore whether underlying tensions between residents and outsiders 
(especially environmental groups) influenced coalition membership and level of participation. 
Finally, the findings on how both coalitions opted to discuss scientific issues using loaded 
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catchphrases rather than specific arguments could inform future research into the communication 
(or “marketing”) of scientific and risk information to lay audiences. 
 
Conclusion 
 
March 8, 2016 – It was clear, sunny day at Oregon Inlet when US Congressman Walter Jones 
stood on a podium for the groundbreaking of the Bonner Bridge replacement. Just over his 
shoulder loomed the same high-rise navigation span Deputy Thaddeous Pledger had raced over 
that stormy night 26 years earlier. The Congressman spoke of how important the new bridge 
would be to providing safe transportation for residents and the millions of visitors to Hatteras 
Island. These two different men, in very different circumstances, shared a similar concern – the 
threat to lives and safety if the bridge were to fall. 
 
A lot of water has flowed under that bridge over the years since the partial collapse. Preliminary 
planning for the bridge replacement had already begun in 1990, yet no one would have predicted 
that it would require 26 years, millions of dollars in environmental studies, and a federal lawsuit 
to get the first replacement piling driven into the inlet. This case study has explored the complex 
back-and-forth between agencies, coalitions, and the public over how to replace the bridge. The 
Long Bridge Coalition, using the permitting leverage of a federal agency, argued that the science 
was clear that the short bridge and NC 12 could not be maintained on Hatteras Island long-term. 
Their arguments focused on long-term costs, reliable transportation, and restoring normal barrier 
island migration. The Short Bridge Coalition relied on political influence and public 
mobilization, using emotion-driven appeals about the need to replace the bridge as quickly as 
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possible to protect the lives and livelihoods of residents and visitors. Ultimately, the Short Bridge 
Coalition’s political strategy won the debate.  
 
There are lessons that can be learned here about managing conflicts over coastal infrastructure 
projects. If coalitions of interested organizations and individuals get involved in a debate, coastal 
managers should listen closely to their narrative choices. Depending on the public and political 
response to those narratives, the winning argument may not be what scientists or professional 
coastal managers would expect. The Bonner Bridge case demonstrates just that. The long bridge 
proposal was grounded in a solid scientific assessment of erosion rates, cost projections, and 
regulatory requirements. Yet the final bridge decision was driven, at least in part, by powerful 
and personal accounts of residents driving over the Bonner Bridge with their windows rolled 
down so they would have a chance of escaping their vehicles if the bridge collapsed under them. 
Coastal managers should never underestimate the power of a good story.   
 
The first piling for the replacement bridge was placed near the spot where Deputy Pledger 
paused to pick up the crewman who climbed from the dredge Northerly Island that stormy night.  
Twenty-six years after part of the Bonner Bridge fell down, the replacement is going up.  
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 APPENDIX A: Coding Manual 
 
 
Narrative classification to identify NPF narratives: 
 
Narrative source:   
 
Is the narrative statement in a newspaper?  (Y/N) 
 If yes 
 Does the narrative statement appears as a quote or excerpt in a larger article? (Y/N) 
  If yes, classify as a “statement to media” 
  If no, continue to next step. 
 Does the narrative statement appear as a letter to the editor? (Y/N)   
  If yes, classify as “complete advocacy narrative” 
  If no, proceed to next step. 
 Does the narrative statement appear as a guest commentary? (Y/N) 
  If yes, classify as “complete advocacy narrative” 
  If no, proceed to next step. 
 Does the narrative statement appear to have been edited by a third party? (Y/N) 
  If yes, classify as a “statement to media” 
  If no, classify as a “complete advocacy narrative” 
 
 If no, proceed to next question. 
 
Is the narrative statement presented as part of an EIS/EA? (Y/N) 
 If yes 
 Is the narrative in written form submitted by speaker/author? (Y/N) 
  If yes, classify as written comment 
  If no, classify as oral comment (should be in transcript form) 
 If no, proceed to next question 
 
Is the narrative statement presented by an organization or advocacy group on a website or other 
forum that is not a newspaper? (Y/N) 
 If yes 
 Does the narrative statement appear edited or filtered through a third party? (Y/N) 
  If yes, consider under one of other categories 
  If no, classify as “complete advocacy narrative” 
 If no, proceed to next question 
 
Is the narrative presented as a press release or official statement?  If so, classify as “complete 
advocacy narrative” 
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First Coding Pass: descriptive emergent coding– derived from text of newspaper items 
 
wealthy vs taxpayers 
unnatural 
convenience 
barrier islands fragile 
dynamic environments 
battered by nature 
treacherous waters 
money on maintenance 
rising costs 
ferry capacity and cost 
flexibility 
ecological sensitivity 
storm overwash 
feasibility 
inlet shifts 
inlet stabilization 
reliable transportation link 
access to necessities 
evacuation 
economic/environ. Disaster 
environmentally disruptive 
efficiency 
construction cost 
development 
traffic volume 
road maintenance 
inevitable erosion 
temp vs permanent fix 
road relocation 
use of state highway funds 
deteriorating bridge 
safety 
sever bridge from road 
time to build 
politics vs planning 
stagnant process 
long-term effects 
erosion/bypass island 
upfront costs 
federal money in rural area 
practicality 
better for Refuge 
upfront cost = delay 
seeking donations 
runoff from bridge 
shellfish 
road in Refuge is key 
path of least resistance 
deferring trouble 
island collapsing 
cannot hold road 
nature will win 
character of Outer Banks 
bridge built, island lost 
pandering to business 
technological capability 
lifeline 
accelerating costs 
impractical 
road maintenance costly 
highway system fragile 
fight mother nature 
buying time 
throwing money away 
short-term vs long-term 
hazardous 
funding availability 
war with ocean 
habitat vs road 
livelihoods 
bridge life span 
as soon as possible 
mired in bureaucracy 
Refuge access 
environment vs people 
loss of recreational fishing 
doomed road 
taxpayer burden to maintain 
access 
road/groin removal 
bridge vs road durability 
long-term feasibility 
common sense 
utilities 
wildlife vs access 
nourishment vs natural 
loss of tourism vs access 
build quickly 
overdue replacement 
essential link 
utility costs for long bridge 
Refuge as private playground 
frustration 
problem plagued NC 12 
short-term thinking 
mired in controversy 
highway most serious question 
upfront vs long term cost 
nervous on bridge 
lifeline 
squandered funds on road 
long-term uncertainty 
realistic 
bridge to nowhere 
pay taxes – right to a road 
no good choices 
take care of road assets 
kicking can down the road 
patchwork 
repeated studies 
threat of lawsuits 
bureaucracy 
bridge wreck risk 
cost less 
access to N. Pea Island 
better for beaches/wetlands 
caved to political pressure 
importance to state 
DOT and key stakeholders 
bypass hot spots 
cumulative costs 
access as secondary issue 
bridge vs bridge and road 
road overwash 
short-sighted 
hazard in high winds 
discourage public use 
bridge may fall – death 
construction vs maintenance 
permitting issues 
mid-Currituck bridge funding 
groin removal 
access vs road maintenance 
startling costs 
long bridge safety issues 
unaffordable 
one agency stall for years 
dangerous delays 
use up decade of funding 
water pollution 
effect on fisheries 
impasse 
lives at risk 
needs of people 
which interests should win 
which is fastest 
affordable 
unnecessary risks 
constant threat of overwash 
turf war 
political posturing vs safety 
best vs most feasible 
cost as key 
due diligence on impacts 
gambling with lives 
obstructionist 
FHWA and DOT cause delay 
wildlife and habitat effects 
reliable and responsible 
protracted scrutiny 
save Refuge for appreciative 
road- continual repairs 
residents vulnerable 
perpetual construction zones 
political pressure 
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Second Coding Pass:  (NVivo) 
 
Basic Demographic Coding: 
 
•   Date:  code for year and policy phase that comment and/or item made, published, or 
released  
•   Speaker: code for category that speaker belongs to.  Use speaker’s self-identification 
and/or letterhead and address (if available) or context (if clear).  If unable to determine 
category, code as No ID 
o   Agencies – agency or agency personnel in official capacity 
o   Local officials – individual elected or appointed official or board/commission at 
local level 
o   Higher Politicians – individual elected or appointed officials at state or federal 
level 
o   Non-Governmental Organization – comments by or on behalf of an organization 
that is not a governmental entity 
§   sub-codes for most frequent organizations:  SELC, Defenders of Wildlife, 
Replace the Bridge Now, Build the Bridge Now  
o   Residents – resident or property owner of Dare County, NC or Ocracoke, NC 
o   Visitors – individuals from outside of Dare County, NC 
o   NCDOT – statements from NCDOT or employees 
o   Scientists – statements from professional scientists 
•   Forum:  code for source of comment or document 
o   Newspaper (by name) 
§   Editorial 
§   Guest Commentary 
§   Letter to Editor 
§   Blog 
o   Websites 
o   Public Comments 
•   Bridge Preference: code according to expressed position on which bridge should be built 
o   Long Bridge:  expresses preference for long bridge or explicit disavowal of 
parallel bridge alternatives 
o   Short Bridge:  expresses preference for any of parallel bridge alternatives or 
explicit disavowal of long bridge corridor 
o   Unclear:  does not express clear preference 
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Emergent coding and eight anticipated codes (from first pass) (see Table 3.3)  
 
 
Ten most frequent codes: 
 
•   safety: code for comments on the safety of the current bridge, the likelihood of harm to 
travelers, safety on NC 12, or safe travel on long bridge 
•   example: “My first concern is for loss of life and risk of serious injury that could 
occur near a bridge failure and the subsequent search and rescue operations.” 
 
•   time: code for comments about the length of planning process, age of bridge, urges to get 
bridge down, urges to avoid further delays from additional studies 
•   example: “Now we’ve waited seventeen years and it still hasn’t been replaced.  I 
mean we’ve looked at all kinds of things and studied it over and over. I got half a 
page here.  But the fact remains that you cannot google any other bridge in 
America that you can find that has been studied as much as this bridge has been 
studied and you want us to continue to study it again.” 
 
•   transportation:  code statements about the importance of NC 12 and bridge as a 
transportation link for residents and visitors 
•   example: “As the only land transportation route to Hatteras Island and as the main 
route to Ocracoke Island, the Bonner Bridge is vital to the residents of Hatteras 
Island and Ocracoke Island and to the economies of Dare and Hyde Counties.” 
 
•   reliability: code for comments about the reliability of a particular alternative for 
transportation, emergencies, storm evacuation, etc. 
•   example: “The concept from the beginning is that replacing the bridge at its 
current location would not meet the objective of providing reliable transportation 
between the two islands because if those areas overwashed or new inlets formed, 
you couldn’t get to the bridge.” 
 
•   Pea Island access:  code for comments about access to Pea Island, including fishing on 
catwalks and old Coast Guard station 
•   example: “But surfers, fishermen and birders would mourn the loss of road access 
between Rodanthe and the inlet.  Passing through the dunes and waterfowl of Pea 
Island National Wildlife Refuge, it is a vestige of the [old] Banks.” 
 
•   environmentalists and lawyers:  code for comments concerning the role or motives of 
environmental groups and legal groups  
•   example: “So many environmentalists have got involved and made this a monster.  
Enough is enough.” 
•   example: “While the lawyers at the Southern Environmental Law Center claim 
‘concern and sympathy’ for the people of the Outer Banks, their actions speak far 
louder than their words.” 
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•   economy: code statements on the economic importance of tourism to the county and 
individual livelihoods, the economic effects of NC 12 being open or closed to travel, and 
economic contribution of Dare County to state economy. 
•   example: “The residents of Dare County are aware of the vital part of the 
economic engine the bridge is to Dare, Currituck, and Hyde Counties.” 
 
•   cost:  code for any references to cost of either bridge; also include allegations about 
misrepresentation of costs; also include mentions of cost of road maintenance or bridge 
maintenance 
•   example: “The costs for a bridge of this length are so great that there is no 
reasonable expectation that the project could be funded now or for the foreseeable 
future.” 
•   example: “Carter said maintenance costs over 100 years have been estimated at $1 
billion.” 
 
•   barrier island processes: code comments discussing barrier island processes, including 
erosion, migration, overwash, dynamic environment, inlet movement, dredging, 
engineering options, etc. 
•   example: “. . . the phased approach foolishly assumes that the erosion rate will be 
regular and predictable and does nothing to address the constant threat of 
overwash on the highway.” 
 
•   agency influence:  references to USFWS, Refuge Manager, or other agencies’ roles in the 
decision, including agency positions and management goals; also include comments 
referring to an agency with undue influence  
•   example: “Bryant urged highway planners to look at a 17-mile route over the 
Pamlico Sound after making a case that . . . .” 
•   example: “I’ve watched with complete and utter disbelief as federal agencies and 
third party litigation oriented interest groups have crippled the permit process . . .” 
 
 
Less frequently used codes: 
•   common sense:  code for references to using “common sense” for bridge decision 
•   example: “I encourage all persons involved in the decision-making process to use 
some common sense and choose the best long-term solution even though it may 
be more expense of less politically popular.” 
•   design elements: code for discussions of specific design options, such as the Rodanthe 
terminus, short bridge NC 12 options, etc.  
•   example: “Working in phases would be costly and entail the use of 
“environmentally damaging methods,” such as building dunes, beach 
nourishment, and ongoing highway construction and repair through the refuge. 
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•   engineering options:  discussion of other engineering methods to hold NC 12 
•   example: “We seek aid in protecting current property boundaries from excessive 
beach erosion, using whatever means available (beach nourishment, beach 
structures – groins, stone revetments or gabions, and minimal low bridges where 
absolutely required.” 
•   environmental concerns:  code for both environmental benefits and harms, including to 
Refuge habitat and wildlife.  Environmental benefits: code for comments on how a bridge 
alternative will help or improve environment or natural processes other than barrier island 
processes.  Environmental harms:  code for statements about how a bridge alternative will 
harm environment or processes.   
•   example: “ . . . [long bridge] would benefit marine and estuarine dependent 
fishery resources that utilize the surf zone and nearshore habitats.” 
•   example: “. . .  a long bridge through a shallow sound and sensitive wetlands 
would run afoul of the Clean Water Act and cause far more environmental harm 
than keeping NC 12 where it is now, in the Refuge.” 
•   long-term vs short-term planning and effects:  code for comments discussing long-
term/short-term planning, or long-term/short-term effects 
•   example: “The only financially sound long-term option is to build the longer 
bridge, where the tides will not have such an impact on the foundation.” 
•   example: “I strongly urge you to . . . refocus on an alternative that will not push 
long-term costs on our children and grandchildren.” 
•   navigation and inlet:  code for comments on the importance of, or measures to maintain, 
the inlet and navigation channel 
•   example: “We’re hoping it’s going to reduce our dredging requirements and that 
we’ll keep a deep-water route coming through the inlet.” 
•   other:  code for comments that reappear but are too sporadic to need a separate code 
•   outsiders:  code for comments that state or imply that there is a different understanding or 
different goals between locals and outsiders 
•   example: “Why should people who don’t live here criticize us?  They have 
convenient ways to get to the rest of the world, and we don’t!”  
•   permitting:  code comments about likelihood of the project receiving permits or the legal 
requirements for aspects of the project 
•   example: “. . . are concerned that the state transportation planners have unrealistic 
expectations about the legality of the short bridge plan.  He said the group had 
repeatedly expressed concerns about the incompatibility of the phased approach 
with laws protecting wildlife refuges.” 
•   place attachment and heritage:  code for comments about emotional or sentimental 
attachment to area, including comments expressing appreciation for scenery 
•   example: “Our children love coming down to Rodanthe. We always called it our 
“little place of Heaven on Earth.”  
•   example: “This ride on 12 from my place of employment in Nags Head to my 
home in Avon is a joy every day.  I actually look forward to the drive to and from 
home.” 
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•   uncertainty:  code for statements about the uncertainty of erosion rates, island stability, 
etc.; also code for uncertainty due to lifespan of project and the adaptability of different 
alternatives 
•   example: “The choices that we are looking at today are the short and the long 
bridge plus variations that are actually 50 year choices and even possibly more.  
So the things that we have to, I think, keep well in mind is that in this process of 
time there are going to be huge changes in the environment. . . we need to have a 
plan which makes sense today and for the next bunch of years.”  
 
 
 
NPF coding (manual): 
 
Document ID: 
Document Year: 
 
Main Issues Discussed (list): 
 
Cost/Benefit Depiction: 
 
Costs:  code for any individual, group, place, or abstract noun (i.e. safety) that is depicted 
as being harmed or put at risk from plan 
 
Benefits:  code for any individual, group, place, or abstract noun (i.e. safety) that is 
depicted as being improved or benefitting from a plan 
 
Costs of Long Bridge (list):   
 
Benefits of Long Bridge (list):  
 
Costs of Short Bridge (list): 
 
Benefits of Short Bridge (list): 
 
Condensation Symbols/Policy Surrogates: 
 
Condensation Symbol:  a phrase or reference that would be familiar to a reader as short-
hand for a larger idea – i.e. “American Dream” – shrinks or reduces complicated concepts 
into simple, manageable, or memorable forms” 
  
Policy Surrogate:  linking a smaller issue with a large issue affecting many – i.e. 
windmills linked with energy independence and terrorism 
 
Does narrative use condensation symbols?  If yes, list. 
 
Does narrative use policy surrogate?  If yes, list. 
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